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Preface
As top down government ruling was often to take the blame for all ails of 
fisheries management, it came as no surprise that over time a shift towards 
more participatory fisheries governance became strongly advocated in the 
quest for a new fisheries management set up. Changing the interaction and 
roles of the state, the industry and society in fisheries management, and in its 
wake a change in role of science underpinning fisheries policy development, 
became pivotal in a search for fisheries management more effective, efficient 
and equitable in obtaining its economic, ecological and public goals. Dutch 
fisheries management had over the years seen the introduction of a number 
of more participatory policy arrangements. The question that came to mind 
was how will the Dutch system evolve in the coming years and how can the 
Dutch lessons be of use to others?
My journey started with a car ride during which I discussed this issue with 
Tuur Mol. And before I knew, it had been arranged: I was going to write a 
thesis on fisheries governance supported and supervised by Professor Tuur 
Mol and supported by Martin Scholten, Director of Wageningen IMARES. I 
am grateful to both of them for enabling this journey.
I want to thank all those individuals that have crossed my path in the last 
decade and shared knowledge, vision and experience on fisheries and its ma-
nagement with me, be it in the Netherlands, Brussels or anywhere else in Eu-
rope, from fishers, processors, traders and fishers’ organisation representa-
tives to administrators, managers and policy makers. Without your input and 
willingness to discuss this topic the research would not have been possible.
I like to thank all colleagues at the LEI fisheries research group, IMARES and 
ENP for providing me over the years with challenges and support. I am still 
grateful to Wim van Densen for back in 1984 having enabled two economics 
students to learn about fishery science, and 20 years down the line be around 
as a much appreciated colleague. Thanks to Marieke Verweij who on all of 
those Tuesdays in Wageningen was a very stimulating room mate and made 
discussing ‘fish’ fun. And Judith van Leeuwen who put me on track in getting 
it all started; and although it was not a race it was nice to simultaneously 
aim for the finish line. Alyne Delaney I thank for many discussions and the 
final English push. And of course all of the Marine PhDs at ENP who form a 
thought-provoking group of individuals, not that easily convinced of any idea 
you may come up with.
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A special word of thanks goes to my supervisor Jan van Tatenhove: to say it 
was motivating is not doing justice to the energy and fun we generated. Still a 
lot of new things on the horizon, so there is still a lot we can do together; but 
watch out where the Huskies go and don’t you eat the yellow snow.
I like to thank my ‘brother in arms’ Martin Pastoors; as Martin referred, we 
have from way back been a multidisciplinary twosome, but I may add, when 
together, a very inspiring perpetual generator of ideas. Let the Centre of Ma-
rine Policy be the start of something special.
A casual conversation at the photo copier made Bettina Bock walk into my 
life. The bearable lightness of being; thanks for immense support.
Finally, I like to thank my two daughters, Kyne and Loukie who, engaged in 
their own path of exploring the world, have been an example and inspiration 
for me over the years. And also ensured that during the two years of writing 
this thesis I had the weekends off and put my mind to other nice things in life.
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Introduction:
Dutch fisheries, management 
and the EU context
Chapter 1
Worldwide, fisheries are perceived to be in crisis as fish stocks have declined 
following a discrepancy between available fish stocks and the level of fishing 
effort deployed. The declining fish stocks lead governments to limit overall 
catches to a more sustainable level by setting up limitations on total lan-
dings, fishing effort and access, including vessel and gear restrictions, area 
closures and days-at-sea constraints. Catch limits are now widely introduced 
in the form of Total Allowable Catch (TAC). These limitations have led to an 
economically inefficient and overcapitalised fisheries, while pressure on the 
natural fish resource (van Hoof et al., 2007b) continues. The resource is not 
utilised in an optimal way. In addition, fishermen will always operate within 
the limits, and incentives, of the fisheries management framework, hence 
optimise operations within the given boundaries. Management frameworks, 
in turn, tend to induce their own adverse effects, for example discards under 
a TAC/quota regime.
Fisheries management today focuses on the sustainable use of marine re-
sources, with primary attention paid to  fish stock conservation. As such, 
conservation of the marine environment centres on the management of hu-
man activities, both terrestrial and out at sea, that impact the environmental 
status of the marine ecosystem. Fisheries activities are perceived in this as 
the most significant pressure interacting with ‘good environmental status’ 
(GES) as for example described under the EU Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). If an analysis 
of the management of human activities in the marine environment, in parti-
cular fisheries, is called for, then the North Sea presents an ideal case study 
because from a global perspective the North Sea is one of the areas where 
human impact is highest (Halpern et al., 2008).
For the North Sea, as well as for the European Union at large, national fis-
heries management is embedded in the wider EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). Established in 1983, the CFP provides a policy framework aiming at 
conservation of fish stocks together with a sustainable development of the 
fishing industry and a supply of fish produce to the consumers. In the current 
European debate towards the revision of the CFP in 2012 there seems to be 
a wide spread consensus that the CFP is not reaching its goals (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008).
Following the reform of the CFP in 2002, fisheries management has been 
redefined in terms of scope (from fish stocks to the more encompassing eco-
system) and partisanship (in terms of increased participation via the creation 
of Regional Advisory Councils). Utilisation conflicts, negative externalities, 
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and environmental degradation have increased, and the need for a compre-
hensive approach to ocean use management has become readily apparent to 
EU-decision makers (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). In 
addition, science based, government led top-down rule making has been at-
tributed as causing a loss of legitimacy of fisheries policy as science was not 
able to deliver the solid basis for policy development, nor was government 
able to deliver required results (cf. van Tatenhove, 1999; Arts and van Taten-
hove, 2004).
In fact, the perceived failure of marine management to deliver good envi-
ronmental status and discussions on the legitimacy, accountability and lack 
of stakeholder participation in fisheries policy have been the main drivers 
of the EU fisheries governance debate. Governance of fisheries, that is the 
sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage 
fisheries, has international, national and local dimensions. It includes legally 
binding rules, such as national legislation and international treaties, and it re-
lies on customary social arrangements and the institutionalisation of (econo-
mic) activities. Effective governance of those engaged in capture fisheries is 
vital for the optimal and long-term use of marine fisheries resources. Recent 
European Union reforms have included the development of new regional fora 
designed to enable stakeholders and scientists to deliberate together about 
the nature of the fisheries crisis and its possible solutions (Griffin, 2009).
The fisheries crisis is often attributed to the nature of open access of ma-
rine natural resources; a resource held in common, bound for overexploita-
tion. Hardin defined this dilemma as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 
1968) arguing that only state control could limit this drive for overexploitation 
(Berkes et al., 1989) by regulating access to the common property resource. 
While there is agreement that free and open access to fishing is not an option, 
there is still an ongoing debate about the most effective and equitable way 
of authorising access and allocating resources. The existence of overcapacity 
(a miss match between fishing capacity and available fishing opportunities) 
adds considerably to the pressure on governments and fishing authorities to 
agree to, for example,  larger quotas and a higher number of permits than 
otherwise tolerable for responsible and sustainable fishing. Restrictions to 
open access is an essential, though not always sufficient, condition for ef-
fective fisheries management. Rights, and institutions that surround these 
rights, need to create a set of incentives that encourage limiting fishing effort 
to what is consistent with the long-term optimal, sustainable productivity of 
the resource. But even where these types of rights exist, their enforcement 
is necessary.
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The future challenges in fisheries management and the effectiveness of fis-
heries governance rests on whether such institutions - that is, an agreed sets 
of rules - can be established and the practical arrangements to monitor and 
enforce rule compliance as well as coordinate and manage conflicting claims 
for access to resources and markets, can be made. The capacity to form ef-
fective management entities with authority over the whole sea area normally 
occupied by a fish stock is crucial to achieving effective governance of that 
particular stock or fishery. 
The set of rules agreed between states to govern the usage of global or e.g. 
EU fisheries resources also establishes a framework within which, at a nati-
onal level, fisheries management arrangements are made. National fisheries 
management is itself a nested institution, or set of rules, nested in a supra-
national or global system of governance. Where management is devolved to 
a local level, the institutions developed to manage the fisheries are nested, in 
turn, within national fisheries management arrangements. 
Recent trends in EU fisheries policy show that after some 25 years of fis-
heries management under the Common Fisheries Policy fishing capacity and 
fishing opportunities do not always tally and a great number of issues still 
needs to be addressed (cf. Commission of the European Communities, 2001, 
2009). One method of seeking improvement is through greater involvement 
of stakeholders in the process of developing and implementing the CFP. This 
includes the establishment of fora such as regional advisory committees in 
order to involve stakeholders more effectively in policy-making as well as 
the decentralisation of certain management responsibilities in order to ad-
dress local conditions and emergency situations. In this way the European 
community also responds to the increasing demand of the fishing industry 
and other stakeholders for greater transparency and openness in relation to 
fisheries policy making in Europe. But still, the crisis in fisheries is perceived 
to be imminent.
This thesis sets out to analyse the crisis in fisheries management from a 
governance perspective. The main question we will ask ourselves is how the 
perceived crisis in fisheries management emerged and how it is dealt with 
by the introduction of new management initiatives and institutional arrange-
ments such as regional fora and decentralisation. I will study how the gover-
nance of fisheries has been changing over the years and how this relates to 
wider changes in governance practices as for example in environmental po-
licy. Through this analysis I seek to develop insight into how the effectiveness 
of fishery governance could be improved.
Chapter 1
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Within Europe, the Dutch fisheries management system has, since the 1990s, 
been regarded as a best-practice model by the EU (Hentrich and Salomon, 
2006). In this timeframe there have been three significant innovations made 
to the system which illustrate new ways of problem solving in the Nether-
lands:  the implementation of tradable property rights (ITQs: Individual Trans-
ferable Quota), the introduction of co-management, and the introduction of 
covenants between state, industry and Environmental NGOs (ENGOs).  I 
therefore decided to use the Dutch fisheries and fisheries management as 
a primary case-study for analysing how the governance of fisheries has 
changed both since the introduction of the EU Common Fisheries Policy and 
through the development of new institutional arrangements. This chapter 
continues with a description of the characteristics of Dutch marine fisheries. 
Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to describing the Dutch and wider EU context 
of fisheries management. In section 5, I will analyse to what extent there is an 
imminent crisis in fisheries, either an ecological, economic or societal crisis, 
and how this relates to failing management of the natural resource. In section 
6, I will introduce the theoretical perspective used for analysing processes of 
fisheries governance. Finally, in section 7, I will detail the research questions 
that will be addressed in this thesis followed by the methodology used. The 
final section outlines the structure of the thesis.
1�1 The Dutch marine fisheries sector
Commercial sea fisheries in the Netherlands comprises two main fleets: the 
trawler fleet and the cutter fleet. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below, representing the 
composition of the Dutch marine fishing fleet in terms of number of vessels, 
engine capacity and turnover for the year 2007, illustrate that the cutter fleet 
is the largest segment in terms of number of vessels, capacity and turnover. 
Figure 1:  Composition Dutch marine fishing fleet in number of vessels, 2007
 (LEI Statistics, Series)
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The North Sea cutter fleet mainly trawls for flat fish and demersals such as 
plaice, sole, cod, whiting and haddock. The coastal fisheries consist of more 
regional-oriented fisheries for shrimp and mussels. The cutter fishery mainly 
consists of family owned businesses; most crew members operate under a 
‘maatschap’ or partnership contract, rather than as wage labourers, which 
makes them partners in a joint fisheries venture. The main markets for the 
cutter sector are Germany, France, Spain and Italy.
The Dutch pelagic freezer trawler sector consists of four ship-owning compa-
nies operating worldwide from the North East Atlantic, North Sea, Celtic sea 
area to the waters of Western Africa and South America.  The main targeted 
Figure 2: Composition Dutch marine Fishing fleet in engine capacity (‘000 Hp), 2007 
 (LEI Statistics, Series)
Figure 3: Turnover in million Euros of Dutch fishing fleet per segment in 2007
 (LEI Statistics, Series)
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species are herring, mackerel, horse mackerel, blue whiting and sardinella 
which are all sorted, frozen and packed on board. The ship-owning companies 
are integrated businesses which encompass catching, processing and trade 
of fish. The main markets for the pelagic sector lay outside Europe in Western 
Africa and the far and near East.
Over the years, the Dutch fisheries sector has become much more inter-
nationally oriented. Dutch shipping companies are owners or co-owners of 
German, French and British trawler fleets. Dutch ship-owners are also very 
active in countries outside the European Union. The Dutch cutter sector has 
business interests in many EU member states such as through the operation 
of reflagged ships and joint ownership.
The Netherlands is an important distributor of fish. The main outlet is the 
European market. Exports mainly consist of processed and deep-frozen fish. 
A quarter of all fish exported is landed by the Dutch national fleet; the remai-
ning three-quarters are imports. Eighty per cent of all fish is sold abroad which 
makes the Netherlands one of Europe’s few net exporters, countries whose 
fish exports exceed their imports. Hence, the Netherlands can be much better 
characterised as a fish trading nation than as a fishing nation.
The fish auction is the essential trade step between fish landings and the 
trade. The Netherlands has eleven fish auctions where fresh fish is traded 
weekly. Auctions play a role in sorting and quality assessment. 
Fish is often filleted, breaded, conserved or processed in one or another way 
before it is offered to the consumer. The Netherlands has approximately 400 
companies involved in such processing and further trading. The processing 
of flat fish, crustaceans and shellfish accounts for the major part of turnover. 
The processing of herring and other pelagic species account for 15 per cent 
of turnover of the processing industry.
According to Salz et al.(2008) the size of the Dutch cutter sector has steadily 
declined in recent years. In Figure 4 the development of the Dutch marine 
fishing fleet in terms of total number of vessels, total engine capacity and 
nominal and real turnover for the period 1995 – 2007 is presented. The figure 
clearly depicts this downward trend. As for the composition of the fleet (Figu-
re 5), the main reduction of vessels has been realised in the cutter segment. 
The other sectors remain relatively stable over time. This development has 
its roots in both biological and economic conditions, the main causes being 
deteriorating fish stocks and rising production costs.
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This development has a negative impact on the fishery communities, and the 
fishery value chain. The Netherlands has 23 municipalities in which marine 
fishery plays a role. In some municipalities the cutter fleet is an important 
employer.  However, in most of the other municipalities the contribution of 
the cutter fleet and the total local employment is less than 0.5%. Since 1995, 
employment in the supply sector has declined from 1,000 to 700 jobs, due to 
a smaller fleet and a decline in intermediary supplies. As a result of the lower 
fish landings and productivity growth, the number of jobs at the auctions has 
Figure 4: Development of Dutch marine fishing fleet in number of vessels, engine capacity, and 
total turn over in nominal and real (1990 = 100) terms over period 1995 - 2007 
 (LEI Statistics, Series)
Figure 5: Development of Dutch fleet per segment, 1995 – 2007 
 (LEI Statistics, Series)
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declined. Fish processing and trade provides employment at a reasonably 
constant level of 6,000 - 6,500 jobs (i.e. 5,200 FTEs in 2006), whereby a slight 
rise may have occurred over the years. The total number of jobs in activities 
associated with the fishery sector has remained fairly constant at around 
8,500 (Salz et al., 2008).
1�2 Organisations involved in Dutch fisheries 
 management 
Since 2009 the main government institution for fisheries management in the 
Netherlands is the Directie Agroketens en Visserij of the Ministerie van Land-
bouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (Directorate Agro-production chains and 
Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality). Under 
the auspices of the Minister, the Directorate is responsible for the develop-
ment and implementation of fisheries management schemes. The Algemene 
Inspectie Dienst (General Inspection Service) is the agency of the ministry 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the fisheries legislation. Wit-
hin the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality the Directie Natuur, 
Landschap en Platteland (the Directorate for Nature, Landscape and Rural 
Areas) has an influence on fisheries especially via the management objective 
for water quality through implementation of the European Water Directive.
The Ministries of Verkeer en Waterstaat (The Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management) and Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment) also 
have a direct, and increasing, bearing on fisheries management. Especially 
with EU environmental directives such as the Bird and Habitat Directives, 
Natura 2000, the Water Directive and most recently the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive, the primacy of implementation of the directives lies 
much more with the latter than with the Directorate responsible for fisheries.
The Dutch Fish Product Board is a ‘productschap’ or Commodity Board; un-
der Dutch law a productschap is a public entity bringing together enterprises 
around a common raw material, in this particular case: fish. All sectors in the 
industry are represented in the Product Board: the catching sector, aquacul-
ture, processing and trade on wholesale level, retail trade and trade unions. A 
productschap has an advisory function towards the government. In the past, 
the Fish Product Board has even played a role in the implementation and 
sanctioning of fisheries management such as in, for example, quota manage-
ment.
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Fisheries Producer Organisations (POs) were established in line with EU re-
gulations as early as 1971, originally with a role in the common organisation 
of the market for fishery products. Until 1986 only two POs were established 
in the Netherlands. During the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s 
with the establishment of the Dutch co-management system (see chapter 3) 
more POs came into existence. Since 1993, about 95 per cent of the Dutch 
cutter fleet are members of a PO (van Hoof et al., 2005).
Next to producer organisations the sector is also organised in two interest 
organisations: the Nederlandse Vissersbond (the Dutch Fishers Union) and 
the Federatie van Vissersverenigingen (the Federation of Fishers Associati-
ons). VinVis is a network established in 2000 which brings together women 
who share a concern about fisheries and the fishing communities. Sportvis-
serij Nederland (Sport Fisheries the Netherlands) is the organisation that re-
presents the interests of the sports fisheries. These organisations are linked 
to international umbrella organisations such as Europêche, the North Sea 
Women´s Network, and the European Anglers’ Alliance and are all members 
of the North Sea RAC (see below).
Next to the direct organisation at the level of the fishers there is an array of 
organisations involved in the processing and trade such as the Visfederatie 
(the Dutch Fish Federation, organisation of fish wholesalers), the Vereniging 
van Importeurs van Visproducten (The Dutch Association of Fish Importers) 
and the Verbond van de Nederlandse Visdetailhandel (the organisation of fish 
specialty shops). Also the fish auctions are in contact with one another and 
some partake in the European Association of Fishing Ports and Auctions.
A large array of Non-Governmental Organisations have a bearing on fis-
heries management, ranging from international operating organisations such 
as WWF, Greenpeace and the World Conservation Union (IUCN), local or-
ganisations embedded in an international network such as for example the 
Stichting de Noordzee (North Sea Foundation) embedded in the Seas at 
Risk network, and local organisations such as for example Vogelbescherming 
Nederland (Bird Protection), the Waddenvereniging (Wadden Sea Society), 
Stichting Wad (Wad Foundation) and Natuurmomnumenten (Nature Monu-
ments). Next to these Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) there are also other 
NGOs such as for example the Consumentenbond (Consumers organisation), 
the Marine Stewardship Council and super markets that play a role in the way 
fisheries and fisheries management is perceived and is evolving.
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1�3 The EU institutional context of fisheries 
 management
The Common Fisheries Policy was first established in 1983 (Council of the 
European Communities, 1983). Conservation of living aquatic resources is 
one of only five policy areas that is under the exclusive competence of the EU. 
Although the EU has exclusive competence, it is up to the member states to 
implement and operationalise the policy. 
Since 1983 the policy has undergone revisions every ten years; in 1992/93 
(Council of the European Communities, 1992) as well as in 2002 (Council of 
the European Communities, 2002) and the next major reform is scheduled for 
2012. Over the years the primary focus of the CFP has, alongside the general 
development in fisheries management worldwide, increasingly shifted from 
ensuring efficient fishing fleets and well functioning markets for fish products 
to that of conserving the resource base, with which the sector ultimately 
stands and falls (Gezelius et al., 2008). 
The formulation, adoption and implementation of EU fisheries legislation is 
a process involving a multiplicity of actors and institutions operating on va-
rious levels in the political system. The standard procedure of EU fisheries 
policy-making starts with a unit within the Directorate General for Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries (DGMARE), the relevant directorate-general within the 
Commission of the European Communities (Commission), drafting the legis-
lation. In this process DGMARE can incorporate, depending on the nature 
of the proposal, input from stakeholders and/or scientific bodies. The draft 
proposal is forwarded to the European Parliament. Once adopted according 
to the internal rules of the Parliament, the resolution - usually in the form of 
suggestions for amendments - is forwarded to the Council of the European 
Union. The Council receives the proposal from the Commission at the same 
time as the Parliament, and it is technically the Council that consults the Par-
liament. The Council is, however, not obliged to implement the Parliament’s 
amendments. The ministers in the Agriculture and Fisheries Council discuss 
the proposal and vote on it. Once adopted (possibly in a revised form) the 
proposal is passed on to the member states for implementation. Should dis-
putes on the interpretation of EU fisheries legislation arise, it is ultimately up 
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to make a ruling (Heg-
land and Raakjær, 2008).
The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) is 
the independent committee, appointed by the Commission, that advises the 
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Commission / DGMARE on matters where scientific knowledge is vital. The 
committee consists primarily of scientists with a background in marine bio-
logy or ecology, fisheries science, nature conservation, population dynamics, 
statistics, fishing gear technology, aquaculture, or the economics of fisheries 
and aquaculture (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a). STECF 
forms internal sub-groups, which can include experts from outside the STECF 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003).
The Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) is a consulta-
tive body set up in 1971 by the Commission to provide stakeholder input from 
European-level stakeholder groups and umbrella-organisations on fisheries 
matters. The mandate of the committee is to provide opinions and resolutions 
on fisheries issues and proposals emanating from the Commission. ACFA 
was reorganised in 1999 and 2004 and is currently organised with four wor-
king groups under it. The plenary committee consists of representatives of 
private ship-owners, cooperative ship-owners, employed fishermen, producer 
organisations, stock-breeders of fish, mollusc/shellfish stock-breeders, pro-
cessors, traders, consumers, environmentalists, and development organisati-
ons. ACFA is numerically dominated by representatives of the fishing industry 
(Hegland, 2006).
The recent establishment of the independent Community Fisheries Control 
Agency (CFCA) is an integral element in the progressive implementation of 
the 2002 reform of the fisheries policy framework. The objective of the CFCA 
is to strengthen the uniformity and effectiveness of enforcement across the 
EU territory. This should be done by assisting with the organisation of opera-
tional cooperation and coordination of monitoring and enforcement activities 
among member states (Council of the European Communities, 2005). The 
powers of the CFCA are highly limited and it is specifically stated in its legal 
foundation that the agency does not have the power to impose additional 
obligations on the member states besides those outlined in the basic regula-
tion of the CFP. Neither does the agency have any powers to sanction mem-
ber states (Council of the European Communities, 2005). 
The seven Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), set up under the CFP fol-
lowing the 2002 reform, are stakeholder fora consisting predominantly of 
representatives of the fisheries sector, defined as “the catching sub-sector, 
including ship owners, small-scale fishermen, employed fishermen, producer 
organisations as well as, amongst others, processors, traders and other mar-
ket organisations and women’s networks” (Council of the European Com-
munities, 2004: art. 1), which according to the legal foundation should have 
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2/3 of the seats. The remaining 1/3 is to be filled with representatives of 
other interest groups, including “amongst others, environmental organisati-
ons and groups, aquaculture producers, consumers and recreational or sport 
fishermen” (Council of the European Communities, 2004: art. 1). The RACs 
are primarily meant to function as advisory bodies towards the Commission 
but also the member states can draw on the RACs for resolutions. The RACs 
are also mandated to issue resolutions on their own initiative (Council of the 
European Communities, 2002). The Commission (or the member state autho-
rities) is not obliged to follow a recommendation from a RAC and, therefore, 
in practice the advantage of following a recommendation from the RAC will 
always be weighed against other preferences of those receiving the recom-
mendation. The RACs are either organised along specific sea areas, roughly 
corresponding to large marine ecosystems / regional seas (five RACs), or 
specific types of fisheries (two RACs ) (Council of the European Communi-
ties, 2004). 
1�4 A fisheries in crisis?
A common opinion about fisheries is that it is in crisis because of ecologi-
cal damage and low stocks, low economic returns and a failing management 
system. Here I will address this view of a fishery in crisis by briefly looking 
at the ecological stock aspects, economic returns, the public appreciation 
of fisheries and the managerial achievements. Again, I focus on the Dutch 
situation. 
1�4�1 Ecological crisis?
The most important stocks for Dutch fisheries are the flat fish species plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa; schol) and sole (Solea solea; tong) , the dermersals 
cod (Gadus morhua; kabeljauw), saithe (Pollachius virens; koolvis) and had-
dock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus; schelvis) and the pelagics herring (Clupea 
harengus; haring), mackerel (Scomber scombrus; makreel ), horse mackerel 
(Trachurus trachurus; horsmakreel) and whiting (Merlangius merlangus; wij-
ting). Based on LEI data (Taal et al., 2009) presented in Figure 6 below, we 
can see that in terms of total national quota in European waters the pelagic 
species form the bulk of Dutch catches. In terms of quantity, the flatfish spe-
cies and demersal species form a smaller proportion. 
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Based on ICES data (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 
2009) below, the development of the Spawning Stock (SSB; the part of the 
fish stock that is reproductive) and the Fishing mortality (F, proportion of a 
fish stock that is being caught in a fisheries) for several North Sea species 
relevant for Dutch fisheries is presented. Also in the graph the Precautio-
nary Biomass (Bpa) reference level is represented. The dynamics of exploited 
fish populations can be highly uncertain and the precautionary approach to 
fisheries management addresses such uncertainties (Richards and Maguire, 
1998). The status of fish stocks can be expressed relative to precautionary 
reference points. In Figure 7 below (based on Lassen, 2007) we see the re-
lation between the status of a certain stock’s biomass (B) related to the 
precautionary reference point (Bpa) and the limited reference points(Blim). A 
similar relation, not depicted here, is defined for the relating fishing mortality: 
the precautionary reference point (Fpa) and the limited reference points(Flim).
Figure 6: Dutch quota holdings of species for European waters 2008 data from 
 (Taal et al., 2009)
Figure 7: Biomass reference points 
 (after Lassen, 2007)
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In fact, when a stock’s spawning biomass is above Bpa one could say that the 
stock is in relative good shape. A stock below Blim is in dire straits. As such 
Bpa is the threshold value for the development of management measures. 
Fisheries management measures aim for a reduction of the fishing mortality 
in order to preserve the stock’s spawning biomass. Usually this is translated 
into a TAC or Total Allowable Catch for a given period, defining the part of a 
stock that is allowed to be removed.
In Figures 8 – 12 the development of the SSB and F for sole, plaice, haddock, 
saithe and cod in the North Sea is presented. Also the Bpa reference level is 
presented in the graph.
Figure 8: North Sea sole SSB and F, 1957 – 2008 
 (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2009) 
Figure 9: North Sea plaice SSB and F, 1957 – 2008 
 (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2009) 
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Figure 10: North Sea haddock SSB and F, 1963 – 2008 
 (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2009) 
Figure 11: North Sea saithe SSB and F, 1967 – 2008 
 (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2009)
Figure 12: North Sea cod SSB and F, 1963 – 2008 
 (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2009) 
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At face value the graphs above depict a number of issues. Currently, (figures 
for 2008), with the exception of cod, all species have a Spawning Stock Bio-
mass above Bpa and hence could be considered to be in relative good health. 
Also, we can see that for some stocks there is a clear development apparent 
in the biomass (for example the downward trend of cod since the 1960s) for 
others, such as sole, there is no clear trend. Also, noting fishing mortality for 
all stocks presented here, we can observe an overall downward trend from 
the 1990s. This trend, of course, tallies with the earlier presented downward 
trend in the Dutch fishing fleet in terms of number of vessels, fishing capacity 
and turnover.
Interpreting these graphical presentations should be done with caution. For 
example estimates of stocks become more vulnerable to statistical uncer-
tainty for the more recent years. Also a current upward trend may for several 
reasons alter in the near future. In addition, the observer tends to estimate 
the depicted development relative to the presented curve. For a large part 
of North Sea stocks there has been a notable increase in the stocks during 
the 1960-1970 period. In the Figure below, taken from van Densen and van 
Overzee (2008) the landings of the main demersal species of the Dutch fleet 
are presented. If we consider landings to be a direct reflection of stock sizes 
this graph shows that if one takes the 1970s as reference period, landings 
have after that period steadily declined and are now to be considered to be 
at an all time low. However, if one takes the 1950s as the starting reference 
period, landings over time have increased and after the 1970s decreased to 
earlier levels.
Figure 13: Dutch landings of demersal species form the North Sea, 1955 – 2006 
 (van Densen and van Overzee, 2008)
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Hence, although some stocks are well below the Bpa reference point, some 
other stocks are doing much better. Especially over the last ten years, fishing 
mortality (F) has been reduced across the board. However, a remaining is-
sue is at what level the target reference values should be set, which involves 
determining a reference period or reference state of the stocks. Also with 
the implementation of the Johannesburg agreed target of Maximum Sustai-
nable Yield (MSY) for stocks by 2015 (United Nations, 2002), the discussion 
remains, for example, on what MSY implies for stocks in a multi-species fis-
heries. And, with natural changes especially in a highly dynamic eco-region 
such as the North Sea, the maximum sustainable levels of individual stocks 
change over time as well as the species composition in the ecosystem.
1�4�2 Economic crisis?
The development of the crude oil price during the 2000s and the resulting 
increase of fuel costs have clearly shown the economic vulnerability of fishing 
fleets throughout Europe. Especially for fishing vessels operating towed ge-
ars, such as for example the Dutch cutter fleet, this was clearly demonstra-
ted. In the Figures 14 and 15 below some indicators for the economic perfor-
mance of the Dutch cutter fleet are presented. 
Whereas the average total revenue per vessel of the cutter fleet in nominal 
terms has increased in the 1990 – 2008 period, the real average total revenue 
has shown a downward trend over the period. Also the net result in real terms 
shows a steady decline over the period, although years of positive results are 
off set by years with negative results.
As illustrated in Figure 16, over the period 1990 – 2008 the costs for fuel 
and lubricants have steadily increased. As crew members fish in partnership 
and crew share is calculated based on expenses incurred1, labour costs are 
a share of the trip’s profit. Hence if the costs for fuel increase and the gross 
returns of a trip remain stable, the crew share and hence the remuneration for 
labour decreases. Consequently the wage per adult crew member has equally 
declined over the same period.
1 In Dutch fisheries crew members usually are not engaged as wage labourers but fish in part-
nership with the owner of the vessel. In the partnership contract the owner makes available to 
the partnership his vessel, gear and days at sea and quota allocation; the crew members make 
available their labour and skills. Crew remuneration is based on the crew share of the revenues 
of a fishing trip. The gross revenues of a trip are presented on the sale slip of the auction. From 
this gross revenue certain costs such as for fuel, hiring additional quota, handling and storing 
of the catch and auction costs are deducted. The remaining net revenues are shared between 
the owner (owner share) and crew (crew share) following a key determined in the partnership 
contract. The crew share is the remuneration for labour; the owner-share is a remuneration for 
the capital input in the partnership and, in case of a skipper-owner, a remuneration for labour.
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Figure 14: Dutch cutter fleet development in revenues (left axis) and net result (right axis), 1990-
2008, nominal average per vessel 
 (LEI, 2009)
Figure 15: Dutch cutter fleet development in revenues (left axis) and net result (right axis), 1990-
2008, real average per vessel with added linear trend lines over total period 
 (LEI, 2009)
Figure 16: Dutch cutter fleet development in costs of fuel and lubricants and of labour, 1990-
2008, real average per vessel 
 (LEI, 2009)
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Figure 17 illustrates a clear downward trend in employment and in fishing ca-
pacity (as measured in engine capacity in Horse power times number of days 
deployed in Hp-days). All the above indicates that the Dutch cutter fleet is, 
in economic terms, not doing very well. As a result of an imbalance between 
available capacity and fishing opportunities over time, the fleet diminished 
rapidly in size and level of activity  with the returns also showing a downward 
trend. In Figure 18 the steady decline in number of ships of the cutter fleet 
and a trend towards ships with lower nominal engine capacity is illustrated. 
The reduction of the fleet, among others through fleet restructuring, has ap-
parently not resulted in increased profitability of the remaining fleet.
Figure 17: Dutch cutter fleet development of employment (left axis) and fishing capacity in Hp-
days (right axis) 1990-2008 
 (LEI, 2009)
Figure 18: Development Dutch cutter fleet; number of vessels and average engine power, 1990-
2008,  
 (LEI, 2009) 
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1�4�3 Social crisis?
Societal aspects of fisheries can be found around the development of fishing 
communities and the public perception of fishing activities. The development 
of stocks and the development of the fleets has resulted in a severe reduction 
in fishing activity and the fish processing industry. For example, employment 
in fisheries, although also affected by external factors such as oil prices and 
other job opportunities, is affected by the catching opportunities available to 
a fleet. With stable employment comes demographic and economic strength, 
in its turn facilitating the development and stability of social structures and 
hence the stability of a given community (van Hoof, 2009). The amount of 
change a fishing community will undergo as a result of e.g. reduced catching 
opportunities and a dwindling fleet will depend on the reliance and resilience 
of fishing communities with regard to the fishing activities (cf. van Hoof, 2009; 
Hatchard et al., 2007; Hatchard et al., 2006). Reliance is here defined as the 
extent to which the social and economic circumstances of actors, busines-
ses, sectors and communities rely on fisheries and resilience as the extent 
to which actors, businesses and communities are able to adapt to changes in 
policy, the health of the stocks and market forces (Hatchard et al., 2006; van 
Hoof, 2009). 
The significance in economic terms of fisheries in the Netherlands is rather 
small and diminishing. Out of the 23 communities in the Netherlands with 
a significant cutter fleet the contribution to employment on average is less 
then 0.5% (Salz et al., 2008) and diminishing. In addition, wage opportunities 
in other sectors have seduced crew members to opt for other jobs. Also, 
the fish processing and trade industry in the Netherlands has increasingly 
become less dependent on national landings and more involved in internati-
onal trade flows. This diminishing significance of fishing and fishing related 
activities does have an impact on local communities, putting the social fabric 
in fisheries communities under pressure as fishing is becoming increasingly 
less important as source of income, employment, social network and identity.
As for the public perception of the fishing industry, a recent study commis-
sioned by the Dutch Ministry responsible for fisheries (Senster et al., 2009) 
concludes that in general the Dutch public has a very limited awareness of 
the fishing sector. Around 60% of the public has a neutral or no image of the 
sector whatsoever (Senster et al., 2009). About 10% of the citizens have a 
negative image of the fishing sector. The negative image is especially related 
to the perceived environmental impact of the sector due to overfishing, dis-
carding and harmful fishing technology.
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On the other hand there is an ambiguous image of fish as a product. The 
positive image of fish as being a healthy source of omega 3 and 6 fatty acids 
is strongly promoted by government. At the same time increasingly Environ-
mental NGOs (ENGOs) stress the negative impact of fishing and the failure 
of the fisheries management system. Increasingly ENGOs are invited to sit 
at the table when fisheries policy is being developed as can be illustrated by 
the coming about of the recent Dutch North Sea and Mussel covenants (see 
chapter 4).
In short, with a sector basically unknown by the wider public, a relatively small 
and further decreasing sector, and a public opinion fuelled by ENGOs being 
critical of the environmental impact of fishing, one could conclude that the le-
gitimacy of fish resource use by fishermen is overall critical. With civil society 
questioning fishers’ ‘license to produce’, and with fishing communities margi-
nalising and losing identity as a result of diminishing fishing opportunities and 
a dwindling feet, one could indeed speak of a social crisis in fisheries.
1�4�4 Management crisis!
Above I have painted a picture of the realm of fisheries being under pressure 
ecologically, economically and socially: some stocks are in good shape others 
are not; the Dutch fishing sector is under economic pressure and over time 
especially the cutter sector is diminishing, affecting the social fabric of fishing 
communities; moreover, public opinion calls for a use of marine resources that 
accounts for environmental impacts. Fisheries management apparently has 
not been able over the past decades to achieve its main objectives: sustaina-
ble utilisation, economic efficiency and equity in access to resources.
This we can note both at a national, Dutch level as well as at the European le-
vel of the Common Fisheries Policy, to which we now turn. The constant pro-
cess of redefining the CFP every 10 years, part of a predetermined process 
of evaluation, shows a permanent quest for new principles and tools to arrive 
at effective and legitimate natural marine resource management. If we take 
the current European Commission’s communication on the reform of the CFP 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009 p 8) the main problems of 
fisheries management in Europe today centre on:
- a deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity;
- imprecise policy objectives resulting in insufficient guidance for decisions 
and implementation;
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- a decision-making system that encourages a short-term focus
- a management framework that does not give sufficient responsibility to 
the industry;
- lack of political will to ensure compliance, and poor compliance by the 
industry.
The conclusion must be that the management system itself, both in its le-
gitimacy and underpinning by science as in its effective functioning (hence, 
its instruments and implementation) is being questioned (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2009). There may be discussion about the extent 
of the crisis in ecological, economic and social terms, but there is a general 
consensus that there is a serious problem with European and national fishery 
policies and governance.
1�5 Analysing fisheries governance
The ecological, economic and social crisis in fisheries has encouraged the 
reconsideration and reorganisation of European and national fishery policies 
and governance. It has, moreover, led governments to introduce new institu-
tional arrangements, among which participatory arrangements such as co-
management, voluntary agreements between public and private actors (co-
venants) and market based instruments such as property rights and ITQs 
(Individual Transferable Quota). This section will discuss the theoretical ap-
proaches that have recently been used to capture, analyse and explain such 
institutional changes. 
To find solutions for the above-mentioned crises, governments, but also mar-
ket parties and civil society actors, have looked for alternative ways to reach 
fisheries policy goals. A central question is whether new fisheries manage-
ment institutions can be established and practical arrangements be made in 
order to coordinate and manage conflicting claims for access to resources 
and markets. In section 1.5.1, I give an overview of the general governance 
debate. In sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3, the fisheries governance literature is dis-
cussed in relation to the general governance debate. This provides the back-
ground and building blocks for my approach to analysing new fisheries gover-
nance arrangements, such as co-management, ITQ’s and covenants (1.5.4).
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1�5�1 The governance debate 
The concept of governance has not only become tremendously popular among 
social scientists (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Treib et al., 2007; 
van Leeuwen, 2010) but also in the realm of (European) fisheries. Changing 
the governance of fisheries management is perceived as an important way 
forward to overcome the deficiencies of the current system (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2001b, 2007, 2008). However, the use of the 
concept of governance is not univocal (see for example Kjaer, 2004; van Kers-
bergen and van Waarden, 2004; Rhodes, 2007, Treib et al., 2007). 
In general, governance refers to ‘‘sustaining co-ordination and coherence 
among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as 
political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transna-
tional organisations’’ (Pierre, 2000). In this sense, ‘governance’ explores the 
changing boundary between state, market and civil society, referring to either 
a new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule, or the 
new method by which society is governed (cf. Rhodes, 2007). For example, 
Kjær (2004), Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004), Treib and colleagues 
(2007) and Rhodes (2007) give extensive overviews of the governance de-
bate. Kjær discusses governance in the political science sub-disciplines of 
public administration and public policy, in international relations, European 
Union governance, governance in comparative politics, and good governance 
as extolled by the World Bank. Rhodes (2007) focuses on governance as go-
verning with and through networks. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden distin-
guish the following forms of governance: Good governance (see also Isham et 
al., 1997; Commission of the European Communities, 2001a; OECD, 2005); 
Governing without government I: International relations; Governance without 
Government II: Self-Organisation (see also Symes, 2006; Rhodes, 2007); 
Economic Governance (with and without the state): Markets and institutions; 
‘Good Governance’ in the private sector: Corporate governance; ‘Good Go-
vernance’ in the public sector: New Public Management; Governance in and 
by networks I: in general; Network Governance II: Multi-level governance; 
Network Governance III: Private – From hierarchies to networks (see also 
Sbragia, 2000; Jordan, 2001; van Tatenhove, 2003).
The common thread among these strands of literature that use the term go-
vernance is that they all describe and analyse ‘shifts in governance’ albeit at 
different levels and in different sectors of society. They all have a common 
concern for the problems of governability, accountability and, hence, legiti-
macy associated with ‘shifts in governance’.
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1�5�2 Three general models in fisheries governance 
The debate and literature on fisheries governance partly draw upon this ge-
neral governance literature, but has also developed along particular lines, 
classifications and arguments. According to Symes (2007), the institutional 
and governance frameworks for fisheries take on unique characteristics in 
relation to the common-pool nature of the resource and with respect to the 
need for collective bargaining in the management of shared stocks. 
A mainstay in the fisheries management discourse for decades has been Har-
din’s analysis of common pool resource use and its pursuing Tragedy of the 
Commons (Hardin, 1968), leading governments worldwide to embark on a 
top-down state management of fisheries in order to counter the perceived 
crisis in fish resource use (cf. Arnason, 1993; Jentoft et al., 1998; Arnason, 
2009b). In this perspective fishermen are perceived as simply strategic, ra-
tional, atomistic players; and due to open access, overfishing is perceived 
as a typical example of market failure as fishing involves subtraction due to 
the fact that fishermen are drawing from a common resource pool where no-
one has property rights. Therefore, the costs of overfishing are not interna-
lised in transactions but treated as an externality. This eventually leads to the 
well-known ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Jentoft, 
2000).
In order to resolve the tragedy of the Commons three fundamental models 
have been developed: 
(1) A hierarchical governance model with Hobbes’ Leviathan-like strong pre-
sence of government in fisheries resource management in which centra-
lised, hierarchical, ‘command and control’ forms of management are sup-
posed to safeguard sustainable fish stocks (cf. Hobbes, 1651; Jentoft et 
al., 1998);
(2) A market-based governance model, originally based upon the rational 
choice ideas and theories in which property rights, such as individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs), through a process of individual calculation of 
self-interest and the use of markets maximise economic returns and pro-
mote optimal economic efficient use of the natural resources (cf. Arnason, 
1993, 2009a; Kelleher et al., 2009); 
(3) A participatory governance model based on the school of collective action 
in which communities are perceived to be able to play a pivotal role in re-
source management. 
Gray (2005b) and also Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) distinguish between the 
theoretical foundations and practical implications of the three main modes of 
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fisheries governance. Whereas for hierarchical governance legitimacy lies in 
the formal system of parliamentary elections, the essence of legitimacy in the 
participatory mode lies in the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making, 
though the nature and extent of that involvement will vary from one type of 
participatory mode to another (Gray, 2005b). Although both market gover-
nance and participatory governance employ against hierarchical governance 
the argument that fisheries, ecosystems and regulations are too complex for 
government to manage alone, they draw different conclusions (Gray, 2005b). 
Market governance argues that only the market can provide solutions (cf. Ar-
nason, 2007; Kelleher et al., 2009), whereas participatory governance argues 
that only the collective knowledge of all affected parties can deliver answers. 
Much of the blame for the current fisheries management crisis is levelled 
at the ‘top down’ or hierarchical mode that characterises ‘conventional’ ma-
nagement systems (Gray, 2005b).
In the rudimentary ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ model, open access is the root 
problem. The way to avoid the destruction of the resource is to institute some 
set of rights, which can attach to individuals, groups, communities, or to the 
state, that does away with open access (cf. Arnason, 1993, 2000, 2001, 
2009a). Most resource economists are in favour of private property solutions. 
Yet these solutions may accelerate the formalisation of the forms of property, 
further disembedding the resource from its social and cultural context (the 
community; LvH), and further reducing the social capital and ecological flexi-
bility needed for effective management (Jentoft et al., 1998). Jentoft further 
argues that by lifting out management tasks from the community to a distant 
bureaucracy, social solidarity within the community is eroded and as a conse-
quence fishermen turn to behave like the rational, a-social, atomistic actors 
as described by Hardin, in fact turning the tragedy of the commons theory 
a self-fulfilling prophecy (Jentoft et al., 1998, Jentoft, 2000). Rhodes (2007: 
1251) concludes that we should not write the history of the 20th century as 
a battle between collectivism and the free market, because they ‘advanced in 
tandem at the expense of other more traditional social arrangements such as 
philanthropy, the family and the local community’. Where Rhodes and Jentoft 
concur is the fact that during the 20th century gradually the local community 
has been pushed out of the governance equation, and hence Jentoft’s call 
(Jentoft, 2000) to bring back in the community into fisheries management.
Bringing community participation in allows for another possibility to describe 
the shift in fishery governance. By contrasting ‘governance’ with ‘govern-
ment’ the development towards a more informally-based, decentralised, sha-
red, collective and inclusive decision-making structure, with multiple levels of 
engagement, is illustrated. Hence governance is about extending decision-
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making outwards to embrace a wider public in which if government is founded 
on consent, governance is founded on consensus and a governing state that 
has been replaced by an enabling state that governs to a large extent by 
co-ordinating and facilitating other powerful actors in society (Gray, 2005b). 
Several authors describe the shift in fisheries governance as the inclusion of a 
broader range of stakeholders and interactions (Kooiman et al., 2005; Mahon 
et al., 2010).
1�5�3 The logic of interactive and participative fisheries governance
Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) perceive governance as a hierarchical system 
in which there are those that govern (the governors) and those that are go-
verned. Separating out the system-to-be-governed and the governing system 
allows us to understand that the governing system is a social system made 
up of institutions and steering mechanisms. The system-to-be-governed is 
partially social and partly natural, consisting of the ecosystem and its re-
sources as well as the system of users of the resources and stakeholders 
(Jentoft et al., 2007). It reflects the fact that we are in fact trying to analyse a 
complex socio-ecological system in which ecological, economic and societal/
political sub-systems interact; these systems are, moreover, characterised by 
competing claims on resource use and conflicting perceptions by governors, 
resource users and stakeholders of the aim of the management thereof (cf. 
Jentoft et al., 2007; Arnason, 2009a, b; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009).  
This complexity of the system brings to bear questions on the governability 
of marine resource use and what a governing system can possibly do. Limits 
to governability can be found in both the governing system and the system to 
be governed (Chuenpagdee et al., 2005; Kooiman and Bavinck, 2005; Kooi-
man and Chuenpagdee, 2005; Jentoft, 2007). Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) 
argue that governability is shaped by diversity, complexity and dynamics of 
the (marine) system. To this can be added the vulnerability of the system 
(Jentoft, 2007), the resilience of the system, the dependency of a community 
on fishing and fishing related activities and the flexibility of the community to 
deal with outside induced changes (Lindkvist, 2000; Phillipson, 2000; Symes, 
2000; Hatchard et al., 2006b; Hatchard et al., 2006a; Hatchard et al., 2007).
In such framings top-down management is perceived not to be adequate or 
capable anymore to govern fisheries effectively. This is related to the mere 
complexity of the marine socio-ecological system – as there is no one single 
root cause problem to address but a complex system of causes and effects 
perhaps even stemming from outside the specific system. But it also relates 
to the perception that the existing knowledge of the functioning of ecosystem 
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and social system may be less than sufficient, that proper management tools 
may be lacking, and some realms of the system-to-be-governed may be out of 
its reach if, for instance, the users resist interference in their activities (Jen-
toft et al., 2007). This inability to govern would be a major cause for the failure 
of government to address the complex problems and would urge for opening 
up to more participative, inclusive and deliberative forms of management.
The shift to more open forms of participative governance and the broadening 
of representation has become fashionable during the last decade, partly be-
cause of dissatisfaction with the performance of fisheries management sys-
tems across the world; partly because of the increasing interest in the notion 
of ‘governance’ as a substitute for ‘government’ in a variety of policy sectors; 
and partly because of the growing popularity of the concept of stakeholder 
participation in all areas of governance and decision-making (Gray, 2005b). In 
fisheries governance this has resulted in a variety of new governance models 
and concepts that focus on interaction and participation, such as adaptive co-
management2 (Armitage et al., 2009) and interactive governance Kooiman et 
al. (2005). Interactive and participatory governance models depict governing 
systems as complex, heterogeneous networks, as political coalitions of more 
or less numerous and powerful stakeholder groups, who are partly internal 
and partly external to the system. Goals are not given ex ante and once and 
for all, but are relative to, and shift with, particular stakeholder compositions 
and interactions among stakeholder groups (Jentoft, 2007). These models 
work on the assumption that each group has interests to defend and contribu-
tions to make and the negotiation of conflict and the building of compromise 
or consensus are central. Consequently, governance is not so much about 
the exercise of authority as about political brokerage (Jentoft, 2007). Also, 
this means that the governing system is intrinsically unstable and dynamic. 
Governability would therefore be an outcome of an ongoing socio-political 
process that may break one way or another, depending on the relative bargai-
ning power of stakeholder groups, individually or by coalition, at a particular 
point in time (Jentoft et al., 2007).
1�5�4 Analysing new governance arrangements
Based on the discussion of fisheries governance this section will introduce 
the theoretical context that will be used in this study to analyse the cases 
studied. Focus will be on the fisheries governance system which is defined as 
2 Adaptive co-management is based on merging the concepts of adaptive management and 
co-management, resulting in a flexible system of resource management, tailored to specific 
places and situations, supported by, and working in conjunction with, various organisations at 
different scales (Armitage et al., 2009).
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the sharing of policy making competences in a system of negotiation between 
nested governmental institutions at several tiers (international, (supra)natio-
nal, sub-national) on the one hand, and state actors, market parties and civil 
society organisations involved in different maritime activities on the other 
(cf. Symes, 1997; Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004; Gray, 2005b; Gray, 2005a; 
Kooiman and Bavinck, 2005; Kooiman et al., 2005; Symes, 2006; Jentoft, 
2007; Jentoft et al., 2007; Symes, 2007; van Tatenhove, 2008; Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee, 2009).
However, because in fisheries policies “governance” and “management” are 
commonly used interchangeably (Raakjær, 2008), it is first important to make 
a clear distinction between these two concepts in order to be able to analyse 
fisheries governance. We make a clear distinction in the discussion between 
the content of a policy, its measures, implementation and enforcement on 
the one hand, and the dynamics of the policy making process on the other, in 
order to analyse whether the underlying cause for policy failure is related to 
the implementation of a policy (management) or the process of developing 
the policy (participation, rules). I follow Jentoft (Jentoft, 2006) in defining 
governance as the broader concept, inviting a more reflexive, deliberative 
and value-rational methodology, and distinguishing that from the instrumen-
tal, means-end oriented management concept.
A combination of multi-actor and multi-level governance and the mix of both 
‘old’ and ‘new’ types of governance (Sbragia, 2000) is characteristic of fis-
heries governance. As a result, a diversity of fishery policy arrangements 
has emerged, ranging from corporatist to (transnational) participatory ar-
rangements. Hence, we have to analyse and understand the chronological 
and synchronic development of different modes of governance, and their co-
existence. The analytical concept of policy arrangements will be applied to 
do so. A fishery policy arrangement can be interpreted as the ordering of the 
fisheries policy domain in terms of coalitions, resources, rules and discourses 
(Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004). These policy arrangements stretch across 
different layers of government, and both besides and within the formal cir-
cuits of policy-making3. 
Fisheries policies are prepared in a way that resembles neither traditional 
international politics nor policy making by nation-states. With the concept 
of multi-level governance it is possible to capture the shifting locus of go-
3 The institutionalization of these arrangements is the result of processes of structural political 
and social change (political modernisation) and problem-oriented renewal of policy making by 
agents in day-to-day practices (policy innovation) (Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004).
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vernance from the traditional state level to sub-national and supranational 
levels. More specific, it points at the sharing of policy making competencies 
in a system of negotiation between nested governmental institutions at se-
veral levels (supranational, national, regional and local) on the one hand, and 
private actors (i.e. ENGOs, producers, consumers, citizens, scientists) on the 
other (van Tatenhove, 2003).
As for the actors and their participation in the governing system, the chan-
ging role of governors, resource users and stakeholders will be a pivotal part 
of the analysis. The most prominent factor I will look at is how participation 
of the different actors in the policy processes and arrangements is changing. 
This is related to which actors can participate in the policy process, and how 
and to what extent these actors can and do participate. The forms and de-
grees of participation of different actors in (new) institutional fisheries arran-
gements relate also to the outcome of the policy processes, in terms of direct 
outcomes (rule compliance and reaching set objectives) but also in terms of 
legitimacy and accountability.
1�6  Research question
As presented in section 4 above, fisheries management Worldwide, in the 
EU and in the Netherlands can be depicted as being in crises. In ecological 
terms, as some stocks are not in good shape despite management effort, in 
economic terms as a large part of the fleets is not profitable and in societal 
terms as public criticism on fisheries practices is increasing. Moreover there 
is a perceived managerial crisis in fisheries management as it fails to reach its 
set goals and lacks legitimacy and accountability.
As a response to this state of fisheries management over the past decades a 
large array of new initiatives has been deployed. I will mention a few of these 
new initiatives. In the Netherlands a system of ITQs and co-management 
has been introduced and over recent years, covenants are increasingly de-
ployed as institutions to achieve fisheries management goals. Science and 
the sector are increasingly cooperating in the collection of data and fisheries 
advice given by, for example, ICES and by IMARES (the Institute for Marine 
Resources and Ecosystem Studies, the main supplier of Scientific Support 
to Fisheries policy in the Netherlands) is increasingly made more open and 
transparent. The introduction of the Fisheries Innovation Platform (Visserij 
Innovatie Platform VIP) and the Kenniskringen (Fishers’ Study Groups), cen-
tring on innovations in the fisheries sector, bring industry and science toge-
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ther in a new constellation, especially with central government relinquishing 
its top down management role for a more enabling role at a distance.
At the EU level, under the 2002 reform of the CFP, RACs have been esta-
blished and more recent marine environmental legislation such as the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive has been introduced. The current CFP reform 
debate centres on improvement of the performance of fisheries management, 
by increased co-operation between sector and research, regionalising of ma-
nagement, increased participation for example through institutions like RACs, 
co-management and result based management.
In short, it may be concluded that different alternative institutional arrange-
ments have been developed in fisheries management in the past decades in 
order to counter the failure of fisheries management, and to live up to the 
desired policy objective of an economically, ecologically and socially sustai-
nable fisheries. This study aims at understanding how and why certain inno-
vative solutions were selected and how and why they functioned more or less 
satisfactorily. In doing so it seeks to understand the innovation of fisheries 
management from a governance point of view. The central questions in this 
research are the following: which new institutional arrangements have been 
developed to cope with the deficit in fisheries management, how and why 
did these new arrangements emerge, what have been the results and how 
do these new institutional arrangements relate to the current debate on a 
sustainable future fisheries governance?
In order to focus the analysis of changes in the governance set up of fisheries 
management I will centre on the development of fisheries governance in the 
Netherlands since the introduction of the EU Common Fisheries Policy in 
1983. In the analysis, the focus is mainly on the institutions in Dutch fisheries 
management, and how these institutions developed over the past decades 
as examples of new policy arrangements and the change of a former neo-
corporatist system. 
The data for the analysis were obtained through extensive observations and 
interviews with the major players from the fishing communities, fisheries or-
ganisations, fishers, RAC members, Dutch and EU policy makers and the 
NGO community. The core of the study is based on some 10 years of partici-
patory research, observations and interviews, both of the Dutch and EU fis-
heries and marine management system in the position of researcher of Dutch 
and EU fisheries policy and management. As such this study is a reflection on 
years of research and a re-interpretation of earlier findings combined with ad-
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ditional interviews with key actors in government, industry and NGO commu-
nity. In Annex I an overview of relevant implemented research is presented.
1�7  Structure of the thesis
In the chapters 2,3,4 and 5 I present the different case studies. Case 1 deals 
with the introduction of Individual Transferable Quota in the Netherlands. 
Case two focuses on analysing the Dutch system of fisheries co-manage-
ment. Case 3 centres on the use of covenants in fisheries management and 
case four looks at the introduction of EU marine policy.
In cases 1 I analyse the introduction of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs) 
in the Netherlands which occurred in the early 1990s. The introduction of 
ITQs was the introduction of a management instrument which simultaneously 
functioned as an environmental instrument, limiting catches, as an economic 
instrument, seeking optimal allocation of fishing capacity over fishing oppor-
tunities. Individual Transferable Fish Quota are perceived as a rights based 
fisheries management system that can effectively steer fleets away from 
overcapacity and overexploitation towards more sustainable fisheries. I will 
use the case of the management of the Dutch North Sea Beam trawl fisheries 
to explore the effect of the introduction of such a marked-based instrument 
and will translate these experiences to the current debate on the reform of 
the EU Common Fisheries Policy, which has an angle on rights based ma-
nagement. The questions I will seek to answer is: did the introduction of a 
marked-based instrument result in obtaining environmental objectives such 
as reduction of fleet capacity and total catches? How did the introduction of 
the ITQs affect the existing fisheries management institutional setting? And 
would such an instrument be applicable to other settings as well?
The second case, the introduction of the co-management system, can be per-
ceived as an attempt by the Dutch government to increase the legitimacy of 
the management system and compliance by devolving management respon-
sibility to the sector through the establishment of partnerships. This deve-
lopment in the early 1990s in the Netherlands is set opposite to the recently 
inaugurated EU Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA). I will use the 
Dutch fisheries co-management system to analyse whether such an insti-
tution can be instrumental in overcoming the perceived failure of fisheries 
management Worldwide. The development of partnerships between govern-
ment and market actors will be used to analyse the increase of legitimacy and 
compliance. The question is how does a governance-type solution, such as 
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co-management, relate to a government-oriented solution such as the CFCA, 
and can a partnership between government and the market, as in co-manage-
ment, serve as an alternative to direct government enforcement?
The use of covenants presents case 3. This, like the co-management sys-
tem, centres on a system of devolved management. But where co-manage-
ment is founded on cooperation between state and the industry in managing 
a fisheries, covenants usually are based on a specific voluntary agreement 
between two or three of the actors of state, market and civic society (NGOs). 
Covenants are frequently used to obtain environmental objectives, especially 
when government policy fails to obtain results. Also covenants are applied as 
instrument in a pacification attempt of government and effort to mobilise sup-
port for policy. The questions I will raise here are what is the role and function 
of covenants in Dutch fisheries management? What was the trigger for ap-
plication of this instrument? And what are the results obtained?
Finally, case 4 looks at the development over the past decade of new EU 
marine policies such as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the 
Maritime Policy. Both policies aim at governing the marine environment, yet 
the two policies have a differing signature in policy formulation and imple-
mentation. From a fisher’s perspective these policies present a change in 
institutional setting in terms of integration as well as participation. Major 
policy measures no longer descend from the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
alone, but increasingly are derived from general environmental policy deve-
lopments. The questions raised are how these different policy arrangements 
affect fisheries management and how these new policy arrangements frame 
participation and compliance in marine resource management?
In chapter 6 I will draw conclusions. Reflecting on the experiences in the Ne-
therlands and their significance for the EU context, I will try to postulate an 
outlook on how an institutional governance set up in the fisheries could deve-
lop in the future and how its legitimacy and effectiveness could be improved.
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For the fishing industry, the combination of high levels of uncertainty and 
a lack of assurance about their rights to resource use encourages a race 
for fish. The race creates an incentive to emphasize short-term gains and 
deemphasizes long-term incentives for stewardship (Hanna, 2001).The core 
question in fisheries management, as in other environmental and resource 
dilemmas, is how to bridge the gap between private decisions and societal 
and environmental impacts. Following Libecap (2009), the disparity between 
private and societal costs and benefits of exploitation of fish stocks results 
in externalities: harmful effects to third parties, in this case: overfishing. The 
absence of information about an alternative resource use (opportunity costs) 
results in a wasteful misallocation of resources (Libecap, 2009).
The resulting declining fish stocks have led governments over the years to 
deploy traditional government top-down measures, such as limiting overall 
catches by setting limits to total landings, fishing effort and access, including 
vessel and gear restrictions, area closures and days-at-sea constraints. The-
se limitations have led to an economic inefficient and overcapitalised fishery4 
and, still, a remaining pressure on the resource. 
In order to overcome the inconsistency between fish stocks and capacity, pro-
perty rights have been introduced in some fisheries through the allocation of 
catch quotas. A major intended effect of quota management is the creation of 
economic incentives for owners of vessels to decrease their inputs of labour 
and capital to a fishery and to use the resource in an efficient, sustainable 
way (Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas, 1999). Transferable 
license and quota systems are the only recognised systems that effectively 
create exit strategies in the industry where the participants themselves ad-
just catch and processing costs to the potential income from the available 
quota (Trondsen, 2004).
Within the current debate in the European Union on the upcoming reform 
of the Common Fisheries Policy, rights-based management tools in fisheries 
have again been put on centre stage (Commission of the European Commu-
nities, 2007a, b, 2008a). Worldwide, marked-based governance instruments, 
such as transferable quotas, are increasingly being deployed by governments 
(Stavins, 1998, 2002) in order to mobilise the market in obtaining environ-
mental policy targets.
4 In case of overcapitalisation a smaller fleet (in terms of vessels and employment) could pro-
duce the same amount of fish and in a more efficient way (Brandt and McEvoy, 2006).
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In this article the case of Individual Transferable Fisheries Quota, as used 
by the Dutch government in managing the North Sea beam trawl fisheries, 
is used to assess whether controlling access to a fishery trough the priva-
tisation and marketisation of catch rights creates sufficient incentive for a 
reduction of input of labour and capital to a fishery and to use the resource 
in a more efficient, sustainable way. In section 2 I will look at the principles of 
privatisation and marketisation as options for government to deploy market-
based governance and economic incentives in environmental policy. In section 
3 I will look more closely into the principles of tradable fishing rights. In sec-
tion 4 I will describe the history of the Dutch system of fisheries management 
by using ITQs and analyse the effect (section 5) and impact of the system 
(section 6). Finally I will draw some conclusions and discuss the applicability 
of tradable fishing rights at an EU scale.
2�1 Fisheries and the neo-liberal paradigm as mode 
of governance
The fundamental question in natural resource utilisation in a market context 
is the occurrence of externalities for which the gains accrue to the entrepre-
neur and the costs are being passed on to society: is there a need for ‘more’ 
market force, to include the costs of externalities into the process of pro-
duction or is there a need for state intervention regulating the externalities. 
The kind of state-initiated social engineering that dominated the better half 
of the last century, which was based on the assumed availability of synoptic, 
universally valid knowledge and of the ability of states to shape society and 
the market, no longer seems an option under late-modernist conditions (Loe-
ber et al., 2005). Instead, governmental institutions, market parties and civil 
society representatives share decision-making competencies (van Tatenhove 
et al., 2006b) and focus on new institutional arrangements involving repre-
sentatives of the state, the market and civil society (Glasbergen, 2007). At 
the interplay of state and market the state governs the economy (Gamble, 
2000 ) but, more importantly, the state has an option to deploy marked-based 
instruments. 
In the 1980s and 1990s we have witnessed a neo-liberalisation discourse in 
this process of (re)negotiation of the boundaries between state, market and 
civil society with increasingly areas being governed by an economic logic (cf. 
Castree, 2008b). This basically ranged from the introduction of a range of pri-
vate sector management instruments into the public sector next to the emer-
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gence of privatisation of state-owned enterprises or assets and the trend of 
using markets to allocate resources (cf. Megginson and Netter, 2001).
In order to analyse market based fisheries governance I will here define libe-
ralisation of environmental policy as the (combination of) delegation, deregu-
lation, privatisation or marketisation of State intervention in managing natu-
ral resources (cf. Hulsink, 2001; Letza et al., 2004; Yesilkagit and de Vries, 
2004; Savas, 2005; Castree, 2008b, a). Delegation refers to the devolution 
of powers of (central) government to either other parts of government (de-
centralisation) or to the market (for example in public-private partnerships) 
(cf. Savas, 2005; van Hoof et al., 2005). Deregulation can be defined as the 
process of reducing state control over an industry or activity so as to make it 
structurally more responsive to market forces (Hulsink, 2001). Privatisation is 
here referred to as the process of providing private rights to a (former) public 
domain. Marketisation is here defined as the process in which environmental 
policy implementation is shifting from government regulation and control to 
more deployment of market based instruments and market control.
In fact the state has the option to either exert full government control and 
regulation or deregulate and privatise resource management as well as any 
combination of the above. Following Arts and van Tatenhove (2004) in some 
areas of environmental policy we see the state withdrawing (energy and 
waste), while increasing its influence in others (infrastructure, agriculture). 
We see new arrangements between state and civil society being established, 
while elsewhere the state adheres strictly to its privileges. We see patterns 
of traditionally privileged interaction between state and market being broken 
down, while such patterns are re-established in other domains. 
Public policy making in the Netherlands throughout the 1980s has demonstra-
ted an increasing awareness that state intervention in the national economy 
had been over-ambitious and that a retreat of the state in favour of market 
forces was necessary. Privatisation became another instrument in redefining 
the boundaries between the public and private sectors. In the Dutch context, 
in which the State traditionally is small in assets and activities it performs 
(van Damme, 2004), privatisation does not so much refer to the transfer of 
ownership of assets from the State to private sector but more to making use 
of private actors and market mechanisms to achieve public goals (cf. van 
Damme, 2004). Especially during the latter part of the 1980s the general 
administration motto became: all services that do not necessarily have to be 
performed by the government are candidates for privatisation. 
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As fisheries policy in the European Union is the sole competence of the Eu-
ropean Commission under the Common Fisheries Policy (Hawkins, 2005) 
the above raises important questions for the institutions at both the member 
state and the Community level involved, as to how to replace burdensome 
command-and-control legislation, public ownership and close government 
supervision with new flexible administrative systems to ensure that social, 
economic and political objectives are met (cf. Hulsink, 2001).
Following Mansfield (2004) in fisheries management the introduction of a 
neo-liberal signature dates way back to the 1950s and evolved from the per-
ception of fish as a common property and the commons as a form of market 
failure. Rights based fisheries management in this neoclassical economic view 
would through individual rational decisions in free markets result in social and 
environmental welfare. Be it from a tragedy of the commons perspective or 
the tragedy of open access, the solution lies in defining property rights in 
such a way that access is limited, market incentives for conservation are pro-
vided and exit from overcapitalised industries is encouraged.
2�2 Transferable fishing rights
Across the European Union a variety of Rights Based Management systems 
is being deployed. Following the analysis as presented by MRAG et al. (2009) 
limited licensing is a common feature in EU fisheries management, and for 
stocks managed by Total Allowable Catch (TAC), member states have imple-
mented a variety of individual non transferable catch quotas, ITQs and vessel 
catch limits. 
Putting property at the centre of fisheries problems is a neoliberal, market-
based approach to ocean governance starting from the problems in fisheries 
stemming from the ways that open access regimes inherently create irrati-
onal incentives representing a market distortion (cf. Mansfield, 2004). The 
solution, then, must eliminate the market distortion. From this neoliberal per-
spective, market incentives decrease capacity and increase efficiency as indi-
viduals or groups lease and sell privatized rights to fish; market incentives en-
courage conservation because each individual or group knows they can profit 
from the fish as much tomorrow as today, and thus they will fish more slowly 
and more carefully; the form of marketable property is presumed to lead to 
increased efficiency––as the least efficient operations sell their quota to the 
most efficient ones, thus reducing total capacity––and better stewardship of 
the resource (Mansfield, 2004).
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Hence liberalisation of fisheries management evolves around privatisation: 
the creation of private property rights; marketisation: leaving the distribution 
of these rights to the rationale of the market; and on deregulation and dele-
gation: no longer is government determining the outcome of the management 
system but the holders of fishing rights. Individual quota and group, commu-
nity or ring-fenced quota are all forms of privatisation: rights formally held by 
society in general (open access common property resource) or by the state 
(Exclusive Economic Zone) are transferred to private rights. ITQs are a form 
of privatisation and marketisation: the private rights are made tradable.
 
Underreporting landings and discarding are among the major concerns of in-
troducing a quota system. Although not exclusive to ITQ systems they un-
dermine the perceived benefits ascribed to such systems. The problems can 
be attributed partly to the fact that ITQ systems do not create true property 
rights in the fishery. Holding a share of quota only gives a particular fisherman 
a right or privilege to harvest fish, it provides no real control over the resource 
itself (Squires et al., 1995; Wingard, 2000).
Another main concern is the loss of access to the fishery of fishermen through 
a concentration of quota in the hands of a smaller number of fishers. Copes 
and Charles (2004) distinguish in this respect two forms of excessive con-
centration of fishery access rights that is taken place through capacity rati-
onalisation. First, in terms of financial concentration; corporations and large 
investors in the fisheries sector may use their financial power to buy up larger 
aggregations of quota, thereby concentrating a substantial share of fishery 
access rights in their hands. Second, in terms of geographical concentration; 
ITQs are likely to produce a geographical concentration towards the larger 
ports where the quota owners have their main facilities. The long-term effect 
of the financial and geographical concentration of fishery access rights may 
be the formation of socio-economic class divisions or monopolisation of the 
fisheries, with a few who control access to the fisheries and the rest depen-
ding on those with access to the resource.
Although the capacity reduction that may be facilitated by an ITQ system 
is likely to generate economic benefits, the distribution of those benefits is 
widely considered to be inequitable (cf. McCay, 2004). Quota initially is given 
out free of charge to individuals who happen to be vessel license owners at 
the time the quota system is introduced. The first generation of quota-holders 
therefore benefits financially as their quota have become valuable assets with 
the introduction of an ITQ system. There is a notable inter-generational ine-
quity involved in having initial recipients receive a free gift of quota from a 
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public resource, while subsequent generations face relatively high purchase 
prices or lease rates (cf. Copes and Charles, 2004).
Moreover, crew members are especially likely to lose out when ITQs are im-
plemented (Copes and Charles, 2004). If a vessel owner decides to sell quo-
ta, crew members usually receive none of the proceeds of that sale, despite 
having been closely involved in creating the catch history which generated 
the ITQ in the first place. In addition, it is quite common practice that the 
costs for temporarily hired additional quota are shared between owner and 
crew, whereas the benefits of renting out quota accrue solely to the owner 
(van Hoof et al., 2002; van Hoof et al., 2005).
Another concern of concentration of fishery access rights into fewer hands is 
that it generates a negative effect on the socio-economic viability of (small) 
fishing communities. ITQs allocated strictly through the market will not reflect 
the broader needs of a community. Quota will flow to those with greatest 
access to capital, which may have little correlation with community depen-
dence on fishing. Small, rural coastal communities with the greatest reliance 
on fishing (as a proportion of their total economy in terms of produce and 
employment) might have less access to capital than do urban corporations. 
Consequently, the access to the fishery will be withdrawn from the very areas 
with the greatest relative reliance on fishing. Reduction in employment and 
income may lead not only to a reduction in the number of fishers (short-term 
impacts), but can eventually lead to a reduction in size or even elimination of 
some fishing communities as with fewer active boats left, boat repair, baiting, 
processing, trade and other related activities are reduced, further reducing 
fishery-related employment.
The case of the introduction of fishing quota in the Netherlands’ North Sea 
Beam Trawl fisheries is used to illustrate the outcome of the introduction of 
rights based management and examine the impact the marked-based ma-
nagement regime had on the development of the fisheries.
2�3 The Dutch ITQ system
The Netherlands do have a tradition of applying marked-based instruments 
in environmental policy. In the early 1970s charges and levies on water and 
air pollution were introduced. Over time other forms of market-based instru-
ments such as ecological tax reforms, emissions trading and tradable permits 
were introduced. (cf. Jordan et al., 2005).
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Management of North Sea fisheries has been shaped over the past 30 
years. After the establishment of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Conven-
tion  (NEAFC) in 1964, being a first step for joint fisheries management, it 
would take up to the mid 1970s for NEAFC to develop concrete management 
measures (cf. van Densen and van Overzee, 2008). With the introduction of 
the 200 nautical mile Extended Economic Zone (in 1977 for the Netherlands; 
LvH), nations had the opportunity to claim the ownership of fish stocks within 
their zone (Andersen et al., 2008), which in fact resulted in a sharing of the 
North Sea over its bordering Member States, a basis was provided for North 
Sea fisheries management.
As a consequence Dutch fishermen, up to the latter half of the 1970s had 
quite some freedom to decide on their operations; the level of regulation 
was rather modest. In 1975 the NEAFC established Total Allowable Catches 
(TACs) for several species of fish, including sole and plaice, the two most 
important species for the Beam trawl fleet. Dutch government responded 
by setting up a system of Individual Quota (IQ) for the fishermen. The IQs 
were distributed based on historic rights. The IQs could not be sold, leased, 
or used as collateral. One reason for this was that quota transfers would 
cause extra management problems; another was the fear that quotas would 
be concentrated in an undesirable way. Nevertheless “unofficial” transfers of 
IQs developed rapidly, for instance by transfer of vessels including their IQs 
to other enterprises, by merging or splitting of enterprises and by individuals 
switching from one firm to the other, taking IQs with them (Smit, 2001). 
Up to the mid 1980s these IQs were perceived by the vessel owners as li-
mitations rather than as rights and as enforcement of the quota was rather 
weak the fishing rights were perceived to be nothing more than ‘a piece of 
paper’ (Davidse, 2000). As the quota were not strictly enforced they did not 
provide secure property rights as the flatfish fishery would be closed once 
the national quotas for sole and plaice were exhausted. Since everyone knew 
that fishing could be closed any day, uncertainty spread end the fishermen’s 
race for fish became even more stimulated than before (Dubbink and van 
Vliet, 1992).
With the establishment of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP ) in 1983 
a change in North Sea fisheries management was marked. Prior to 1983 the 
European fisheries policy would follow the NEAFC management measures. 
As from 1983 the European policy not only aimed at the implementation of 
the TACs in the context of the conservation policy it also sees the introduc-
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tion of the EU structural policy5. Under the CFP structural policy limits were 
set to the capacity of the North Sea fleets under the Multi Annual Guidance 
Programme (MAGP). In order to fulfil the obligations resulting from the first 
MAGP the Dutch Ministry responsible for Fisheries implemented a license 
scheme in 1984 which led to a horsepower ceiling for the fleet. 
As the informal trade of IQs increased over time the Ministry responsible 
for Fisheries officially allowed in 1985 the trade of IQs for sole and plaice 
(cf. Davidse, 2000). This followed a growing political concern about the non-
compliance with the quota regulations. In order to get fishing effort to be in 
line with allocated TACs a tie-up scheme was established in 1986; vessels 
were not allowed to go out to sea for a number of days. This was followed 
by the establishment of a days-at-sea regime in 1987 (van Densen and van 
Overzee, 2008).
Despite all these management measures the Dutch fishing industry was cha-
racterised by reports of illegal fishing, under-reporting of catches, grey and 
black trade circuits and inadequate policing and enforcement by the Dutch 
state (van Ginkel, 2005): the national administration was not prepared for 
a rather large system to keep track of landings (of each individual vessel 
in Dutch and foreign ports) and enforcement continued to be weak (Smit, 
1997). Catches remained exceeding the national quota and as a consequence 
of failure to contain the problem a political crises evolved in 1990. Due to 
these enforcement problems government sought a new division of responsi-
bilities between the state and the private fishing sector. 
To arrive at a devolution of specific management responsibilities to fisher-
men, the fishermen had to organise themselves into groups6. Parliament thre-
atened to introduce regulations to generically limit engine power should the 
fishing industry decide not to accept organisation into groups. Especially at-
tributable to the latter threat of parliament, but also because group members 
were entitled to more days-at-sea than non-members and the period in which 
the latter can trade quota is restricted, ninety-seven per cent of all beam 
trawl fishermen (van Ginkel, 2005) joined the co-management system. 
The aim of the management groups was twofold: first, to arrive at an effective 
and efficient system of quota compliance that is supported by the fishers; se-
5 The CFP consists in total of 4 policy areas: Conservation policy, Structural policy, Market 
Policy and External Policy
6 the so-called ‘Biesheuvel groups’, named after the chairman of the committee that advised on 
the new policy, former Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel
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condly, to improve economic performance within the quota restrictions. Each 
individual group member takes his individual rights to be managed within the 
confines of the group. This allows decisions which otherwise would be adop-
ted by Government, such as the fishing season planning, to be undertaken by 
the fishermen themselves. In addition group members can constantly modify 
their initial right allocation; according to their necessities, the fishermen can 
buy, sell or rent their quotas and fishing days (Davidse, 2000). The group as 
a whole is responsible for the management of the quota uptake, ensuring 
landings to be in line with total group entitlements. In addition the group fa-
cilitates trade, hiring and renting of the ITQs between their members, which 
makes the system far more flexible.
The ownership of the rights remains with the individual holders. Since the 
fishing rights are owned by the fisherman and can be freely traded, the rights 
can be used as a collateral for a loan; in fact, the ITQs always serve as a 
security for the bank when a loan is acquired, for example to finance a new 
vessel (Davidse, 2000).
Whereas the ITQs are individual and freely transferable there are some go-
vernment rules and restrictions as to the transfer of ownership. For example 
all transfers of ITQs have to be registered with the Ministry responsible for 
Fisheries. Also ITQs have to be attached to a principal vessel. Quota can 
be held independent of a vessel for only a restricted period of up to 5 years 
and only when the individual holding is part of a group holding. This period 
is  meant to enable owners to lease out their rights within a period that they 
are in between vessels: a new vessel being under construction while the old 
vessel is already sold.
With a progressing development of bringing species under a TAC, such as 
for example the introduction in 1994 of quota for cod and the 1996 quota 
for herring and mackerel, the ITQ system was further extended. Today all of 
the mean species of the Beam trawl fisheries (plaice, sole, cod, whiting) are 
under the ITQ system. Only few such as ray, dab and brill have a national TAC 
and no individual quotation, and only the likes of red mullet and gurnard are 
not under any quotation restriction. In case a species is shared through ITQs 
the Ministry responsible for Fisheries does not share out the entire national 
TAC but retains a part for management purposes.
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2�4 The impact of the introduction of ITQs in the 
Dutch system
If we look at the period starting after the introduction of the EU CFP in 1983 
the following Figures present trends in development of the Dutch Beam Trawl 
fleet in terms of number of vessels, fleet capacity, investments, employment 
in terms of number of crew, landings, quota and profitability.
The downward trend in number of vessels, total engine capacity and crew 
over the period 1984-2007 becomes quite clear from Figure 19. Of course 
total employment on board has a straight forward relation with the number of 
vessels (average crew size remaining rather stable over time at just over 4).
As Figure 20 shows, not only have total annual investments in the fleet (in 
real terms measured in million Euros) dropped significantly over the period, a 
logical consequence of a shrinking fleet, but also the annual investment per 
vessel in real terms has dropped from an average of about 80,000 Euro an-
nually over the 1980s to 40,000 Euro annually in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
average capacity per vessel in nominal terms shows a downward trend since 
the late 1990s.
Figure 19: Development of the number of beam trawlers total nominal engine capacity and total 
crew employed (secondary axis) over the period 1984-2007; 
 data from LEI 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2008 (LEI Statistics, Series)
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Whereas for sole nominal landings have over the entire period been in line 
with the Dutch quota allocation of the total TAC (Figure 21), for plaice Figure 
22 shows that after the 1980s, in which landings overshot allocated quota, 
landings were in line with Dutch TAC entitlement. As for discards, according 
to Catchpole et al. (2008) based on a rather limited sample over 2001 and 
2002, the discard rate (including all fish and benthic material) was 77% of the 
catch.
As for profitability of the fleet, according to Davidse (2000) in analysing the 
1983-1998 period the conclusion is that “the profitability level of the cutters 
Figure 20:  Development of the total investments in the fleet (primary axis) and average invest-
ments per vessel and average capacity of vessels of the Dutch Beam trawl fleet over 
the period 1984-2007. 
 Data from LEI 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2008 (LEI Statistics, Series).
Figure 21:  Dutch North Sea sole quota including swaps and nominal landings over the period 
1984-2006
 Nominal landing data from ICES ACFM (2007), Dutch quota data from LEI 1985, 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2008 (LEI Statistics, Series).
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has improved. The sector has been profitable or at break-even level since 
1991. This is a rather long period of good economic results in view of deve-
lopments in the 1970s and the 1980s. Profitable years were followed by years 
with adverse results in that period. Fleet expansion through investments in 
new cutters after good years used to dissipate potential profitability.”
Taking the data as presented in Figure 23 we can confirm Davidse’s analysis 
for the 1990s. With the increase in oil price in the mid 2000s we see that the 
results of the fleet diminish rapidly.
Figure 22:  Dutch North Sea plaice quota including swaps and nominal landings over the period 
1984-2006.
 Nominal landing data from ICES ACFM 2007 (ICES, 2007), Dutch quota data from 
LEI , 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2008 (LEI Statistics, Series).
Figure 23: Net results Dutch North Sea beam trawl fleet in million Euro real value 1984 = 100. 
 Data from LEI 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2008 (LEI Statistics, Series).
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2�5 Dutch ITQs as market-based fisheries gover-
nance 
From the analysis in section 2.4 we can draw the conclusion that the Dutch 
ITQ system since the introduction of the EU CFP in 1983 has resulted in a 
smaller fleet, with less overall capacity. Catches of plaice and sole are in line 
with total Dutch quota allocation and at least for a period of 10 years (1991-
2001) the net results of the fleet have been positive. Employment in terms of 
number of crew is reduced and also investments in the fleet have diminished.
In analysing the effects of the Dutch ITQ system we should realise that the 
management instrument has not been introduced in isolation but was part 
of a series of government management instruments among which the esta-
blishment of the co-management system, intensified control, a days-at-sea 
regime, a maximum gear width for double-beam trawls and, in addition, next 
to an overall limitation of fleet capacity under the MAGP, a maximum engine 
capacity of 2000 HP for new ships was set. In fact some of the instruments 
applied work in parallel. Court ruling in the Netherlands for example made 
clear that in case days-at–sea regulation and ITQ entitlement are conflicting, 
the right to fish an amount of fish prevails over a limitation of effort in terms 
of days-at-sea. Others, such as compulsory landing of catches at an auction 
greatly enhanced the monitoring and enforcement capabilities of the system.
From the perspective of the individual fisher the introduction of the ITQ sys-
tem provided both a necessity and opportunity to bring individual quota hol-
dings in line with the fishing capacity of the vessel. In addition the indivi-
dual and perceived perpetual character of the ITQ, although perhaps not a 
real property right over the resource in the sense as meant by Squires et al. 
(1995) and Wingard (2000), since it provides no real control over the resource 
itself, is a right to fish that can be exerted and defended and can be used as 
a collateral.
Access to the group system allows the individual fisher to fine tune quota 
holdings and landings during the year by leasing out or hiring in additional 
quota; rather convenient in a mixed fisheries in which plaice and sole are ne-
ver caught in fixed proportions. In fact what has been introduced as individual 
property rights is during the year managed as a cooperative catch right. The 
individual fisherman remains proprietor of the individual quota entitlement, 
but during the year the management of the uptake of the quota is collectively 
managed in such a way that landings match the total of the group quota hol-
dings. The majority of quota transfers, either temporary (leasing) or perma-
nent, primarily take place within the group.
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In addition, groups can take an active role in acquiring additional quota. On 
the one hand this is done by collective buying of quota on the market: the 
quota become the property of the group hence quota transfers provide the 
opportunity for groups to “buy in” to certain fisheries. In addition, groups 
can take an active role in the so called quota swaps: the exchange of quota 
between EU Member States7. 
At the European level these quota swaps play a significant role. Some, known 
as ‘traditional exchange’ are quota that are usually each year exchanged 
between Member States. In addition there are the more ad hoc exchanges 
dependent for example on the development of a fishery (acquire additional 
rights for a species that is temporarily landed in large quantities) or more 
strategic exchanges, for example in times of high oil prices the search for 
the exchange of quota in more for away stocks (Skagerak/Kattegat) against 
stocks that are more near by (North Sea). 
In fact the swaps mark the fact that the Dutch ITQ system is a three tier 
system in which the fisher is holding individual rights, manages the rights 
during the year collectively in a group next to the species (for example ray) 
with no individual allocation, managed at the national level against which all 
fishermen can fish. There are examples in which it is tried to at the European 
level between member states exchange individual quota managed by groups 
against species with no individual quota managed at the national level.
Quota swaps play an important role in group management of the quota. The 
groups play an active role in on the one hand ensuring landings to be in line 
with total quota holding and at the same time, by being involved in quota 
transfers and swaps, ensure that the quota holding of the group is in line with 
landings and desired catch opportunities. 
ITQs are a marked-based instrument in which objectives are sought to be 
reached through regulations of a market. The transfer of quota results in a 
re-allocation of catch rights and a development towards increased efficiency 
of the activities. From the Dutch case we can learn that after the introduction 
of the market arrangement of ITQs the fishers utilised the group system to ar-
rive at an arrangement of self regulation. Not only for the uptake of the group 
quota entitlement (as was the government’s intention of the establishment of 
the groups) but also in managing the transfers and allocation of quota. The 
group takes the position of broker in the quota transfer process, taking a po-
7 After the TAC for a stock is determined the EU TAC is devised over the Member States ac-
cording to the principle of Relative Stability: each Member State receives a fixed share of the 
TAC in order to provide relative continuity to its fishing activities 
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sition in the allocation process which makes the Dutch system one of a mix of 
individual and collective management of catch rights. The emphasis however 
tends to differ between the several individual groups with some emphasising 
the collective management and joint transfer of quota whereas other groups 
put more emphasis on the individual entitlement of a fisher and the provision 
of a platform of transfer of rights within the group. 
This managerial role in quota trade the groups have taken might be the rea-
son that within the Netherlands, despite worldwide evidence on fisheries in 
which quota tend to leave the primary fishing sector to be either accumula-
ted by larger fleet owners or even the processing industry (as for example 
presented by Squires et al., 1995; Copes and Charles, 2004; McCay, 2004 
), there is no clear evidence that quota have on a significant scale left the 
segment of family owned beam trawlers. Indeed the fact that individual quota 
holdings are being brought into a management group might have been a ma-
jor contributor as in first instance quota transfers are being traded within the 
confines of the group. 
Then again, it is true that the first allocation of quota privileges the original 
group of fishermen who received their quota share gratis. After the initial al-
location the fishermen (owners) further invested in obtaining an appropriate 
quota holding, thus developing a market for the transfer of quota and setting 
a price. This of course puts a strain on new entrants to the sector: they have 
no access to a start up quota share for free. Also, in times that the quota 
holding is the main determinant of potential profitability of a vessel (assuming 
that the underlying amount of fish can be caught) competition for, and hence 
price of quota will increase. 
Currently if one was to invest in a new beam trawler for flat fish fishery the 
required investment of about 8.5 million Euro would for up to as much as 30% 
consist of obtaining transferable licenses and quota. Not only is this total 
amount rather prohibitive for entering the fishery, it can be queried whether 
under the current circumstances in the market licences and quota will be avai-
lable. On the other hand this is of course among the aims of establishing a 
ITQ system: a reduction of the over-capitalisation and rationalisation of capa-
city of the fleet. In Figure 24 below the relative share of investment required 
for the vessel, the licences and quota since the 1980s is being presented. We 
can observe that both in nominal as in real terms the price for investment in 
a vessel, licences and quota8 has gone down over the past decades. This for 
one can be attributed to what for example Arnason (2002) and Squires et al. 
8 Based on the purchase of a new 42 meter vessel with a GT licence and additional licence for 
2000 Hp and the purchase of  100.000 kg sole and 150.000 kg plaice quota.
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(1995) refer to as a thin market: markets with few participants and infrequent 
transactions in which price formation can be rather erratic. On the other hand 
this situation reflects the fact that today both within the sector as with the 
banks there is little confidence on the returns of such an investment and for 
example loans are almost impossible to obtain.
In the Netherlands the significance of fisheries is rather small and diminishing. 
Out of the 23 communities in the Netherlands with a significant cutter fleet 
the contribution to employment on average is less then 0.5%; only in com-
munities like Den Oever (9%) and Urk (7%) the contribution to employment 
is more significant (Salz et al., 2008). The communities are, compared to for 
example Iceland and Norway not very isolated. Of course the disappearance 
of fishing vessels and hence related fishery activities does have an impact on 
local communities. But then again, as these communities are closely linked to 
the wider economy, in recent years we have seen that wage opportunities in 
other sectors have been such that crew members have already opted to take 
other jobs. In addition also increasingly the fish processing an trade industry 
in the Netherlands becomes less dependent on national landings and more 
involved in international trade flows.
In the debate on safeguarding quota for local communities (for example Ey-
thórsson, 1996; Crean, 1999; Jentoft, 2000; Wingard, 2000; LeDrew, 2003) 
the Dutch case shows that by managing the quota in groups the rights can be 
maintained. Although there are active fishermen that protest against the so 
called ‘sofa’ fishers (slipper skippers: former fishermen holding on to quota, 
leasing it out in stead of actively fishing on it) this phenomenon is of minor im-
portance (Vissersbond, personal communication); on the one hand because 
only a small part of quota is currently owned by slipper skippers and the pe-
Figure 24:  Calculated relative share of investment in vessel, licenses and quota Dutch North Sea 
beam trawl fleet in million Euro, real value calculated on price level 1984=100. 
 Data from LEI, personal communication.
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riod in which quota can be held without being attached to a vessel is limited. 
On the other hand these quota are made available to fishers to lease. In fact 
this illustrates the process in which ITQs can facilitate the gradual withdrawal 
of a fisher from the fisheries.
2�6 Conclusion and discussion
The case of Individual Transferable Fisheries Quota in the Netherlands, as 
used by the Dutch government in managing the North Sea beam trawl fis-
heries, shows that marked-based governance in fisheries management has 
had an effect in terms of reduction of fleet capacity, investments in the fis-
heries, employment and total catches. The introduction of the Dutch ITQ sys-
tem created private rights to access to fish and a market for these access 
rights where one did not exist before. By embedding the ITQ system in a 
group-management setting the government at the same time deregulated 
and delegated monitoring and enforcement tasks. The embedding of the ITQ 
system into a joint management structure around groups of fishermen may 
well have cushioned off some of the negative effects associated with the in-
troduction of an ITQ system such as the concentration of fishing rights in the 
hands of a few.
The fishermen used the group system not only for private optimisation of quo-
ta holdings but also for the collective management of quota uptake as well as 
to a degree for developing a collective quota holding of the group. By linking 
private owned quota to collective (group) management and the realm of nati-
onally managed quota and international quota swaps the fisheries sector, as 
private entity, gained a navigating role in the steering mechanism of the state. 
This system was not conceived and designed in one go but evolved over time; 
adjustments such as the tradability of rights were more of a pragmatic coop-
tation of practices of the fishers then stemming from a grand design. The 
system portrays an amalgam of privatisation, marketisation, deregulation and 
self-governance. Open access has been transferred into tradable private ac-
cess rights. The privatisation of fishing rights enabled fishermen to plan their 
fishing undertaking and hence reduce the ‘race for fish’. The marketisation of 
these rights enabled an individual balancing of fishing capacity and access. 
The co-enforcement system, but more over the collective management of the 
groups’ quota holding, characterises a form of self-governance. But as for 
deregulation and delegation of fisheries management the Dutch government 
and the EU CFP still determine fisheries policy with no formal position of the 
fishing sector. 
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We can characterize the governance of Dutch fisheries management not so 
much as a transition from state to market but as a market-based government 
policy in a setting of self-governance by the fisheries sector with a partial 
deregulation of fisheries management.
At the EU level we see the coexistence of a liberal discourse of free move-
ment of goods and people combined with a centrist, etatist (van Hoof and 
van Tatenhove, 2009) competence of the European Commission in fisheries 
policy. Assigning specific access rights to a privileged group of actors (the 
current group of fishers) is at odds with this liberal discourse. In fact the 
access to the resource is being privatised and marketised by ITQs, but not 
fully liberalised since  government regulation still prohibits other than fishers 
access to quota. The question can be raised whether it is time to open up the 
ITQ market to for example recreational fisheries, whose landings of quota 
species at times are considerable, do not need quota nor do they have access 
to purchase quota. Opening up the possibility to recreational fishers, but also 
to Environmental NGOs, Fishing Communities and (local) governments would 
provide an instrument to other actors to play a role in fisheries management. 
For example fishing communities could safeguard access to the resource for 
their communities; a form of community fishing rights as we have seen for 
example emerge in Shetland (van Hoof et al., 2002; van Hoof et al., 2005; van 
Hoof et al., 2007b). 
Rights based management, such as through ITQs, is in fact the delegation of 
state management tasks to other actors, hence transferring competences in 
fisheries management. Opening up the trade in access rights, for example to 
other stakeholders or even other Member States’ citizens, would fit the phi-
losophy of liberalisation. Already international swaps of quota play an impor-
tant role in EU fisheries management. And although the principal of relative 
stability regulates the distribution of Total Allowable Catches over Member 
States, swops between Member States and private ownership construction 
of companies already grant quite some leeway to move quota around.
A remaining issue is the fact that at this moment ITQs are a rather peculiar 
entitlement. On the one hand ITQs are a firm defendable and excludable right 
of individual fishers to access to a resource (access to the fishery itself is 
regulated through i.e. licenses and permits). On the other hand it is a rather 
insecure entitlement as the magnitude of fish to which the ITQ provides ac-
cess varies from year to year based on scientific advice and the EU political 
process of negotiating TACs between Member States and third countries.
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According to EU Maritime Commissionaire Joe Borg, developing a culture 
of compliance throughout the chain of activities related to fisheries from the 
fisherman to the consumer is the surest way of delivering sustainable and 
equitable fisheries in Europe (Borg, 2008). And apparently this change is di-
rely needed since: “Today, those in the industry who uphold the law frequently 
witness offenders escaping sanction and making huge financial profits in the 
process. This is untenable in any context, and particularly in the current situ-
ation, with fish resources getting increasingly scarce” (Borg, 2008). In fact, 
according to Borg, the main stay of the problem of non-compliance lays not so 
much in the fact that the management system is insufficient in delivering the 
desired goals but “ The current control system is so inefficient that it jeopardi-
ses our efforts to achieve sustainable exploitation and long term management 
of stocks” (Borg, 2008). Despite an overall expenditure of € 400 million a year 
on control “Any control policy falls apart like a house of cards if it is not pro-
perly implemented, and if infringements are not followed up” (Borg, 2008).
Hence, as a result of the 2002 revision of the EU Common Fisheries Po-
licy (CFP) the emphasis is put on enforcement of measures (monitoring and 
control) and not so much on the basic fabric of fisheries management. The 
search is how to better get the policies enforced. The answer apparently lays 
in a government oriented solution: a Community Fisheries Control Agency 
(CFCA) to organise operational coordination of fisheries control and inspec-
tion activities by the Member States and to assist them to cooperate so as to 
comply with the rules of the Common EU Fisheries Policy in order to ensure 
its effective and uniform application.
In 1990 a similar enforcement crisis evolved in the Dutch fisheries manage-
ment system. Fishermen lost their faith in government as agent of effective 
fisheries management and government failed to implement fisheries manage-
ment rules effectively. Contrary to today’s proposal of Borg, to reinforce 
government enforcement of fisheries management, in the Netherlands the 
solution was found in establishing a more participatory system of fisheries 
management involving fishermen and the state alike: co-management.
In this paper I will use this example of Dutch co-management and the parti-
cipatory governance discourse to analyse whether a more participatory so-
lution, as substitute for government rule making, can serve as alternative for 
enforcement. I will start by looking at the practice of fisheries management, 
compliance and the role of co-management. In order to further analyse co-
management I will look at the current discourse on political modernisation 
and participatory governance. I will use the history of Dutch fisheries co-
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management to analyse whether this new institutional setting has led to an 
increase in compliance with the formal government fisheries management. In 
the final part of the paper I will discuss these findings and theoretically assess 
possibilities of co-enforcement at a European scale.
3�1 Fisheries management and compliance
The call for fisheries management can be found in the open access natural 
renewable resource character of fish stocks. In the absence of property rights 
over the resource, individual fishermen will have little incentive to conserve 
the fish stock or to harvest the fish efficiently because the benefits of doing 
so may be appropriated by other fishermen. The obvious answer in fisheries 
has for long been to make the case for a strong presence of government 
in fisheries resource management (Jentoft et al., 1998; Noble, 2000; Kear-
ney et al., 2007; May, 2008). Hence the development in the second half of 
the twentieth century of management of marine fisheries by central govern-
ments and international organisations with the characteristics of today: bio-
logy based measures (such as mesh size regulations, total allowable catch, 
area closures, nursery ground protection), measures directly affecting the 
economic operation of the vessel (such as restrictions on days at sea, fishing 
time, engine size and holding capacity of the vessels) and marked-based (e.g. 
tradable quota) as well as non-marked based instruments (e.g. subsidies for 
construction of new vessels) which affect the economic operation of the ves-
sel more indirectly (Arnason, 2000; Sissenwine and Symes, 2007).
Compliance with regulations refers to the degree to which citizens adhere 
to rules and regulations, in this case in particular the various fisheries ma-
nagement regulations. The degree of compliance provides insight into the 
effectiveness of the management system of translating policy into concrete 
operational measures. On the other hand, the level of compliance provides 
insight into the way the measures are supported and perceived as legitimate 
by the people that have to operate by the rules. The decision of individual 
actors to comply or not is primarily based on a calculation of the (economic) 
gain to be obtained from bypassing the regulation compared to the likelihood 
of detection and the severity of the sanction. Increased enforcement activi-
ties can reduce or even prevent non-compliance behaviour among fishers, but 
there are limits to the amount of resources (human and capital) that can be 
used on enforcement activities, in particular if the aim is to strike a reasona-
ble balance between the costs of enforcement activities and the profit to be 
obtained from fishing activities (Raakjær and Mathiesen, 2003).
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Especially in a fishery with over capacity, as we will see later in the Dutch 
case, there is a strong economic incentive for non-compliance. Fishers often 
argue that they are forced to non-compliance behaviour in order to maintain 
in business (Hatcher et al., 2000). Hence in terms of legitimacy, fishers feel 
threatened by a situation where the regulations are incompatible with their 
daily practice of fishery.
3�2 Fisheries co-management
The choice of type of instrument in fisheries resources management is largely 
government-driven although experiences worldwide show that various forms 
of partnership between government, industry and fishers strengthen manage-
ment and produce results (Raakjær et al., 2004). In fact fisheries manage-
ment has been more concerned with the means, such as Individual Transfera-
ble Quotas (ITQs), than with institutional and organisational aspects (Noble, 
2000). From the so called Brundtland report, the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development report Our Common Future of 1987, we can learn 
that in order to arrive at sustainable development, and hence also sustainable 
management of natural resources, communities should have greater access 
to and control over decisions affecting their resources, in cooperation with 
government, economic and administrative functions (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). This idea of partnerships became even 
more internationally acceptable and promoted following the 1992 United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, the “Rio conference” 
and, even more strongly, after the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustaina-
ble Development of 2002 (Mol, 2007). Co-management is the application of 
this principle to fisheries management (Noble, 2000). 
Fisheries management literature provides many examples of resource user 
participation in fisheries management. For example Jentoft and McCay 
(1995), Raakjær and Vedsmand (1995), Sen and Raakjær (1996) and Raak-
jær and Vedsmand (1999) provide a plethora of cases in which user participa-
tion is in operation, including African, Asian and also European cases such as 
those of the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. Smith et al. (2008) provide 
the example of the Resource Assessment Groups operational in Australia. 
The co-management of the sand eel fisheries in the Ise Bay is a famous case 
in Japan, where the natural resource management is carried out through the 
interplay of fishermen communities, science and government (Ashida, 2009). 
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Participatory arrangements in fisheries management can range from histo-
rical fishers’ organisations, such as the Confradias de Pescadores in Spain 
and the Prudhomies in France (Galle and Weber, 1992; Jentoft and McCay, 
1995; van Hoof et al., 2005) to safeguarding use rights of native groups of 
fishers such as in use in the system of Community Development Quota of the 
US North Pacific Regional Fishery Council to help bring economic and social 
development opportunities to Native Alaskan villages along the coast of Wes-
tern Alaska (May, 2008). They can be rather ancient local systems, such as 
found in Japan (Ashida, 2009) and the Customary Fishing Rights Areas in Fiji 
(Sen and Raakjær, 1996) but can also be of more recent signature such as 
the management of the mechanised beach seine fishery in Mozambique and 
the management of Lake Malombe in Malawi (Sen and Raakjær, 1996). Today 
the United States government is moving toward a co-management model to 
fishery governance based on stakeholder engagement (May, 2008). There is 
compelling evidence that such participatory governance is crucial for conten-
ding with complex problems of managing for multiple values and outcomes to 
achieve ecological sustainability and economic development (Kearney et al., 
2007).
Although the cases above feature a form of resource users (fishers’) parti-
cipation in the management system, not all would be considered to be co-
management. Co-management is here defined as a dynamic, collaborative 
and participatory process of regulatory decision-making in a setting of insti-
tutional and organisational arrangements using the capacities and interests 
of user-groups, complemented by the ability of the fisheries administration to 
provide enabling legislation and administrative assistance to reduce informa-
tion and regulation costs to the government and improve decision making and 
regulatory effectiveness (Raakjær and Vedsmand, 1995; Sen and Raakjær, 
1996; Jentoft et al., 1998; Raakjær et al., 2004; van Hoof et al., 2005). If 
top down government control and fishers’ self-management would be at the 
extremes of a management dichotomy, co-management would be found in 
between the two extremes.
Covering a variety of partnership arrangements co-management can be vie-
wed as a set of institutional and organisational arrangements (rights and ru-
les) which define the cooperation between the particular fisheries adminis-
tration and its related user-groups. Raakjær and Vedsmand (1995, 1999) use 
the balance in the roles that both government and user-groups play to classify 
co-management into five broad types: instructive, consultative, cooperative, 
advisory and informative. In those cases in which government only informs 
users on the decisions they plan to make (instructive) or in which mecha-
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nisms exist for governments to consult with users but all decisions are taken 
by government (consultative), although being participatory to a degree, do 
not qualify as co-management since government and resource users do not 
collectively develop, implement or monitor policy measures. Hence also those 
cases in which fisheries management boils down to being de facto resource 
users’ self-management, such as community based management, do not qua-
lify as co-management. Although in cases such as in Ise Bay in Japan and 
the Customary Fishing Rights Areas in Fiji, where local users’ (community) 
institutions manage the resource and are sanctioned by government, the ma-
nagement itself does not constitute a cooperative process of policy making 
with the state. Consequently traditional marine tenure systems, traditional 
fisheries management systems and community-based resource management 
are not considered to be co-management because government is not involved 
in the decision-making process (Sen and Raakjær, 1996).
In order to analyse a system of co-management it should be viewed in its 
proper local historical and institutional setting. For EU fisheries this implies 
that in order to analyse co-management it should be put in the context of 
the EU fisheries governance extending from the supranational, national and 
regional to the local level. EU fisheries management, captured under the 
Common Fisheries Policy, is one of only five areas of exclusive competence 
of the European Commission. This extraordinary elevation of marine conser-
vation reflects the complexity of fisheries management within the EU (Haw-
kins, 2005). Although the EU enjoys the ability to adopt binding legislation 
that requires no review or ratification at the national level, the responsibility 
for implementation falls upon member states (Jordan, 2001). Hence the EU 
Member States have within the context of the CFP regulations, a degree of 
freedom to develop national regulations and organise the way responsibilities 
in fisheries management are shared between the national authorities and sta-
keholder groups. 
3�3 Partnerships and marine governance
Founded on great optimism about the possibility of progress by the applica-
tion of rationality and the state’s capacity to solve societal problems by rati-
onal policy making and comprehensive planning, early environmental politics 
can be characterised as being state-initiated, based on scientifically deduced 
standards, and presuming loyalty from both market and civil society in its 
actual implementation. Starting in the late 1960s and 1970s a gradual shift 
in environmental politics can be witnessed. Fuelled by scepticism about sci-
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entistic optimism, a critique on the one-sided one dimensional character, the 
limits of rationality, and the (unforeseen and neglected) external effects of 
environmental policies developed. The criticism focussed on the lack of equa-
lity, emancipation, democracy and participation of prevailing environmental 
policies (van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). This call for increased participation 
and innovation of environmental polices was labelled political modernisation 
(van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). In this process of modernisation the cen-
trality of the state as a political actor is decreasing, providing leeway for an 
increasing role for politicisation within other spheres of society. Hence in this 
process an increasing interweaving of state, market and civil society takes 
place, a process in which the common formulation of the problem and the 
design of its most adequate solution strategies are part of the policy-making 
process. These basic features are reflected in a variety of participatory, in-
teractive and deliberative patterns and practices of policy-making that we 
witness throughout contemporary Europe (van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003).
In such environmental partnerships between government and industry, 
through which solutions to environmental problems can be negotiated, a shift 
occurs towards a focus on tackling the source of environmental problems, 
not merely dealing with the impacts. Analysing these partnerships Glasber-
gen (2007) portrays a strong state no longer as a state that is able to run 
from a central position but rather as one that is able to stimulate the self-
governing capacities of stakeholders on sustainability issues. To improve the 
regulatory capacities of governments a shift is made towards new institutio-
nal arrangements involving representatives of the state, the market and the 
civil society with the emergence of partnerships and other forms of ‘co-’ and 
 ‘self-’ governance. 
Looking at the examples of fisheries co-management described earlier, fis-
heries co-management presents such a partnership arrangement of a coalition 
between state and fishers. The coming about of a fisheries co-management 
arrangement presents a shift in the relationships between the institutions 
of state, market and civil society involved in fisheries management and im-
plies new conceptions and structures of governance (Arts and van Tatenhove, 
2004). However, identifying the fishers as representing the private domain 
driven by a market rationale, hence depicting fisheries co-management as a 
simple state-industry arrangement, does not seize the reach of the partner-
ship. The majority of fishermen have a dual-actor position both as profes-
sionals and members of a local community, hence combine a rational econo-
mic efficiency paradigm with social and emotional drivers such as long term 
continuity of the family firm and a sense of belonging to the local community. 
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This is congruent with Glasbergen’s (2007) description of a shift from the 
state-centred approach towards a more pluralistic approach in which the goal 
is to refine the definition of quality of life encompassing material welfare and 
social equity, recognising self-governing capacities of business and organisa-
tions in civil society. 
Like for example in the US where fisheries governance extents from the fe-
deral to the regional levels (May, 2008), the EU fisheries governance extents 
from the supranational, national, regional to the local level. Today the vast ma-
jority of policy areas have some supranational characteristics, such as quali-
fied majority voting and co-decision making with the European Parliament 
(Jordan, 2001). No longer is the nation state in control of the policy making 
process but shares responsibility at the regional and international level (such 
as the EU) and operates in an arena with non-governmental organisations 
and other private or quasi-private bodies. As Loeber et al. (2005) conclude: 
the nation-state in the later half of the 20th century has become a collection 
of social and economic actors who are, as inhabitants, nominally based in a 
country but who participate in diverse dynamic social and economic networks 
that stretch across national boundaries. Hence, fisheries co-management wit-
hin the sphere of the EU CFP is a public-private partnership at (sub)national 
level, within the context of a multi-level participatory governance arrange-
ment involving the national and supranational level. 
3�4 Co-management in Dutch fisheries 
After the Second World War, and particularly since the 1960s, the Dutch 
North Sea fishing fleet for flatfish developed rapidly. The growth of the sector 
was based upon a technical innovation, the double-beam-trawl, which was 
introduced at the end of the 1950s, and the development of an export mar-
ket for flatfish. As a result, over the years the Dutch beam-trawler fleet has 
increasingly concentrated on flatfish, especially sole and plaice (Dubbink and 
van Vliet, 1992).
Towards the end of the 20th century Dutch fisheries management can be cha-
racterised as an ongoing process of restricting fisheries. Before 1975 Dutch 
fishermen had quite some freedom to decide on their operations; the level of 
regulation was rather modest. This fitted into the national political philosophy 
based on ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘sovereignty in own circle’ (van Hoof et al., 2005). 
In an organisational sense this is exemplified by neo-corporatist institutions 
in fisheries (but also in agriculture and many other sectors) in which govern-
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ment and organised interests (mainly trade unions and employer associati-
ons) jointly develop and implement social-economic policies. The government 
does not operate at a distance and organised interests do not have to lobby; 
they are welcome partners at the table. There is consultation at all stages of 
legislation and policymaking. Often this is institutionalised in advisory bodies, 
but much coordination takes place in an informal way.
In 1975, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission established Total Al-
lowable Catches (TACs) for several species of fish, including sole and plaice. 
Based on ‘historic rights’ Dutch fishers were allocated over seventy per cent 
of the TAC for sole, and nearly forty per cent of the TAC for plaice. These 
TACs did not provide secure property rights as the flatfish fishery would be 
closed once the national quotas for sole and plaice were exhausted. Since 
everyone knew that fishing could be closed any day, uncertainty spread. The 
outcome, i.e. the fishermen’s race for fish, became even more stimulated 
than before (Dubbink and van Vliet, 1992). 
Hence with the system of a national TAC the race for fish was not eliminated 
and until the late 1980s the Dutch fleet was expanding, both in terms of to-
tal capacity (measured in horsepower), in supply of fish (in weight and real 
value) and in employment. In reaction, Dutch government organised an indi-
vidual quota system for the two major flatfish species: sole and plaice (Smit, 
1997), initially as Individual Quota which could not be sold, leased, or used 
as collateral, developing into an official system of IQ trade including a central 
clearing institution (Smit, 2001). 
Because many fishermen had been investing heavily in fishing capacity 
throughout these years, many fishermen faced a discrepancy between their 
fishing rights and their fishing capacity: they did not obtain/have quota rights 
for their new and bigger ships, ships which were financed on the basis of easi-
ly accessible loans. As a result, “fishermen felt on one shoulder the weight of 
their financial burden and the banks that told them to keep on fishing and on 
the other shoulder the hand of the government that told them to quit fishing” 
(Dubbink and van Vliet, 1992).
According to Smit (1997) fishermen tried to dodge the system, putting up 
a smoke screen around landing declarations. This period of rapid expansion 
of the Dutch fishing industry was characterised by reports of illegal fishing, 
under-reporting of catches, grey and black trade circuits and inadequate poli-
cing and enforcement by the Dutch state (van Ginkel, 2005): the national ad-
ministration was not prepared for a rather large system to keep track of lan-
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dings (of each individual vessel in Dutch and foreign ports) and enforcement 
was weak (Smit, 1997). Catches continued to exceed the national quotas and 
as a consequence of failure to contain the problem a political crises evolved 
in 1990 in which it was clear that the command-and-control regulation failed 
to police fishermen’s behaviour. 
During the mid-1980s a growing political concern about the non-compliance 
with the quota regulations evolved. Until the late 1980s three factors enabled 
the fishermen to land considerable quantities of “black” and “grey” flatfish in 
addition to their legal quotas: (1) a weak monitoring and enforcement policy; 
(2) low fines for violations; and (3) logistical and administrative help from the 
auctions (Dubbink and van Vliet, 1992). A growing awareness occurred that 
the involvement of the public authorities in the continuation of illegal beha-
viour could no longer be tolerated (Dubbink and van Vliet, 1992). In order 
to regain legitimacy of the fisheries policy, negotiations between the fishers 
and fisheries managers on the establishment of co-management groups were 
devised. A simultaneous increase in the sole TAC helped to calm down the 
flatfish fishermen’s discontent with the European and national fishery measu-
res and led to greater compliance with quota regulations.
Aim was to give responsibility to the Dutch fishery sector through self-ma-
nagement. To arrive at devolution of specific management responsibilities to 
fishermen, they had to organise themselves into groups – the so-called ‘Bies-
heuvel groups’, named after the chairman of the committee that advised on 
the new policy, former Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel. Parliament threa-
tened to introduce regulations to generically limit engine power should the 
fishing industry decide not to accept organisation in groups. This became 
known as ‘de stok van Mok’9. Because of this threat of limiting engine po-
wer but also because group members were entitled to more days-at-sea than 
non-members and the period in which the latter can trade quota is restricted, 
ninety-seven per cent of all beam trawl fishermen joined the co-management 
system. 
The aim of the management groups was twofold: first, to arrive at an ef-
fective and efficient system of quota compliance that would be supported 
by the fishers; secondly, to improve economic performance within the quota 
restrictions. The Biesheuvel co-management regime to a large extent hinged 
on the idea of social control and peer pressure. The management groups are 
administered by a board, consisting mainly of fishermen but chaired by an 
9 Mok’s stick, named after the 1992 advice of the commission chaired by Mr M. R. Mok looking 
into a forced capacity reorganisation
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independent chairman. The primary task of the management groups is to ma-
nage and control the quota of their members. Fishermen were free to choose 
their group. Within these groups the individual fishermen pool their individual 
quota and their days-at-sea. Fishermen remain the owners of their catching 
rights and days-at-sea but within the group they can easily and in the short 
term buy, sell or lease quotas and days-at-sea, in the event that they have a 
shortage or a surplus. In this way the individual fishermen gain more short-
term flexibility and have more options to react to unexpected events. Fisher-
men have to deliver a “fish plan” to the board, presenting how they want to 
spread their days-at-sea and catches over the year (Dubbink and van Vliet, 
1992).
Beam trawl fishers appreciate the co-governance system because it gives 
them a say in the management of the group and their own firm; it increases 
their flexibility because they can transfer quotas and days-at-sea; it provides 
them with the certainty to take their quota share at the time they deem eco-
nomically most rewarding; and the likelihood that others will dodge the rules 
and regulations has decreased (van Ginkel, 2005). However, although the 
Biesheuvel regime has delegated considerable responsibility to fishers for 
quota management, government still is in control of fisheries management. In 
addition, fishermen do not perceive the co-management system as providing 
a platform to participate in the general cycle of policy design and implemen-
tation. 
3�5 Dutch co-management system in perspective
The introduction of the Dutch co-management system clearly played a role 
in both bringing back legitimacy to the system as increasing compliance with 
the quota management. Since the start of the co-management system offi-
cial landings of both plaice and sole have been below the TAC, hence in that 
respect the system has shown a clear improved performance. Also, especially 
compared to the period of great turmoil of the 1990’s, the costs of the ma-
nagement system have been reduced greatly. In the early days of the system 
over the period 1989 – 1992 we see a reduction of costs of the inspection 
service of 20% and a reduction of registered infringements of 32%. Five years 
later the annual costs of inspections have been reduced by 45% and the num-
ber of registered infringements reduced by 90%. (Based on AID, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 2000). In addition social costs (unrest and an unstable system) have 
been reduced. This has led internationally to the image of the fisheries control 
in the Netherlands ITQ system, which is largely based on self-responsibility 
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among the local producer organisations (management groups), to be regar-
ded as a best-practice model by the EU (Hentrich and Salomon, 2006). 
By inclusion of the fishers into the management system and founding the 
system in social control and peer pressure, the legitimacy of the system is 
increased. Also a shift is noticed in the driver for compliance, from an eco-
nomic rational towards a more social normative rational. At the onset fishers 
approached compliance as a calculation of the economic gain to be obtained 
from bypassing the regulation compared to the likelihood of detection and the 
severity of the sanction. As the severity of the penalty was considered minor 
vis-à-vis the profit to be gained non-compliance became the rule. In fact the 
last haul of a week’s fishing trip was considered to be the haul to pay for the 
fines. With the transition towards management in (local) groups with joint 
responsibility for the management of the quota the utility maximisation focus 
gave way for a more normative approach emphasising the social normative 
values of the fishers. 
The Dutch fisheries co-management system is a public-private partnership, 
using the capacities and interests of user-groups, complemented by the abi-
lity of the fisheries administration to provide enabling legislation and admi-
nistrative assistance. Looking at the experiences of the Dutch case and other 
examples from around the globe resource user participation, such as in fis-
heries co-management, proves to be a functioning alternative for top down 
centralistic government management of natural resources (Jentoft and Mc-
Cay, 1995; Raakjær and Vedsmand, 1995; Sen and Raakjær, 1996; Kearney 
et al., 2007; May, 2008; Smith et al., 2008; Ashida, 2009).
The introduction of the co-management system in the Netherlands has 
brought about a change in the basic governance fabric of fisheries manage-
ment by devolving part of management responsibilities from government to 
user-groups10. But then again, following Smit (1997) in his analysis of the 
Dutch ITQ system, the co-management system has to share the credit for 
success with other developments. Beginning around 1987, top down con-
trol was intensified, accompanied by licensing, input management (maximum 
days-at-sea), and maximum gear width for double-beam trawls. The days-at-
sea restrictions had a strong impact, especially in the early years. A maximum 
engine capacity of 2000 HP for new ships was set and a development towards 
fleet reduction emerged. Decommission schemes and Dutch vessels being 
10 Information based on a series of interviews with key players in the Dutch fisheries sector 
ranging from fishermen and their organisations and fisheries managers through other related 
organisations and ENGOs.
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reflagged to fish under adjoining EU countries’ flags have led to a capacity 
reduction in the Netherlands.
In fact, in real terms what is labelled a co-management system is in practice 
a mere ITQ management system. Hence the core of the system is not a joint 
management of fish stocks but a decentralised effort of monitoring quota 
uptake and keeping landings in line with set TAC. One can easily argue, as 
is also shown by the history of the coming about of the Biesheuvel groups, 
that the interest of the individual fishermen laid much more in gaining access 
to the ITQ trade system and additional days-at-sea under the threat of par-
liament to be subject to a generic cut in engine capacity, than a development 
towards a joint management of marine resources.
Using Raakjær and Vedsmand’s (1999) classification of co-management, the 
actual management of quota at group level is an example of cooperative ma-
nagement, where responsibilities of government are devolved to user-groups. 
However, the user-groups have no direct input in the wider policy development 
process rather than a mere instructive role. In fact, in looking at the polity 
and politics aspects of Dutch fisheries management, it is still the Directorate 
for Fisheries leading the development and implementation of fisheries policy. 
Co-management takes places “in the shadow of hierarchy” (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2005) as government has a pivotal role in providing the legal basis for 
the functioning of co-management arrangements (Raakjær et al., 2004) and 
to fulfil a role in monitoring and control of the system. As shown for the Dutch 
case and as documented by Raakjær (2003) for Danish fishermen, groups of 
users will be reluctant to in fact police their operations among themselves. In 
the Dutch system the fishermen clearly look at government to fulfil a role in 
enforcement of the management rules of the system. In the Dutch case the 
‘stok van Mok’, the threat of mass capacity reduction, portrays public autho-
rities organising self-regulating governance networks backed by the threat of 
replacing the horizontal network governance with hierarchical rule. 
One could argue that the current Dutch co-management arrangement is a 
system of limited participation and devolution. Fishers are not actively parti-
cipating in an interactive process of policy development. Although for a mi-
nor part fishermen’s participation in the management system has increased 
(quota administration and trade), in other areas of fisheries management 
their role has not been altered. The latter becoming very obvious when gover-
nment, enthusiastic about the success of the co-management system and wil-
ling to embark on an increase of co-operation in more policy dossiers, sought 
the devolution of more (monitoring and control) tasks to the co-management 
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system, which was being turned down by the fishing sector. As stated by Ed 
Nijpels, chairman of the commission looking into a recalibration, extension 
and broadening of the co-management system, taking more responsibility 
in fisheries management is perceived as possible by the fishing sector but 
only if implemented under equal circumstances for all (North sea) fishermen 
(Nijpels, 2003). It is only after prolonged discussions between industry and 
government that in 2005 the co-management system was extended to also 
include the management of engine capacity (Anon., 2004; Hoefnagel, 2007). 
In fact the Dutch system centres much more on a decentralised monitoring 
and surveillance system for a single objective: quota management (and since 
2005 engine capacity management). In that sense the Dutch system does not 
represent an environmental policy instrument in which the constellation of 
state, market and civil society is fundamentally altered to accommodate com-
mon formulation of the problem and the design of its most adequate solution 
strategies as part of the policy-making process. Rather we see a shift from 
an arrangement of monitoring and control in which the state at first is directly 
involved in quota management and later operates more at a distance with the 
groups of fishers managing quota uptake. 
So in conclusion, the Dutch co-management system only involves a relative 
small portion of fisheries policy: quota uptake management. And then again, 
one should realise that although some changes have occurred in the polity and 
politics of fisheries management, this has only accrued to a limited number of 
actors: the fishermen. Other stakeholders and interested parties do not form 
part of this arena, yet of course do have their separate fora to influence the 
policy process. In fact co-enforcement seems to be a more appropriate term; 
fishermen in their Biesheuvel groups and central government through the 
AID, the General Inspection Service of the Ministry of Agriculture together 
see to implementation of quota rules (set by the EU and government). This 
arrangement apparently does provide benefits to the fishers, such as access 
to a quota trade system and joint management of group quota, hence their 
willingness to partake. 
3�6 A role for a Fisheries Control Agency
If we try to translate the Dutch experience to the challenge raised by EU Ma-
ritime Commissionaire Borg in bringing about a culture of compliance in fis-
heries management, the first conclusion is that certainly the system of Bies-
heuvel groups to manage quota has in the Netherlands lead to a system that 
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brought about an increased compliance with the management system. The 
introduction of the Dutch system is a clear example of how an arrangement of 
fisheries management can be developed with greater fishermen involvement. 
However, still within the system there is a need for enforcement of the rules. 
If this takes place within a co-management system, such as in the Dutch 
Biesheuvel groups based upon self management and the principals of social 
control and peer pressure, there still is a need for an outside agent (perhaps 
at a distance) with vested monitoring and enforcement powers to be called 
upon by the actors within the system if required. 
By inclusion of the private actors (fishers) into the arrangement of fisheries 
management the compliance to the rules of TAC and quota improved. In the 
Dutch case it resulted in a situation with increased compliance and lower 
costs both in terms of costs of monitoring and surveillance but also in reduc-
tion of costs of illegal and unreported landings and trade. Co-management 
in the Dutch case is a mixture of government set legal measures, economic 
advantages and peer normative control. If the problem of the fisheries ma-
nagement system is its enforcement (as is claimed by Commissioner Borg 
in introducing the Community Fisheries Control Agency) the Dutch example 
shows that in stead of introducing more enforcement and control one can 
also establish a system based on shared responsibilities and less government 
control in order to regain compliance. 
Would such a system be an option for the EU at large? The essence of co- 
management is fisheries management implemented in conjunction with local 
groups of fishermen. This regionalisation of fisheries management is in line 
with the EU strive for bringing fisheries management to the regional level, 
such as for example illustrated by the introduction of the Regional Advisory 
Committees. As EU fisheries governance extents from the supranational, na-
tional and regional to the local level the question of scale and at which level 
to organise the management arrangement needs to be addressed. The co-
management arrangement has to fit in with the local and national institutional 
setting. Hence it would be logical to organise management groups around 
similar regional practices such as for example metiers. 
This then brings to bear the question of where in a EU co-management sys-
tem to organise the enforcement. From the perspective of the CFP and fis-
heries management as supranational arrangement it would seem logical to 
organise enforcement at a central EU level, as for example is proposed in the 
Community Fisheries Control Agency. If organised and unified at a central 
level all arrangements would be controlled in a similar way, hence building 
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a level playing field. However, the sheer character of modern governance, 
fuels the development of varying local institutional solutions. On the one 
hand there is a shift in the focus of democratic politics and practices, from 
hierarchical and well-institutionalised forms of government towards less for-
malised practices of governance, in which state-authority makes way for an 
appreciation in politics of mutual interdependence (van Tatenhove and Leroy, 
2003). On the other hand there is a shift in the locus of democratic politics: 
governance at subnational and supranational levels is gaining importance vis-
à-vis the national level (van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). A continued call for 
increased local and activity specific participation, will result in a plethora of 
locally specific and divers forms of partnerships. In this case one can query 
the relevance of unified and universal agencies for control and enforcement 
at a European level. 
Yet, it is right in this setting, with on the one hand a call for unification and 
a level playing field in control and enforcement and on the other hand a call 
for local specific (hence diverse and differing) arrangements, that a Com-
munity Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) could take up a role. As the co-
management arrangement will be locally specific, the national government 
will be responsible for enforcement at Member State level. The role of the 
CFCA could be one of enabling these local arrangements by unifying rules, 
maintaining standards and ensuring compliance. This can be operationalised 
by taking up the role of outside agent creating a level playing field by pulling 
together and standardising the generic CFP rules and enforcement practices, 
leaving ample room for (sub)national and regional co-management practices 
to be developed. 
3�7 Conclusions
From the Dutch case we learn that co-management within the CFP is a viable 
option. Co-management is a specific local participatory arrangement fitting 
the local institutional setting. However, we also learn from the Dutch case 
that Dutch fisheries co-management is not so much a participatory interac-
tive policy arrangement, with fishers actively involved in the process of policy 
development, but is an arrangement in which part of management and enfor-
cement is devolved to the fishers, shared with the enforcement agent of the 
government: a situation of co-enforcement.
The EU Community Fisheries Control Agency can play a role in establishing 
co-management at a wider EU scale by providing an enabling environment in 
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which such subnational and national arrangements can be developed. On the 
other hand it can play a role in co-enforcement by taking up the role of enfor-
cement agent at a distance, sharing this role with the national enforcement 
agencies. 
Co-management: An alternative to enforcement?
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Declining fish stocks have led governments over the years to deploy tra-
ditional top-down measures which have led to an economic inefficient and 
overcapitalised fishery, a remaining pressure on the resource (van Hoof et 
al., 2007a) and a fisheries management system in crisis (Raakjær, 2008). The 
lack of legitimacy is often perceived in EU fisheries management as the factor 
leading to governments failing to effectively govern fisheries (cf. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 2001b; Hawkins, 2005; Sissenwine and 
 Symes, 2007; Commission of the European Communities, 2008a).
In the wider field of environmental politics we can notice a gradual shift in 
political participation triggered by criticism on the state regarding both its 
ignorance of environmental effects of decisions and the lack of participation 
of the people affected. The criticism on the nation state of its fundamental 
incapability to protect the environment (Mol, 2007) was followed by a call 
for an innovation of environmental polices (van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). 
Challenges or risks in society post to the state today cannot be dealt with 
by the classical, state-centred system of the industrial society. A decreasing 
centrality of the state as a political actor, and an increasing interweaving of 
state, market and civil society, in which the common formulation of the pro-
blem and the design of its most adequate solution strategies are part of the 
policy-making process, is perceived as the way forward.
In Europe, fisheries management traditionally takes place in a neo-corporatist 
arena, in which government and organised fishing industry interests jointly 
develop and implement social-economic policies (van Hoof et al., 2005). This 
neo-corporatist foundation has provided a stage in the Netherlands for the 
development of a co-management system in fishing quota management. Next 
to this joint policy implementation we have witnessed over the past years 
the coming about of new ways of policy making in Dutch fisheries by way of 
so called covenants: a social contract between state, market and society on 
fisheries management. In this article I will use these Dutch experiences of 
covenants to analyse the role and function of such covenants and seek to 
analyse their wider implication for fisheries management within the context 
of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
In section 2 a theoretical frame for the analysis of covenants will be presen-
ted. In section 3 I will present the three fisheries covenants developing in the 
Netherlands: the management of engine capacity in the cutter fleet, North 
Sea cutter fisheries and Mussel fisheries. In section 4 I will analyse the role 
of Dutch fisheries covenants and in section 5 I will draw some conclusions.
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4�1 Theory of covenants
After the first decades of modern environmental policy (1970-1990), in which 
environmental aims were translated into standards for products and produc-
tion processes (Glasbergen, 1998) we can, following Chappin et al. (2009), 
see the transition from at first central management by means of coercion and 
incentives, via interactive management and internalisation (target group po-
licy, covenants or voluntary agreements), towards self-management. 
Covenants are more or less formal agreements between a governmental 
organisation (usually a ministry) and a representative of the private sector 
(usually a sector organisation) with the intent of achieving national environ-
mental policy aims on a voluntary basis (Glasbergen, 1998). Covenants are a 
form of soft law, such as declarations of intent, social contracts, ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ or simply ‘agreements’, in which the operationalisation and exe-
cution is delegated to social partners and organisations (‘self-regulation’). 
Covenants are produced and implemented according to a procedure in which 
the government is integrated, but in which the social partners take the actual 
lead in delivering the goods. They regulate ‘how’ themes and issues of com-
mon concern can be tackled, and like most soft law are procedural rather than 
substantive (Korver and Oeij, 2005).
Following Korver and Oeij (2005), for government the advantage is that cove-
nants may compensate for the defects of traditional legislation, substituting 
for the declining power of ‘command and control’. With the covenant the 
government enlists the cooperation of non-public parties in order to achieve 
its goals. For the latter (for example, companies and social partners) the ad-
vantage is an enhanced predictability of the behaviour of public authorities: 
by binding themselves, they also bind the government. Paradoxically, though 
legally unenforceable, the covenant guarantees the non-governmental par-
ties a measure of legal security they would not otherwise have. They are not 
like regular contracts, nor are they laws: they bind, yet not in a legal sense. 
Rather than prescribe, they create mutual commitment. They do not stress 
hierarchy, but emphasize reciprocal dependence, treating dependence not as 
a weakness to overcome, but as a model for discovering the advantages of 
cooperation. 
Over time we have seen the nature of covenants change. According to Glas-
bergen (1998) in a first phase, single issue voluntary agreements for specific 
environmental issues (such as waste management, water management and 
energy efficiency) or for a certain product were developed. Gradually these 
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gave way for more complex ’second-phase’ agreements, aimed at lowering 
the overall emissions of a sector of industry; they span a long period of time; 
and they call for a specific type of institutionalised co-operation between in-
dustry and government in which a consensual track (agreements on the basis 
of mutual trust) merges with the legal track (binding standards for products 
and production processes). To this we want to add the emergence of a third 
generation of negotiated agreements in which not only government and indus-
try are involved but also the societal environmental concern, as represented 
by Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) becomes part 
of the negotiated agreement. Hence a shift in government rule making from 
top-down policies towards more participatory policy development and from 
state centred stages to constellations involving state, market and society.
For a covenant to be successful, according to Bressers and Bruijn (2005), 
target groups need to have a clear motive for joining the ‘voluntary’ negotiati-
ons. This stick can have many forms. In some cases it is the government thre-
atening to introduce tough regulations that drives industry to the negotiating 
table. In other cases it is public opinion that makes industry realise change 
was inevitable. Covenants need to be embedded in the policy system as other 
instruments can support the covenant, and vice versa; direct regulation can 
deal with free-riders, subsidies can help lift technological barriers. The sole 
use of covenants will be less effective than the design of a complete package 
containing many instruments. If all partners know the precise measures to be 
taken beforehand, it is questionable whether direct regulation would not be 
a more efficient way to proceed; as negotiation processes can carry on for 
years the transaction costs involved in the negotiation processes before and 
after concluding the covenant are substantial. The question of whether these 
efforts are justified is legitimate. This means that covenants are probably 
best used in a certain phase of a policy cycle, namely for dealing with pro-
blems that need further exploring before solutions are found. 
Compliance is partially dependent on the idea that changes are inevitable 
(Bressers and Bruijn, 2005). Knowing that they will have to improve the envi-
ronmental performance one way or another may create a sense of ‘normality’ 
to the induced changes, however what is rational on the level of the sector 
may not be so obvious on the level of an individual firm that may act as a 
free rider (Bressers and Bruijn, 2005). Hence there is an apparent need for 
a stick behind the door to ensure enforcement of the regulation and a stick 
before the door to create the sense of urgency needed to enter the agree-
ment. While the operationalisation of public goals and policy implementation 
is delegated to social partners and organisations (the ‘self regulation’ aspect 
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of covenants), the government’s role is to regulate self-regulation (Leisink 
and Hyman, 2005). 
In analysing covenants, following Smit et al. (2008) two perspectives can 
be taken: a business administration perspective and a public administration 
perspective. The business perspective provides insights in the rationale of 
(actors in) supply chains and networks of firms, the public administration 
perspective focuses on policy networks dealing with the various actors, their 
interests, and the influence they try to exert on each other and on the policy 
to be formulated. 
From the public administration perspective already two distinct uses of the 
covenant can be seen. On the one hand government can seek to deploy the in-
strument when top down regulation fails. By reaching an agreement between 
government and sector the state has an agreement to which the industry will 
have to comply. In this State – Industry agreement, basically the phase one 
and two agreements as described by Glasbergen above, industry gains parti-
cipation in setting the rules in exchange for compliance to the rules. 
Another option for government is the use of the covenant as a tool for conflict 
resolution. In case a discussion between for example industry and ENGOs 
has reached a stalemate, the covenant becomes a pivotal instrument in the 
negation process. Although government will still be part of the final agree-
ment, it demands the quarrelling stakeholders to produce a path towards a 
solution. In this case the agreement will be between state, market (industry) 
and society (ENGOs). 
Hence in order to analyse covenants we will have to analyse the role and 
position of the parties involved and, from both a business perspective and a 
public administration perspective, look at the scope and aims of the agree-
ment reached. In addition, in analysing the way in which the agreement is 
translated into a concrete plan of action and the way the covenant is intended 
to be monitored and evaluated will shed some more light on the very nature 
of the agreement as rather a tool for conflict resolution or environmental po-
licy implementation; a distinction can be made whether a concrete solution 
needed to be identified or whether the covenant creates leeway for a process 
of solution implementation. Analysing the role of government in the process 
of the development of the covenant, together with the wider set of policy 
instruments deployed (financial support, policy measures), will reveal the in-
tend with which the instrument has been deployed. The consensus reached 
between the signing partners can bring to light the degree to which the cove-
nant is instrumental in regaining legitimacy of (fisheries) policy.
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4�2 Covenants in Dutch fisheries management
In a relative short period of 3 years a number of covenants have been signed 
in the Netherlands between the fishing sector and government and, with the 
exception of once case, Environmental NGOs. Following discussions between 
the Ministry responsible for fisheries11 and representatives of the fishing sec-
tor in the mid 2000s steps were taken to address issues of engine capacity 
management and the wider sustainability of North Sea cutter fisheries. More 
recent the stalemate between the fisheries sector and ENGOs on mussel 
seed fisheries in the Wadden Sea has been addressed.
Management of Engine Capacity
In 1975 the European Commission limited engine capacity for vessels ope-
rating in the 12-mile zone to a maximum of 300 Hp and a maximum 50 GRT 
(Gross Registered Tonnes). In the early 1980s the maximum of 50 GRT is 
traded for a maximum vessel length of 24 meters. This resulted in the deve-
lopment what later became known as the ‘Eurocutter’ fleet; a fleet of vessels 
operating in the coastal 12-mile zone with on average a length of 23.95 me-
ters (Hoefnagel, 2007) but considerable larger then 50 GRT, in fact at times 
larger than 160 GRT. This size of vessel could not be viably run on a 300 Hp 
engine and hence the sector dodged the rules and installed engines with lar-
ger capacity. 
By the end of the 1980s also the engine capacity of the North Sea fleet was 
limited to 2,000 Hp. Fishermen of this fleet segment also were quite reluctant 
to reduce engine capacity. As both fleets operate a beam trawl, the success 
of the operation with such an active gear is directly related to the engine 
capacity. Despite a seal plan (in which engines were sealed at a certain capa-
city) and increased inspections during the 1990 and early 2000s, government 
did not manage to enforce the rules and increase compliance. 
Following the introduction of an Individual Transferable Fisheries Quota (ITQ) 
system in the Netherlands in the 1980s a system of co-management was 
introduced in the 1990s. Groups of fishermen became responsible for the 
management of the quota uptake throughout the year. In the 2000s Dutch 
government, enthusiastic about the success of the co-management system 
and willing to embark on an increase of co-operation in more policy dossiers, 
11 Currently the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, before known as the Ministry 
for Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries; in the remainder of this chapter we will refer to it as ‘the 
Ministry’. 
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sought the devolution of more (monitoring and control) tasks to the co-ma-
nagement system, such as the management of the engine capacity. This offer 
was turned down by the fishing sector. As stated by Ed Nijpels, chairman of 
the commission looking into a recalibration, extension and broadening of the 
co-management system, taking more responsibility was perceived as possible 
by the fishing sector but only if implemented under equal circumstances for 
all (North sea) fishermen (Nijpels, 2003).
Following the report of the Steering Committee Nijpels mid 2000s the Minis-
ter had a series of what is commonly referred to as ‘fire place discussions’ 
with representative of the fisheries sector during which the Minister convey-
ed his concern about the environmental sustainability of the beam trawl fis-
heries and the compliance of the sector. These discussions resulted in a joint 
statement in 2004 in which the Minister and the fisheries sector expressed 
their intention to establish a sustainable, viable and a social responsible cut-
ter fisheries and their intent to embark on the required transition process 
(Anon., 2004). In this declaration it is stated that the fisheries sector itself 
will take responsibility to reduce the use of engines with a capacity larger 
then permitted in the fisheries license. It was felt that an approach in which 
the sector itself would regulate compliance to be an effective addition to the 
public control (De minister van Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, 2008). 
The ‘Werkgroep Motorvermogen’ (the engine capacity committee, a working 
group installed under the Nijpels committee) designed a private arrangement 
consisting of a framework of private inspections and sanctions. This arrange-
ment became operational mid 2005 and is a voluntary arrangement to which 
89% of the fishers signed up (Hoefnagel and van Mil, 2008). Fishers that sign 
up limit their engine to the capacity as permitted in their fishing license. To 
allow for a transition period those that have signed the agreement are al-
lowed to at the start of the campaign have an engine capacity that can be 
no higher then 400 hp, after which it has to be reduced to a maximum of 300 
Hp by 2009. For those that do not sign up, their engine capacity has to be 
brought in line with their fishing license immediately. Also the General Inspec-
tion Service of the Ministry (AID) performs random checks on 25% of those 
fishermen that have signed up for the arrangement but a 100% inspection on 
those that did not sign.
The fishermen groups that manage the quota uptake, also manage the engine 
capacity programme. If an infringement is found by the group members the 
culprit will be fined. If an infringement is detected by the AID an immediate 
reduction of the engine capacity is required in addition to the fine as set by 
the group in their management rules. 
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According to a preliminary evaluation of the arrangement both the AID, the 
Board members of the Fisheries Groups (responsible for implementation) as 
fishers seem to be content with the implementation of the arrangement; no 
infringements have been detected and engine capacity is set at the levels as 
agreed. However, two aspects have become clear: as the arrangement next 
to self control also aims at self financing of the implementation, and since no 
infringements have been detected, there is a financial deficit in the imple-
mentation of the arrangement. In addition, Board members of the fisheries 
groups experience a conflict in their roles, which on the one hand is enforcer 
of the public-private engine capacity agreement, on the other hand they are 
promoter of the interest of the fishermen (De minister van Landbouw Natuur 
en Voedselkwaliteit, 2008).
North Sea Covenant
In 2006 a Task Force Sustainable North Sea fisheries, established by the Mi-
nistry, consisting of representatives of the Ministry, the Fish Produce Board, 
fisheries sector and market organisations, Environmental NGOs, research 
institutions and fuelled by direct input from fishermen through a series of 
discussions, produced a report pinpointing the major challenges to reach sus-
tainable fisheries on the North Sea. There were two motives for the esta-
blishment of this task force. On the one hand the rapid increase in oil price 
seriously affected the viability of the fleet, which was already confronted with 
diminishing catch opportunities for a prolonged period of time (Task Force 
Duurzame Noordzeevisserij, 2006). On the other hand the societal accep-
tance of fisheries dwindled. Civil organisations, such as ENGOs, increasingly 
gained access to policy processes and are very critical of the sustainability of 
North Sea Beam Trawl fisheries. This is amplified by a development in the mar-
ket where increasingly retailers, especially supermarkets, request guaranteed 
sustainable fish production. The report concludes that in order to achieve a 
viable and sustainable fisheries, state, market, societal organisations and sci-
ence institutions should cooperate. It is directly suggested a covenant to be 
signed between the sector and the most relevant civil organisations in order 
to regain the required societal acceptance of North Sea Fisheries.
During 2007 fisheries organisations and Environmental NGOs started the 
discussion. Early 2008 the Ministry was asked to join the deliberations and 
by June 2008 the North Sea Covenant was signed between the Ministry, two 
Environmental NGOs, the Fish Produce Board and the 5 Fisheries Producers’ 
Organisations. The main agreements of the covenant were:
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- Obtaining MSC certification for a number of fisheries between 2009-
2012;
- Improve communication on sustainability aspects;
- Sustainable fisheries should become an integral part of the fisheries edu-
cational curriculum;
- Embark on a joint process of establishing goals and measures for the esta-
blishment of Marine Protected Areas, operationalising NATURA 2000 and 
OSPAR agreements;
- The management of flat fish stocks should result at stocks at Maximum 
Sustainable Yield level by 2015; a multi annual management plan, reduc-
tion of discards and a joint and transparent system of data collection and 
scientific support to policy should be developed.
For each of the 5 items above there are concrete tasks described for the state, 
industry and ENGOs to take up. In order to facilitate the required transition 
process of the cutter fisheries, government established a Fisheries Innovation 
Platform which could finance initiatives towards a more sustainable fisheries.
Monitoring of the process is agreed to be a joint activity and is part of a 
regular meeting (Groot Beheer Overleg, a semi-annual meeting of the main 
players from state, market and society). The signing parties agreed that each 
of them was responsible for the implementation of the covenant and had a 
task in both promoting this covenant publically and create support for the 
covenant in one’s constituency.
Mussel Covenant
In October 2008 the Minister signed a covenant with ENGOs and the Mus-
sel producers organisation to reach a transition in the mussel fisheries and 
restore nature in the Wadden Sea area. The signing of this covenant marks 
an end of a period commonly known as ‘the war on the Wadden Sea’. Twice 
a year fisherman from the Zeeland province in the South West of the Nether-
lands come to the Wadden Sea in the North to collect mussel seed which is 
then spread out on the plots in the river Schelde estuary in Zeeland were the 
mussel seed grows to reach consumption size. Based on a fisheries, in fact 
the mussel sector is the largest mariculture sector in the Netherlands.
The Wadden Sea is a protected area, regulated under the Key Planning De-
cision Wadden Sea (PKB), the establishment of the State Nature Reserve 
Wadden Sea (falling under the Nature Protection Act), the Fisheries Act, the 
Flora and Fauna Act and the Interprovincial Policy Plan for the Wadden Sea 
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(EcoMare, 2009), next to EU regulation of Bird and Habitat directive, Natura 
2000 area and the Water Directive. Ninety percent of the Wadden Sea has 
been designated as a State Monument. Fishery activities must fit in with the 
nature protection policy. That means that the effects of the fisheries on the 
environment must be taken into account: the benthic life, the marine mam-
mals and the food supply for birds. Undesired effects must be managed by 
limitation of fishing activity. In 2005 and 2008, the Council of State deci-
ded, based on a judicial procedure initiated by a number of ENGOs, that the 
Ministry unrightfully issued licenses to the mussel seed fisheries. The seed 
fisheries on wild banks contradicts the European Bird and Habitat Directive. 
The spring fishing in 2008 was consequently cancelled and the autumn fishing 
was being threatened.
The judicial procedures frustrated further development and threatened the 
viability of the mussel sector. In order to reach a way out of these doldrums 
a Commission was established by the Ministry which prepared the draft co-
venant, which was signed in October 2008 by the Minister, the Mussel Pro-
ducers Organisation and four ENGOs. The conservationists promised not to 
start any judicial procedure provided the mussel sector would do everything 
in its power to convert seed fishing and mussel cultivation into an environ-
mental-friendly industry by 2020. The covenant states that the Wadden Sea 
is a nature conservation area in which human activities can be tolerated as 
long as they are not conflicting with the main goal of nature preservation. 
Also the covenant provides a period in which the mussel fisheries is allowed 
to embark on a transition process towards a more sustainable mussel seed 
harvesting technique.
Early 2009 the covenant was translated into a plan of action of concrete ac-
tivities. Core of the plan is that by 2020 the traditional mussel seed fisheries 
is banned from the Wadden Sea and is being replaced by a method not inter-
fering with the bottom. In fact at the start 20% of the Wadden Sea is closed 
for mussel seed fisheries and annually this closure will be extended to a larger 
part of the Wadden Sea (Waddenzee, 2009). The covenant at the same time 
stipulates that the transition process should allow for a viable operation of 
the sector. Noting the past volatile history of the conflict between fishers and 
conservationists it is not surprising that this covenant addresses explicitly the 
fact that implementation of the covenant is the task of all signing parties and 
that in case there is disagreement parties will not start a judicial procedure. 
More over, it is stated that the covenant cannot be legally enforced.
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Following the signing of the covenant a work plan was developed by early 
2009 which provided concrete and detailed actions. Again specific roles and 
tasks are defined for government, the sector and the ENGOs. Main target 
is the progressive closing off of the Wadden Sea for bottom disturbing gear. 
This agreement between signing parties does have an effect on fisheries that 
are not part of this covenant such as the shrimp fisheries and static gear 
fisheries. The plan of action states that these actors should be included in 
the implementation of the plan. However, they are not part of the covenant 
signing parties.
Monitoring of implementation is again a task for the signing parties. A detai-
led evaluation programme has been incorporated in the work plan, based on a 
monitoring and research plan. The covenant partners will agree upon research 
institutions that will fulfil the scientific role in the monitoring of the implemen-
tation and the effects it has on the ecosystem.
The Mussel covenant was severely put under pressure May 2009 as one of 
the ENGOs that was not signatory to the covenant (the ‘Faunabescherming’ 
fauna protection foundation) challenged the permit for mussel fisheries on 
the Wadden Sea in court. The Council of State ruled that a further limitation 
of the mussel fisheries was in order and reduced the permit as given by the 
Ministry for mussel fisheries on the Wadden Sea with an additional 25%. The 
Dutch House of Representatives, in debating the outcome of this procedure, 
queried the value of the instrument of covenants as apparently in judicial pro-
cedures any individual or organisation can claim to be stakeholder and chal-
lenge the agreement reached in the covenant, often after a lengthy process of 
seeking compromise (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2009).
4�3 Analysing the character of Dutch fisheries cove-
nants
Over the last decade the Ministry developed the motto of ‘van zorgen voor 
naar zorgen dat’ (from taking care of towards enabling) which implies a shift 
in the position and role of government. Government seeks private initiative to 
reach policy goals, where before governmental rule making and enforcement 
were the preferred tools. In all the three Dutch fisheries management cases 
described above the government has opted for a voluntary agreement with 
industry to reach policy objectives. 
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In the case of the engine capacity arrangement main government concern 
seems to be to increase compliance to fisheries regulation. The existing rules 
and enforcement were apparently not sufficient to bring about the required 
industry behaviour. In fact the rules were easy to dodge, rules were not effec-
tively enforced and punishment was not felt to be restrictive12. The incentive 
to increase engine capacity is eminent in an active towed gear fisheries in 
which engine capacity determines to a large extent catch success. Govern-
ment tried for some time to get the industry to play a role in enforcement of 
these rules. Although at first held away, falling economic returns as a result of 
the prevailing high oil price which, as a side effect, induced a rationalisation of 
the use of fuel, hence engine capacity, and the pressure from society, ENGOs 
and the Minister to strive for sustainable production facilitated the industry 
to come to the negotiation table. As a result of the covenant compliance has 
increased based on a voluntary agreement but with the stick behind the door 
of inspections by the government control agency AID. 
The engine capacity state-industry agreement has a very clear path of im-
plementation and specific rules for those individuals not signing up to the 
covenant. Implementation is monitored by the state and by way of external 
evaluation at three moments in time the impact of the regulation is appraised. 
The necessity for the sector to comply is felt; in the light of the wider sustai-
nability discourse the sector perceives the need to change and the urgency 
to obtain a licence to produce. The agreement plays a role in opening the 
prisoners dilemma in which fishers point at each other for non-compliance; 
individuals are only inclined to change conduct when free rider behaviour is 
no longer tolerated.
Whereas the engine capacity agreement is a bilateral state-industry agree-
ment, the North Sea Covenant is a tripartite arrangement between state, 
industry and ENGOs. It aims at an environmental policy to obtain a viable and 
sustainable fisheries sector within the boundaries of a healthy ecosystem, 
yet bringing the environmental concern and the economic concern together 
to obtain an implementation plan. 
From the industry’s perspective the sector is confronted with dwindling re-
turns and a public opinion and a market that demand sustainable fish produc-
tion. In addition, the traditional neo-corporatist arena in which industry and 
government could negotiate policies is increasingly being influenced and in-
12 Fishers indicate that if punishment for excessive engine capacity would have been much stif-
fer (in the range of tying up vessels for a number of months and high fines) the rules would 
have been much more complied to (Hoefnagel, 2007).
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vaded by public concern as expressed by ENGOs. By entering the agreement 
the sector gains time, political support and resources (through the Fisheries 
Innovation Platform (FIP) and European subsidies of the Fisheries Fund) to 
embark on a transition process. From a societal perspective the covenant on 
the one hand brings about a process of necessary change and on the other 
hand it provides a stage on which environmental concerns can be directly 
discussed with the fishing sector and become part of the covenant when it 
comes to implementation. For the state the covenant creates leeway for in-
dustry to become sustainable in an environmental and economic sense yet si-
multaneously creates a sense of urgency to make this transition and provides 
a tool to put into effect a process of innovation while protecting the industry.
Although greatly influenced by the high oil price, which favours any project 
that will safe fuel and reduce costs, especially the FIP, with the possibility 
to embark on innovative technological and managerial processes, creates 
momentum for the industry to change towards more sustainable production 
techniques. Form the side of the ENGOs it shows that government and indus-
try are willing to make a major effort to change fishing practices. 
The North Sea covenant and its consecutive work plan consist of 5 themes 
on which agreement could be reached. It mainly consists of the intention 
between the signatories to address an array of issues that need further ope-
rationalisation. For example discard reduction, if one looks at the past history, 
can prove to be a volatile subject in which vision of ENGOs and industry 
might not be easy to bring together. 
As for the mussel covenant, from the perspective of government, the required 
transition of the mussel industry is hampered by mistrust and judicial proces-
ses between industry and ENGOs. In order to bring about a meaningful tran-
sition the stalemate caused by the ‘War on the Wadden Sea” needed to be 
ended. Government took a leading role in orchestrating the coming about of 
this covenant. Industry and ENGOs were persuaded to compromise in order 
to change the stalemate into a process of change. Out of the three voluntary 
fisheries agreements the mussel covenant is the one that most clearly still 
emulates differences of opinion between the signing parties. Also it consists 
of two main objectives and courses of action: transition of the mussel fishing 
techniques and the development of a Wadden Sea Nature Conservation plan. 
The covenant, in contrast to the other two arrangements, details quite an ar-
ray of actions to be undertaken by government. 
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For the industry the covenant provides a platform to continue operation while 
simultaneously embarking on a transition process. For the ENGOs giving up 
their resistance provides a role in the process of transition of the sector and 
simultaneously obtains the development of a nature conservation programme, 
which stretches beyond fishing activities. For government it provides a basis 
for meaningful change, providing a way to obtain time for the sector to adjust 
the production process to be able to continue operating in a nature reserve 
and ending a routine were all Minister’s decisions were challenged in court.
The mussel covenant is the most clear example of using the instrument for 
conflict regulation. It is also the covenant which depends to a large extend 
on outside independent (scientific) monitoring and evaluation. It is an agree-
ment that may have an effect on other fishers who were not signatories to 
the covenant.
So far the engine capacity covenant is perceived to be successful with no 
infringements and vessels having adjusted engine capacity. The North Sea 
covenant has facilitated a process of transition and an array of initiatives 
e.g. under the Fisheries Innovation Platform (subsidies for development of 
new fishing technology (pulse trawl, reduction of fuel consumption), impro-
ved marketing initiatives and sharing of knowledge among fishers) have been 
launched to support this process. The mussel covenant is put under pressure 
from parties not being signatory by contesting the agreement in court.
From a business perspective the three covenants differ in scope, incentives 
and rational to sign up to the voluntary agreement; the engine capacity agree-
ment allows for a transition period for the industry to adapt to the rules. The 
stick behind the door of government control and sanctioning together with 
the carrot of industry self control and a transition period for adjusting to the 
rules provides a platform for change. The North Sea covenant provides incen-
tives for change towards more sustainable fishery practices against the stick 
behind the door: a required licence to produce based on public opinion on the 
use of marine resources and especially supermarkets, requesting guaranteed 
sustainable fish production. The Mussel covenant provides the industry a way 
out of a stalemate on obtaining a fishing licence and hence allows for conti-
nuation of business.
From a public administration perspective government can have different roles 
and positions in the (process of arriving at an agreement of a) covenant. The 
engine capacity covenant is close to what Glasbergen (1998) refers to as 
a first phase single issue agreement for a specific issue between state and 
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industry. The state provides both stick (control and punishment) and carrot 
(transition period). In the North Sea covenant case government provides a 
carrot (funds and Fisheries Innovation Platform) and facilitates the process of 
industry and society conjointly developing a programme for more sustainable 
use of marine resources. In the Mussel case the carrot provided by the state 
(a conservation plan for the Wadden Sea) provided the leeway for industry 
and ENGOs to reach agreement on further use of the area for fisheries; hence 
government much more in the role of facilitator seeking to reduce conflict.
In all cases we see a repositioning of the state in relation to the actors from 
industry and society. The covenants are a manifestation of government ne-
gotiating fisheries policy in order to obtain a more sustainable use of marine 
resources. The degree of self-management differs between the three cove-
nants. In the North Sea covenant quite some opportunity can be found for 
the covenant partners to (re)define policy whereas under the engine capacity 
covenant policy is not renegotiated at all; in the end the industry will comply 
with prior existing regulation. 
Experiences from other sectors learn that at times the instrument of a cove-
nant is used as no more than non-committal agreements to look into the issue 
again (Glasbergen, 1998). In Dutch fisheries, noting the fact that the pres-
sure is put on the industry as their license to produce is under debate (quite 
literally as in the Mussel case), a sense of urgency is imminent. 
4�4 Conclusions
In all of the Dutch fisheries covenants a form of joint problem solving can 
be found. Also in all covenants government plays a significant role either as 
direct party or as facilitating party. In fact a large part of the covenants deals 
with the emergence of a transition trajectory towards more sustainable pro-
duction techniques. In such a trajectory the choice for a covenant by govern-
ment seems logical: it is not government’s role to define the how and who of 
a transition process, but government gains by stimulating that process and 
being involved in setting the (policy) goals.
On the other hand, the covenants define tasks for all signing parities, hence 
also specifically to government. In that sense a covenant is an instrument in 
which parties from industry and society can directly influence government 
policy. 
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Indeed in a transition in the role and position of government, from law maker 
and enforcer towards enabler, new instruments, such as negotiated cove-
nants are required. A covenant in that respect is clearly a tool that reflects 
a repositioning of government: in dialogue with stakeholders, with at times 
different stakes and concerns, agreement is reached on (policy) goals and 
ways to achieve these. Government is still part and parcel of the process and 
indeed remains in the role of final enforcer of the agreed targets. However, 
implementation is transferred to the other actors.
The covenant takes the form of a social contract in which the parties agree 
upon the implementation of a work plan and all players are committed to the 
implementation of that plan. Government is final party as to the enforcement 
of implementation, but all parties can hold each other accountable for imple-
mentation.
The Dutch cases show clearly that the instrument is utilised by the state in 
three differing settings and hence in three different ways. In the agreement 
on the management of engine capacity the government is using the instru-
ment as tool for increased compliance and enforcement of legislation. In the 
mussel covenant government uses the tool to pacify the nature conservation 
movement, which was obstructing policy implementation by taking all deci-
sions to court. The covenant serves as a conflict resolving measure. In the 
North Sea covenant government uses the input of civil society to persuade 
the fishing sector to embark on a more environmental sustainable mode of 
production. In fact it is public opinion that forces the fishing sector to the 
table; government positions itself as facilitator to embark on an action plan.
Clearly government can chose to be initiator of a covenant (engine capa-
city management) or can line up with public debate and facilitate the coming 
about of a social contract. Especially in those cases were state, market and 
civil society team up in a covenant the transparency, openness and accoun-
tability of the policy cycle is greatly enhanced. As a result the legitimacy of 
a covenant, as opposed to traditional top-down management, is much larger. 
The fact that public policy makers show a willingness to use alternative policy 
instruments as a stick behind the door to deal with environmental problems 
(in case the negotiated agreement fails) is a crucial factor for the positive 
performance of negotiated agreements (Bressers and Bruijn, 2005).
The emergence of covenants as policy instrument may seem a logical de-
velopment in Dutch fisheries as the fisheries was already managed under a 
form of co-management and the Netherlands are widely renowned for their 
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‘polder model’; the corporatist arrangements that lie at the heart of the capi-
talist economies of the small Western European countries, including the Ne-
therlands (Tjiong, 2005), in which a strive for negotiated consensus between 
government and industry is basis for conflict resolution. However in most 
of European fisheries management a form of neo-corporatism exists: a well-
defined exchange relation between state, market and civil society actors in 
which policies are made and implemented jointly, based on a commonly agreed 
substantive discourse, in which the participating organisations are granted 
privileged influence on public policy-making in exchange for disciplining their 
constituency (the fishermen) and restraining their demands (Frouws and van 
Tatenhove, 1993; van Hoof et al., 2005). Hence governments already have 
an institutional setting in which agreements with the fisheries sector can be 
reached. Whether this will allow for a major shift across the EU from traditio-
nal top-down management towards more novel policy arrangements, such as 
the negotiated tri-partite covenants, remains to be seen.
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In recent years a number of initiatives on EU marine policy have seen the 
light, among which the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP in 2002), 
the development of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD, 2005) 
and the introduction of the Integrated Maritime Policy (MP in 2007). The CFP 
is traditionally the platform for the conservation of (commercially exploited) 
fish stocks and the development of the structure and economics of fishing 
fleets. The MSFD is designed from an ecosystem conservation perspective 
(water quality objective) and stands in a tradition of directives already influ-
encing the marine sphere such as the bird and habitat directives and the wa-
ter directive. The MP is an instrument seeking integration over a multitude of 
different sectoral policies (i.e. shipping, oil and gas extraction, fisheries) ad-
dressing a plethora of different challenges, stakes and their representatives.
The development of the MSFD and the MP raises not only questions how the 
three sets of policies relate to one another, but also how the two major new 
marine initiatives affect the already existing CFP. The central question of this 
paper is: how is fisheries policy related to the new marine policy initiatives 
and how will the ecological and integrative objectives of MSFD and MP influ-
ence and affect the Common Fisheries Policy?
In section two the policy arrangement approach is presented. This theoreti-
cal framework makes it possible to describe and analyse the different policy 
arrangements of CFP, MSFD and MP and to explain the relations between 
MSFD and MP on the one hand and CFP on the other. In section 3 a start is 
made with the analysis of the fisheries arrangement. Dominant in the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy are neo-corporatist exchange relations and rules. This 
arrangement is both formulated and shaped on the level of member states, 
and on the level of the EU. The specific signature of the CFP-arrangement is 
analysed along the lines of the four dimensions of coalitions, resources, rules 
of the game and discourses. In sections 4 and 5  two marine policy arrange-
ments are described and analysed: the Marine Strategy Framework Direc-
tive and the Maritime Policy. In section six the two marine arrangements are 
confronted with the fisheries arrangement; how does the co-existence and 
plurality of arrangements structure the institutionalisation of marine policies 
and in what way is fisheries policy influenced by the marine arrangements? In 
section 7 some conclusions are drawn.
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5�1 A conceptual framework: the co-existence of 
policy arrangements
A policy arrangements can be defined as “the temporary stabilisation of the 
content and the organisation of a particular policy domain” (van Tatenhove et 
al., 2000; Liefferink, 2006). The structure of a policy arrangement can be ana-
lysed along four dimensions, the first three referring to the organisational, the 
last to the substantial aspects of policy (Liefferink, 2006; Arts et al., 2006):
- The actors and their coalitions involved in the policy domain;
- The division of resources between these actors, leading to differences in 
power and influence, where power refers to the mobilisation and deploy-
ment of the available resources, and influence to who determines policy 
outcomes and how;
- The rules of the game currently in operation, in terms of formal procedures 
of decision making and implementation as well as informal rules and ‘rou-
tines’ of interaction within institutions; and
- The current policy discourses, where discourses entail the views and nar-
ratives of the actors involved (norms, values, definitions of problems and 
approaches to solutions).
The policy arrangements approach is developed to understand and to analyse 
change and stability of policy processes, by studying the on-going institutio-
nalisation of policy arrangements (van Tatenhove et al., 2000; Arts and Leroy, 
2006; Arts et al., 2006). The institutionalisation of policy arrangements is the 
result of both the day-to-day interactions of actors in policy practices and 
processes of social and political change (political modernisation). Political 
modernisation refers to structural transformation processes within the politi-
cal domain of society (van Tatenhove, 1999; Arts and van Tatenhove, 2006). 
In interactions actors use rules, resources and discourses ‘to do things other-
wise’ (Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004). Processes of political modernisation 
result in a certain division of resources, specific rules and discourses which 
shape the interactions of actors within policy arrangements.
Political modernisation expresses the shifting locus and focus of politics. Po-
litics and policy are no longer framed within the nation-state model alone, 
but within a diversity of society-centred forms of governance. Governing is 
increasingly a shared responsibility of state, civil society and market actors. 
The shift in locus of governing refers to the emergence of new actors and new 
levels. Interest groups, fishermen, NGOs, firms, citizens and other non-state 
actors enter the arena of policy making both at the national and the internati-
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onal level. The nation state model seems to have lost its exclusiveness, as it is 
paralleled by a whole series of local, regional and global arrangements, while 
the traditional divides between the state, the market and civil society have 
been crossed. More and more policy-making is the result of state, society and 
market interrelations and in international politics the access of non-state ac-
tors to the international arena is not any longer via the state, they now sit at 
the table directly. The increase of actors goes hand in hand with the increasin-
gly multi-level character of political and policy processes. From the perspec-
tive of the nation state, one can witness an upward trend to the international 
and supranational level and a downward trend to the sub-national level. The 
shift in locus is accompanied by a shift in focus of policy and politics, refer-
ring to a shift in the rules of the game and steering mechanisms. New actors 
and multi-level forms of governance result in new practices of policy making 
in which the traditional formal rules of governing are challenged. In these 
new policy practices actors form state, civil society and market have the pos-
sibility to negotiate and even change the rules of the game. Moreover, state 
authority is making way for an appreciation of mutual independence in which 
tools and techniques are being developed to govern societal developments. 
This results in the co-existence of steering mechanisms; laws, international 
protocols and directives co-exist next to soft law, procedural regulation, cove-
nants and best practices.
To understand the dynamics of marine politics and its influence on fisheries 
arrangements a typology of policy arrangements is used, based on shifting 
ideas about the relationship between state, civil society and market. This ty-
pology consists of a diversity of arrangements, such as etatist, liberal-plura-
list, neo-corporatist, sub-political, reflexive, intergovernmental, supranational 
and transnational arrangements (based on van Tatenhove et al., 2000; Lief-
ferink, 2006; Arts, 2000; van Tatenhove, 2003). 
Etatism refers to the situation where state actors dominate the policy ar-
rangement. In etatist arrangements the political institutions are the ultimate 
locus of authoritative power and they therefore largely determine the con-
tents and the organisation of policies. Crucial resources are controlled by 
the state and other than state actors are placed in a dependent position and 
have limited access to decision-making. Liberal-pluralism denotes a market-
oriented model. No single actor dominates: resources are spread over a wide 
array of public and private parties (business, but also actors from civil society, 
such as NGOs). Characteristic for liberal-pluralist arrangements are rules, 
accommodating open competition between the parties involved. Competition 
also extends to the dimension of substantive discourses, with different actors 
promoting conflicting views of the policy problem at stake. Neo-corporatism 
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describes a well-defined exchange relation between state, market and civil 
society actors. In neo-corporatist arrangements political authority is shared 
by the state and some few accepted organisations of stakeholders. For other 
actors, gaining access is very difficult. Policies are made and implemented 
jointly, based on a commonly agreed substantive discourse. This is usually 
done in highly institutionalised settings, providing rules for negotiation and 
the search for consensus. In a neo-corporatist exchange relation functional 
interest organisations (for example fisheries organisations) possess a repre-
sentational monopoly, co-operating between each other and with the state on 
the basis of a political-economic consensus at the top. The participating orga-
nisations are granted privileged influence on public policy-making in exchange 
for disciplining their constituency (the fishermen) and restraining their de-
mands (Frouws and van Tatenhove, 1993; Frouws, 1993).
The shift in locus and focus of governance has given rise to the emergence 
of new types of sub-political and reflexive policy arrangements. State institu-
tions at different levels and institutionalised methods of decision making are 
still relevant and form important contexts for action, but much political action 
either takes place next to or across such orders, or is meant to establish 
new institutional rules (Hajer, 2003). While the traditional arrangements (eta-
tist, liberal-pluralist and neo-corporatist) are directed towards public policies 
mainly on the level of the nation state, the new arrangements focus on prac-
tices of policy making and politics outside the formal institutions of the state, 
challenging the established rules by re-defining the rules of the game. In the 
struggle to address problems that the established institutions fail to resolve 
in a manner perceived as both legitimate and effective, sub-politicisation, po-
litics taking place outside the formal political institutions of the state and 
interfering of rule-directed and rule-altering politics, may take shape in the 
form of new policy arrangements bringing together actors from state, market 
and civil society (van Tatenhove et al., 2006a).
Sub-political arrangements (Liefferink, 2006) are characterised by a mem-
bership, which is usually limited to stakeholders in the problem concerned. 
The role of the state is minimal, private actors control major resources. Usu-
ally, sub-political arrangements challenge the existing substantive discourse 
by presenting new, alternative discourses. Interaction within the arrangement 
is based upon the idea of ‘bottom-up’. In reflexive policy arrangements (Pest-
man and van Tatenhove, 1998; van Tatenhove et al., 2006) coalitions of public 
and private actors have the possibility to challenge and eventually change 
the rules of the game and to mobilise resources in order to reformulate policy 
and politics.
EU Marine Policy on the move: The tension between fisheries and maritime policy
109
To grasp the dynamics of processes of European governance and to under-
stand EU marine policy making the concepts intergovernmental, supranati-
onal and transnational arrangements are being introduced. In intergovern-
mental arrangements sovereign states are the loci of formal authority and 
legitimacy. A transnational arrangement is characterised by flexible coalitions 
of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, global-local linkages, 
diffusion of power, rules based on the political legitimacy of stakeholders, 
and by integrative discourses. Supranational arrangements consists of the EU 
institutions (i.e. parliament, council, commission and court), and the diffusion 
of power among these institutions, member states and non state actors.
5�2 The signature of the CFP
Classifying the Common Fisheries Policy in terms of policy arrangements is 
not straightforward. Partly this stems from the fact that the CFP encompas-
ses different policy domains reflected in the four main policy pillars: Conser-
vation policy, Structural policy, Market policy and International policy. Under 
one umbrella one can find ecological aims, such as managing stocks and envi-
ronmental impact of fisheries, next to economic aims, such as strengthening 
the competitiveness and the viability of operators in the sector and foste-
ring the sustainable development of fisheries areas, as well as market and 
consumer considerations. The unification of the CFP is found in its focus on 
fisheries. 
Partly this stems from the fact that different actors are involved in fisheries 
policy at different levels. Of course, with fisheries being only one of the five 
subjects in which the Commission has exclusive competence (Hawkins, 2005) 
the Commission plays a central role in setting policies. However, implementa-
tion of policies is left to the individual Member States. This results in a struc-
ture that can be classified as being simultaneously inter-governmental, supra-
national and transnational. Inter-governmental as the CFP accommodates to 
solve the conflicting interests of the Member States; for example the resource 
sharing (Jensen, 1999). Supra-national as the core competence lies with the 
Institutions of the European Union. Yet concurrently trans-national in its di-
versity of committees and European agencies in which co-operation between 
the sub-national, national and supra-national levels is shaped where policy 
ideas can be deliberated upon, policy proposals can be discussed and policy 
implementation can be monitored (van Tatenhove et al., 2006). Examples of 
the later are ACFA, the advisory committee on fisheries and aquaculture, 
already created in 1971 to have stakeholder input into the implementation of 
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the rules of the CFP and the formulation of analyses and joint positions, and 
off late the establishment of the Regional Advisory Councils. But also more 
informal fora such as working groups and workshops are used.
The principle of subsidiarity, in which the State is seen to only interfere if the 
autonomous lower parts seriously fail to fulfil their tasks (Kickert, 2003), in 
fisheries management is interpreted in the European Treaty as fisheries ma-
nagement being the sole competence of the EU (CFP). Ironically, subsidiarity 
impedes the command and control form of fisheries management under the 
CFP since the Commission can only command management but it does not 
control implementation (Sissenwine and Symes, 2007). 
Historically at Member State level, as demonstrated by several studies (Sy-
mes, 1996; van Hoof et al., 2005), fisheries management shows a neo-corpo-
ratist signature. This can be shaped as a formal structure such as the consul-
tative board in Denmark and the Management Council (‘Reguleringsrådet’) in 
Norway, or as traditional structures such as the prud’homies in France and 
the Spanish cofradias, or have a more informal structure such as the several 
‘overleggen’ (an informal mix of discussions and negotiations) in the Nether-
lands (van Hoof et al., 2005). The core of the neo-corporatist arrangement 
lies in the fact that government does not operate at a distance of fisheries 
but invites organised interest to the table, trading off participation in policy 
design against compliance from the sector. The fisheries sector and the state 
negotiate and agree upon resource management. The number of actors at 
the table is usually limited to representatives from the state and the fishing 
sector. 
In the neo-corporatist setting at Member State (MS) level the discourse has 
a strong fisheries bias and focuses on reaching a balance between ecological 
opportunities and economic and societal implications. As fisheries policy is 
shaped both at the MS level and the EU level the CFP echoes the corpora-
tist policy arrangement; fishermen’s organisations gain influence on the CFP 
through their national representation, ministers travel to Brussels negotiating 
with the consent of their parliament and sector.
Although over time external pressure has been put onto the fisheries ma-
nagers to incorporate stronger the environmental objectives in the fisheries 
policy and to more strictly adhere to the scientific advice for stock manage-
ment, in fact promoting a much more technocratic management approach in 
which management measures derive automatically from the gap between set 
objective and current indicator value, the fisheries discourse has remained 
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one of seeking compromise between long and short term economic and eco-
logical objectives. The discourse could be labelled as being in search for long 
term sustainability, in which environmental sustainability is perceived as in-
strumental for economic sustainability.
In fact a rather strong horizontal coordinating governance arrangement exists 
between policy makers, fisheries managers and the fisheries sector. In line 
with what is labelled in literature community of practice (groups whose mem-
bers regularly engage in sharing and learning, based on common interests 
(Wenger, 1998; Lesser and Storck, 2001) and policy community (Coleman 
and Perl, 1999) a way of sharing public power among a select group of ac-
tors with a common set of beliefs, values and norms) the interplay between 
fisheries managers, scientists, fishers and policy makers can be labelled an 
agora of communality. Characterised as a highly informal and ad hoc struc-
ture, the agora of communality consists of the people involved in the sector, 
policy making and management, meeting frequently and exchanging views on 
issues currently under debate. As such, the agora functions throughout the 
levels of policymaking from member states and the inter-governmental stage 
to the supra- and trans-national. It bears characteristics of a community of 
practice, functioning as network for the development of novel management 
ideas. Although it has characteristics of a neo-corporatist policy community, 
with limited membership and a fisheries focused discourse, it does not con-
tain the mechanisms for decision making. It can be classified as a back stage 
informal network (van Tatenhove et al., 2006) for the exchange of ideas and 
probing support for policy initiatives. Its main stay is a communal strive for 
development of policy measures widely supported and allowing for an econo-
mic viable fisheries within certain ecological boundaries.
Hence both at the MS level as in the inter-governmental, supra- and trans-
national fisheries arena the situation can be classified as a rather closed com-
munity of in-crowd sharing a common fisheries interest, yet from differing 
perspectives, with a discourse aimed at agreement.
One could say that with the review of the CFP in 2002 this arrangement has 
on the one hand been further institutionalised and formalised at the EU level 
by the introduction of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs). On the other hand 
this arrangement has been opened up (partly) to include more stakeholders 
and hence more stakes, implying a change to the exclusivity for the fishermen 
and their corporatist structure. In fact the introduction of RACs had two ma-
jor effects on the existing agora of communality: a change of discourse and 
a change of arrangement. The existing institutionalised mode of exchange 
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between government and the fisheries sector of participation in policy design 
from the sector in exchange for disciplining its constituency under the neo-
corporatist arrangement is replaced by a more participatory arrangement in 
which stakeholders are invited to give problem definitions and to find solu-
tions. This opens the path for more interests and stakes to be represented 
at the table, hence more organisations entering the arena for debate. With 
more stakeholders at the table the discourse changes from fisheries centred 
to more ecological and multi-use centred. 
The CFP can be perceived as a policy arrangement with limited number of 
actors in the inner circle (fishers and policy makers). However, whereas at the 
level of the Member States fisheries policy is clearly based on a negotiation 
process in which the major resources are controlled by both state and sector 
aimed at reaching agreement on the course to follow, at the EU level the CFP 
is not strictly a neo-corporatists arrangement. At the EU level, with inter-go-
vernmental and supranational characteristics, participation is still limited to a 
closed circle, yet the Member States and the supranational institutions con-
trol the resources with the Council of Ministers being focal point of authority.
5�3 The Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive, agreed on between the Europe-
an Parliament and the European Commission in December 2007, provides a 
comprehensive framework for the protection of water throughout its full cy-
cle. The main objective of the Marine Strategy Directive is to achieve environ-
mentally healthy marine waters by 2020. This will be achieved by establishing 
marine regions and sub-regions, which will be managed by member states in 
an integrated manner based on environmental criteria. In drawing up marine 
strategies for the waters within each marine region, member states will be 
required to cooperate closely. Each (sub)regional marine strategy consists of 
an action plan to be implemented in several stages. Member states will first 
need to assess the state of the environment and the main pressures in their 
respective marine regions, next to determining what can be considered as a 
good environmental status and then establish targets, indicators and monito-
ring programmes. Programmes with measures must be drawn up by 2015 to 
attain good environmental status by 2020.
European policy-making, to the extent that it concerns directives, does not 
end at the last stage of the legislative process in the Council of Ministers. Af-
ter adoption, directives are further shaped by the member states when they 
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are put into national rules. In this process, and within the limits of Commis-
sion oversight, domestic actors can adopt an interpretation that somewhat 
deviates from the directive. In this way, EU policy-making is best described 
as a long chain of mutually dependent decisions that cuts across multiple 
levels of government (Steunenberg, 2006). In this vein, the mechanisms of a 
directive are seen by the Commission as preferable to that of a regulation or a 
decision that would be too detailed and restrictive, have a character of a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach, and thus, would be inappropriate to address the varied 
problems in each region (Juda, 2007).
The MSFD directive has, in line with other environmental directives, been 
developed not by the DG responsible for fisheries, but by the Environmental 
DG. As with other environmental directives, the development and implemen-
tation of polices by the environmental departments results in a rather tech-
nocratic approach in which science defines a measurable standard to which 
a phenomenon has to comply. Policy implementation in that case evolves 
around steering on indicators.
The MSFD, by being a directive, is an instrument that fits in a rather tradi-
tional command-and-control type of policy arrangement in the sense that a 
directive is an instrument, with relative little attention for integration and par-
ticipation. The MSFD involves a move towards sustainable development with 
emphasis on ecological targets and little inclusion of socio-economic aspects. 
Whereas a directive, rather then a policy, provides room for local adaptation 
and implementation, as with the water directive, the marine directive is not 
detailed in a participatory way with inclusion of actors, but in an instrumental 
way with a focus on “good environmental status of the marine environment”. 
The consultation process prior to the publication of the MSFD did not aim 
at balancing multiple objectives of ecological, economical and societal per-
spective but centred upon consensus “on the magnitude of threats facing the 
marine environment, generating potentially irreversible or nonlinear changes 
to marine ecosystems, with wide ranging economic and social consequences” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). Hence a rather limited 
discourses with a primary focus on environmental development. 
In that sense the MSFD is closely related to an etatist policy arrangement: 
centralized government having control over planning and policy. Following 
Kaika and Page (2003) concluding on the development of the Water Frame-
work Directive, “ … the environmental lobby is becoming increasingly influ-
ential in shaping European water policy. The effectiveness of the green lobby 
is in part a result of internal shifts within the governing structures of the EU. 
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These internal shifts may be constitutional (as in the ‘greening’ of the treaty) 
or institutional (as in the increasing power assigned to the European Parlia-
ment through the Amsterdam Treaty). In either case, these changes have 
opened up a space in which individuals within the Commission, the Parliament 
and the Environmental lobby can find common ground and make considerable 
progress in producing regulations.”
At the level of the EU the MSFD has characteristics of an imposed, state dri-
ven instrumental arrangement with a low number of actors involved. At Mem-
ber State level the implementation of the MSFD can differ pending on the 
local institutional and governance setting and traditions. In the Netherlands 
operationalisation of the MSFD is taken up by the Ministry of Water Manage-
ment. The ministry is currently in the process of defining good environmental 
status and developing indicators to be applied. In this process both the fis-
heries sector and the Fisheries Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture are 
but marginally involved. 
From the perspective of discourse resources and coalitions, the MSFD in 
fact is ‘business as usual’ in a tradition of environmental directives. The CFP 
already contained an environmental conservationist part, aimed at manage-
ment of the natural renewable (fish) resource. The MSFD increases the focus 
on the sustainability discourse and extends it beyond the scope of the CFP 
into the larger marine environment reflected by the aim “to achieve good en-
vironmental status of the marine environment by 2021” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005b).
From the perspective of the CFP the introduction of the MSFD implies a shift 
in playing field as new actors legitimately enter the stage. But also a shift in 
stage is noted from the traditional fisheries platform to a stage at which DG 
Environment and ministries involved in water management play a leading role. 
A reduction of participation of the fisheries sector in the discourse is clearly 
noted. As such the MSFD can be an instrument that breaks open the national 
neo-corporatist arrangements in fisheries management.
5�4 The Maritime Policy 
On the 10th of October 2007 the European Commission presented its vision 
for a Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union. The vision document 
– also called the Blue book –seeks to establish an all-embracing maritime 
policy aimed at developing a ‘thriving maritime economy in an environmentally 
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sustainable manner’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c), a 
vision for an integrated maritime policy that covers all aspects of our relati-
onship with the oceans and seas. This innovative and holistic approach will 
provide a coherent policy framework that will allow for the optimal develop-
ment of all sea-related activities in a sustainable manner (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007c). The Marine Strategy Directive is regarded 
as the environmental pillar of this maritime policy (Kroepelien, 2007).
As experienced elsewhere, sectoral approaches have shown themselves to be 
inadequate and ineffective in the European context. Use conflicts, negative 
externalities, and environmental degradation have increased, and the need 
for a comprehensive approach to ocean use management has become readily 
apparent to EU-decision makers (Juda, 2007). 
By seeking integration and participation, cutting across sectors the MP can 
be seen as an integrative and participatory policy arrangement. It seeks to 
bring together actors from a wide variety of sectors, hence also with an agen-
da covering a wide range of issues. As such it brings on board new actors or 
at least brings them together in a novel configuration. 
The MP is an inclusive approach, embracing and incorporating CFP and 
MSFD. This integration raises the question of inclusion of increasingly he-
terogeneous stakes and stakeholders (shipping, oil and gas extraction, fis-
heries, conservation) and also raises the issue of balancing ecological and 
economic objectives.
The recently published Marine and Maritime Research Strategy (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008b) – not a policy arrangement as such 
but part of the implementation of the Maritime Policy – reflects this emphasis 
on an “integrated approach to cope with complexity… and to find coherent 
solutions for exploiting all the economic potential of the seas within an eco-
system-based approach” similar to that of the MP, promoting a governance 
model in which “marine and maritime stakeholders (are involved in; LvH, JvT) 
… strategic marine and maritime research issues at pan-European and regi-
onal levels (and; LvH, JvT) marine and maritime stakeholders, in partnership 
provide support measures to enable screening of marine and maritime tech-
nology expertise to promote rapid transfer at EU level. From the perspec-
tive of fisheries management this marine and maritime research strategy is 
quite a novel arrangement, following the development over time from a highly 
science/biological driven research agenda, via attention for socio-economic 
impact assessment and integration of analyses towards a search for novel 
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management instruments such as the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Ma-
nagement, Rights Based Management, Spatially Managed Areas, Maximum 
Limits to negative Impacts and Improving fisheries assessment methods by 
integrating new sources of biological knowledge. Now even a further integra-
tion with other sectors, stakes and discussions will need to take place.
The MP presents a new configuration of stakeholders into the area of marine 
management. In fact its starting point lies in a search for integration over 
sectors and policy areas both to face challenges posed to the policy areas 
(such as increasing an conflicting uses of oceans and environmental challen-
ges such as climate change) as well as posing challenges to the marine and 
maritime sectors to integrate the policy field. As such the MP forms an inte-
grative discourse including the entire marine and maritime field of activities, 
sectors and stakeholders. As worded in the Blue Paper: “The new integrated 
maritime policy will truly encompass all aspects of the oceans and seas in a 
holistic, integrated approach: we will no longer look only at compartmenta-
lised maritime activities, but we will tackle all economic and sustainable deve-
lopment aspects of the oceans and seas, including the marine environment, in 
an overarching fashion” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007d).
It emulates an integrated regional approach, incorporating activities ranging 
from shipbuilding and shipping, ports and fisheries, offshore energy (including 
oil, gas and renewables), coastal and maritime tourism, exploitation of mine-
ral resources, aquaculture, blue biotech and emerging sub-sea technologies 
as well as the recreational, aesthetic and cultural uses and the ecosystem 
services provided (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). The 
coordinated development of current sectoral policies also calls for integrated 
and crosscutting actions to create the necessary links between them. Tools 
such as spatial planning, an integrated approach to data collection proces-
sing and delivery, and the coordination of surveillance and monitoring activi-
ties and processes (Commission of the European Communities, 2007d) are 
examples of proposed integrative actions.
The holistic integrated approach (Commission of the European Communities, 
2007c) aims at an integration beyond the sum of the individual parts. In order 
to establish this integration across activities and regions it is obvious that 
new rules will need to be formulated at the central EU level and resources 
(i.e. funds, research) be controlled by the EU. This in fact is already common 
practice both with the Common Fisheries Policy as with the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive. Both are formulated at the EU level, with national im-
plementation. The CFP a policy with a degree of stakeholder input through 
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i.e. RACs and ACFA, the MSFD a directive with relative low stakeholder in-
volvement.
By seeking integration the MP will create a new playing field with an inte-
grative discourse over activities and sectors, rules set at a central level and 
resources controlled at EU level. By creating a new playing field new col-
lations of actors across sectors (with a regional focus) are likely to occur. 
The MP aims at formulating new rules, “Change the way we make policy and 
take decisions” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). Fishers 
together with e.g. the maritime transport sector, oil and gas extraction and 
tourism will seek new ways to plan and use the maritime space. An integrated 
Maritime Policy cannot succeed in a top-down statist arrangement but will 
require a reflexive arrangement in which coalitions of different activities and 
sectors renegotiate and reformulate the rules of the game.
5�5 CFP, MSFD and MP: the coexistence of policy 
arrangements
The Maritime Policy is clearly the new centre piece in marine and maritime 
management, encompassing the CFP fisheries management and the ecolo-
gical MSFD. The MSFD has a clear environmental focus, while the MP is 
more encompassing and stresses the need for economic development as well 
as sustainability (Commission of the European Communities, 2007d). The 
MSFD and MP can be seen both as a two pillar system (Mee et al., 2007) 
and as two contrasting frameworks for Integrated Marine Management (Sis-
senwine and Symes, 2007). It concerns on the one hand a policy designed 
to maximise the economic benefits from the rational use of the marine en-
vironment and, on the other hand, legislation designed to conserve the flow 
of economic goods and services from marine ecosystems whilst maintaining 
their resilience and biodiversity.
Integration of the frameworks of MP, CFP and MSFD has to deal with the 
different levels of scale of its constituting policies and the specific charac-
teristics of the policy domains and policy arrangements. The MSFD has an 
environmental conservationist, statist signature, the CFP seeks to integrate 
conservation of fish stocks with sustainable exploitation of the resource, and 
the main stay of the MP is the search for integration of economic wealth and 
social well being in a sustainably way. The MP clearly represents a modern 
arrangement of new social and political values of marine governance: a less 
interventionist state and the greater protagonist of the various social agents 
(Suárez de Vivero, 2007).
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Next to a difference of emphasis on either ecological or economic aspects, 
from the perspective of policy arrangements, the rather novel integrative and 
participatory policy arrangement of the MP can be found next to the more 
classical neo-corporatist arrangement and inter-governmental structure of 
the CFP and under the same umbrella the etatist arrangement of the MSFD. 
Resolving the problem of mixed competences, and particularly the Commis-
sion’s exclusive competence in matters relating to fisheries, and the question 
of primacy between the CFP and environmental Directives, will be crucial to 
ensuring the efficient and effective implementation of either strategy (Sis-
senwine and Symes, 2007).
The challenge put to the MP lies in its attempt to integrate over sectors and 
policies, with differing sets of stakes and stakeholders, with different sets of 
policy resources and discourses. Where in shipping arrangements are made 
at an international level, in which individual member states are involved, the 
CFP is the exclusive competence of the EC and implementation of the MSFD 
is devolved to the Member states.
The dilemma of the MSFD lies in the fact that the operationalisation of the 
directive is devolved to the individual MS. This in practice has in the past 
for example with the Water Directive and Bird and Habitat directives lead to 
differing interpretations of the letter of the directive. And in practice imple-
mentation differs at the national and regional level. This hampers the deve-
lopment of a level playing field. Part of this can be attributed to the different 
institutional settings of the different countries (van Hoof et al., 2005) in terms 
of national legislation and the practice of operationalising and enforcing mea-
sures, leading to different levels of conformity across the EU.
The challenge for the CFP lies in the fact that with the 2002 reform the cor-
poratist signature of fisheries management was challenged, and the closed 
environment was opened up to a more open and participative governance 
structure. An example is the establishment of RACs. In addition, new stakes 
and stakeholders are also forced in through increased attention for environ-
mental aspects such as through the MSFD. In this respect it is also note-
worthy to focus on the fact that by establishing an MSFD, a directive with a 
sole environmental objective, it provides tools to some stakeholders to take 
control over the debate with the aid of the legal system: the directive will 
stipulate rules and regulations to which all have to adhere. It can be queried 
which policy will be leading when it comes to weighing environmental impact 
of fisheries versus the social and economic effects of fisheries on local com-
munities.
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The CFP is placed on a new stage, away from the national neo-corporatist 
setting. Where in the past organised sectoral interest of fishermen could be 
brought to bear in the international discourse through the national corporatist 
structure, in the new era CFP is embedded in MP and MSFD which implies 
negotiations increasingly shifting to the supra national stage with different 
policy objectives (integration, environmental status) and different stakehol-
ders (from DGFISH to DGMARE and DGENV, from fishers to oil and gas 
extraction, shipping and environmental concerns).
The CFP is facing a general shift in locus from the national corporatist struc-
ture to the European and regional level, and a loss of competences with the 
introduction of the MSFD and the integration under the MP. This breaking 
open of the fisheries arrangement is intensified by the already ongoing deve-
lopment of increased influence of spatial planning and environmental policy 
on fisheries policy. The institutional framework for the protection of Europe’s 
seas and oceans has become highly developed over the last 35 years, inclu-
ding milestones like the 1972 and 1974 Oslo and Paris Conventions (merged 
in 1992 into the OSPAR Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment of the North-East Atlantic), the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Seas (UNCLOS), the 1992 Rio Agenda 21, the regional conventions 
for the protection of the Baltic Sea (HELCOM), the Black Sea, and the Me-
diterranean, as well as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) of 
2002. In addition, several international and EU initiatives focus on land-based 
sources of pollution with an impact on the marine environment like the IPPC 
Directive and the REACH initiative. Extensive environmental requirements for 
shipping developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO), and the work under the Climate Change Convention is another 
important element (Kroepelien, 2007). All these developments influence the 
CFP and raise the question whether there is still a niche for a specific policy 
aimed at managing fisheries. 
5�6 Conclusions
As part of the governance era rather simultaneously policies can be deve-
loped that have a novel, participatory and integrative arrangement, such as 
the MP, whilst at the same time a more classical etatist command and control 
arrangement is devised within the same area of management.
Next to a difference in arrangement the policies also do have a difference in 
focus (between economic and ecological aims), include different stakes and 
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hence stakeholders and focus on different ways of setting rules (between 
challenging and integrative to instrumentally state imposed). Yet the over-
arching integrative MP seeks to incorporate the etatist MSFD and the neo-
corporatist CFP. 
The position of the CFP in this new policy arrangement is changing. Already 
the reform of the CFP called for opening up the traditional neo-corporatist 
structures to encompass new stakeholders. With the MSFD objective of good 
environmental quality the sole competence of the CFP to manage fish re-
source conservation issues is terminated. And with a further integration into 
a wider MP, with even more stakes from a larger group of actors, fisheries 
can easily turn out to be a field of relative modest political and economic 
importance. With a shift towards a leading principle of environmental status, 
away form sustainable production in an environmental, economic and societal 
sense, the already limited room to manoeuvre for the sector, both in the cur-
rent dire economic straits and the narrow path of fisheries policies, is further 
closed.
Also, with a change of stakeholders and discussions, hence fora at which 
(marine and maritime) policies are shaped in order to maintain clout in the 
debate the fisheries sector will have to realise that the former neo-corporatist 
structure no longer ensures entry to the centre stage. The Netherlands show 
that implementation of MSFD is not necessarily controlled by the body of 
government responsible for fisheries but by the agency responsible for the 
Marine Environment to which both the sector as the DG for fisheries have 
rather limited access. The Marine Policy will also challenge the characteris-
tics of the fisheries arrangements. More and more the dynamics, rules and 
discourses of other marine policy domains will affect the content and organi-
sation of the CFP. May be this could be the end of separate sectoral marine 
policies in favour of an integrated marine policy, of which fisheries is just one 
of the aspects.
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Conclusions
Chapter 6
6�1 Towards governable fisheries
Fisheries management worldwide, in the EU and in the Netherlands is per-
ceived as being in crises:  in ecological terms, as some stocks are in poor 
shape despite management effort; in economic terms as a large part of the 
fleets are not profitable and in social terms, as fishing communities are, as a 
result of diminishing fishing activities, losing identity and losing legitimacy as 
public criticism on fisheries practices is increasing. Moreover, one could say 
that there is a managerial crisis in fisheries management as it fails to reach 
its goals and lacks legitimacy and accountability.
As a response to this state of fisheries management, a large array of go-
vernance innovations has been deployed over the past two decades. In this 
thesis I have analysed Dutch initiatives in this area, such as the introduction 
of the system of ITQs, co-management and the use of covenants. Also, at the 
EU level governance innovations have taken place, of which the introduction 
of Regional Advisory Councils is the most notable innovation. In addition, 
there is the introduction of specific marine environmental legislation, such as 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. And the introduction of the Ma-
ritime Policy which seeks integration over activities and actors in the ma-
rine environment, as detailed in a number of EU communications such as the 
Action Plan Maritime Policy, a European Strategy for Marine and Maritime 
Research, a Roadmap towards maritime spatial planning by Member States, 
a Strategy to mitigate the effects of Climate Change on coastal regions, 
Reduction of CO2 emissions and pollution by shipping and a Review of EU 
labour law exemptions for the shipping and fishing sectors. 
In this thesis I have analysed and assessed a number of these policy and 
governance innovations. This study aimed at understanding how and why cer-
tain solutions were selected and how they functioned. In so doing, it sought 
to answer the central question of which new institutional arrangements have 
been developed in fisheries management, how and why these new arrange-
ments emerged, what have been the results and how these new institutional 
arrangements relate to the current debate on the future of fisheries gover-
nance? This chapter addresses the research questions raised and formulates 
conclusions of this study. In the next section I will take stock of the lessons le-
arnt from the several cases studied. The main focus will be on the (changing) 
roles of actors from state, market and society in devising and implementing 
fisheries policy and the way in which the new arrangements changed partici-
pation. In section three I will go beyond the specific new management initia-
tives and institutional arrangements and look at the more overarching trends 
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and developments in fisheries management, in particular how participation of 
the different actors in the policy process is changing. This is related to ques-
tions regarding which actors can participate in the policy process and to what 
extent these actors can participate. In section four I will take the analysis a 
step further by looking at the governance trends as described in section three 
and how these trends will be drivers of a future fisheries governance. 
6�2 Coping with the fisheries management crisis
We have seen that the top-down, government-controlled fisheries manage-
ment system has reached its governance limits and failed to produce the 
required economic, ecological and social results. As a reaction to the crisis in 
fisheries management, an array of initiatives have been developed in the Ne-
therlands and at the EU level. In this thesis I examined 4 such developments: 
the introduction of ITQs, co-management and covenants in the Netherlands 
and the coming about of new EU level marine policies: the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and the Maritime Policy. These 4 new arrangements 
affected the steering principle of the fishing management system. Did the 
innovations in fisheries management result in a better functioning system in 
terms of effectively obtaining specific economic, ecological and social goals? 
And how did the new arrangement affect the roles of the actors from state, 
industry and society and the way they participate in the policy process?
6�2�1 The introduction of ITQs
The Netherlands does have a tradition of applying marked-based instruments 
in environmental policy. With ITQs, a management instrument was introdu-
ced which simultaneously functioned as an environmental instrument limiting 
catches, and as an economic instrument seeking optimal allocation of fishing 
capacity over fishing opportunities. 
From the perspective of the individual fisher, the introduction of the ITQ sys-
tem resulted in individual quota holdings being brought in line with the fishing 
capacity of the vessel and provided a right that can be exerted and defen-
ded and can be used as collateral. Access to the group system allowed the 
individual fisher to fine tune quota holdings and landings during the year by 
leasing out or hiring additional quota. In addition, groups take an active role 
in acquiring additional quota, either by collective buying of quota or by facili-
tating the exchange of quota between EU Member States. Fishers utilise the 
group system not only for the uptake of the group quota entitlement (as was 
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the government’s intention of the establishment of the groups) but also in 
managing the transfers and allocation of quota. The group takes the position 
of broker in the quota transfer process, taking a position in the allocation pro-
cess which makes the Dutch system one of a mix of individual and collective 
management of catch rights.
The Dutch ITQ system can be characterised as a three tier system in which, 
first, the fisher is holding individual rights; secondly, during the year the rights 
are managed collectively in a group; and thirdly, the government manages 
at the national level, those species with no individual quota allocation. The 
Dutch case shows that by managing the quota by fishermen’s groups the 
rights can be safeguarded for local communities.
With the introduction of the ITQ management system (embedded in the co-
management system which was introduced during the same period) the fleet 
capacity was reduced and catches were brought in line with the Total Allo-
wable Catch (TAC). Hence the number of vessels and fishing pressure was 
reduced and compliance with catch restrictions increased. The ecological ob-
jective of reduction of fishing pressure and fishing within set TAC levels was 
obtained. However, as reflected in the net result of the Dutch cutter fleet, the 
ITQ system has not resulted in a long term economically healthy cutter fleet 
able to absorb, for example, changes in fuel prices. 
The introduction of the ITQs had an effect on fisheries management as the al-
location of catch rights became subject to market forces where earlier gover-
nment had allocated the rights. The state transferred the allocation of catch 
opportunities to the market and, embedded in the system of co-management, 
the fishers themselves steered quota distribution. Hence today, the quota 
market is (partly) a ‘free market’ based on the willing seller – willing buyer 
principle with no steering role for the state. However, the market is only partly 
free as quota can only be bought by licensed fishermen. Fishers within the 
confines of their group direct quota transactions. Opening up the quota mar-
ket to, for example, recreational fishermen or NGOs, or to government itself 
in that respect, would allow other stakeholders to also exert their market 
power by purchasing quota. 
The question whether the Dutch system of ITQs would be applicable to other 
countries and fisheries as well is difficult to answer based on the Dutch expe-
rience alone. The Dutch case shows that ITQs can function well in obtaining 
certain management goals (fleet reduction, compliance with quota). By em-
bedding the ITQ system in a system of co-management, which gave fishers 
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control over the distribution of the quota, some of the negative effects usually 
associated with the introduction of market based instruments such as ITQs 
(concentration of rights, communities losing fishing rights) did not occur on a 
large scale. Hence the effect of the introduction of ITQs will depend on the in-
stitutional setting in which it is being introduced. If the quota market would be 
opened to other players (recreational fishermen, NGOs, government) there 
is the possibility that a concentration of rights and fishing communities losing 
fishing rights will occur.
As for participation in the policy process, this innovation was introduced top 
down by government. The industry participates in the system by exerting its 
market force; the Dutch ITQ system created private rights for access to fish 
and a market for these access rights where one did not exist before.
6�2�2 The introduction of co-management
In the same period as the introduction of ITQs, a public-private partnership 
between the state and the industry for the management of quota uptake was 
established. The introduction of the Dutch co-management system clearly 
played a role in increasing compliance with the quota management system. 
By including fishers into the management system and founding the system on 
social control and peer pressure, the legitimacy of the system increased. Also 
a shift is seen in the drivers for compliance: from compliance as an economic 
calculation of gains and sanctions towards a more normative approach emp-
hasising the social normative values of the fishers. 
The introduction of the co-management system in the Netherlands has 
brought about a change in the basic governance fabric of fisheries manage-
ment by devolving part of management responsibilities from government to 
user-groups. However the core of the system is not a joint management of 
fish stocks but a decentralised effort of monitoring quota uptake and kee-
ping landings in line with set Total Allowable Catch (TAC). It is a form of 
cooperative management, where responsibilities of government are devolved 
to user-groups but the user-groups have no direct input in the wider policy 
development process beyond ‘tokenism’ (Arnstein, 1969). Although fisher-
men’s participation in the management system has increased slightly (quota 
administration and trade), in other areas of fisheries management their role 
has not changed. In that sense the Dutch co-management system does not 
represent an environmental policy in which the constellation of state, market 
and civil society is fundamentally altered to accommodate a participatory in-
teractive policy arrangement, with fishers actively involved in the process of 
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policy development. Rather it is an arrangement in which part of enforcement 
is devolved to the fishers, shared with the enforcement agent of the govern-
ment: a situation of co-enforcement.
The introduction of the EU Community Fisheries Control Agency, a top down 
government type solution, existing side by side with the Dutch state-market 
partnership, illustrates the possible co-existence of different policy arran-
gements. The EU Community Fisheries Control Agency can play a role in 
establishing co-management at a wider EU scale by providing an enabling 
environment in which such sub-national and national arrangements can be 
developed. On the other hand, it can play a role in co-enforcement by taking 
up the role of enforcement agent at a distance, sharing this role with the na-
tional enforcement agencies. 
6�2�3 The use of covenants
The introduction of covenants and of co-management centres on a system of 
devolved management. But where co-management is founded on cooperation 
between government and fishers, covenants are based on voluntary agree-
ments between two or three of the actors of state, market and civic society 
(NGOs). From the perspective of the state, the use of covenants signifies a 
shift in the position and role of government since government seeks private 
initiative to reach policy goals, whereas before governmental rule making and 
enforcement were the preferred instruments. 
In Dutch fisheries management we have seen three cases of covenants: an 
agreement to extent the co-management system to include management of 
the cutter fleet engine capacity; an agreement between state and industry 
on the development towards sustainable fisheries on the North Sea; and an 
agreement mainly between NGOs and industry to solve a dead lock in attai-
ning sustainable fisheries on the Wadden Sea.
In the case of the engine capacity arrangement, the existing co-management 
arrangement on the uptake of quota had been extended to increase compli-
ance to the fisheries engine capacity regulation. The agreement played a role 
in opening up a dead- locked situation in which individuals are only inclined to 
change conduct when free rider behaviour is no longer tolerated. Within the 
groups, engine capacity management is sanctioned with government having 
final responsibility for compliance. 
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Whereas the engine capacity agreement is a bilateral state-industry agree-
ment, the North Sea Covenant is a tripartite arrangement between state, 
industry and ENGOs. It aims at a policy to obtain a viable and sustainable 
fisheries sector within the boundaries of a healthy ecosystem, bringing en-
vironmental concerns and economic concerns together in an implementation 
plan. By entering the agreement the sector gains time, political support and 
resources to embark on a transition process towards more sustainable opera-
tions. From a societal perspective the covenant brings ENGOs and industry 
together to discuss environmental concerns and reach agreement on a pro-
cess of change towards more sustainable fisheries. For the state the cove-
nant creates leeway for industry to become sustainable in an environmental 
and economic sense, yet simultaneously creates a sense of urgency to make 
this transition. 
The mussel covenant was a tool to open up a dead lock situation in which 
a transition towards sustainable production was hindered by the stalemate 
caused by the “War on the Wadden Sea” between the industry and ENGOs. 
Government took a leading role in orchestrating the coming about of this 
covenant. The mussel covenant is the most clear example of using the in-
strument for conflict regulation. This covenant depends to a large extend on 
outside independent (scientific) monitoring and evaluation. 
So far, the engine capacity covenant is perceived to be successful with no 
infringements and vessels having adjusted engine capacity. The North Sea 
covenant has facilitated a process of transition and an array of initiatives e.g. 
under the Fisheries Innovation Platform (subsidies for development of new 
fishing technology such as pulse trawl and reduction of fuel consumption, 
improved marketing initiatives and sharing of knowledge among fishers) have 
been launched to support this process. The mussel covenant is put under 
pressure from parties not being signatory by contesting the agreement in 
court.
In all cases we see a repositioning of the state in relation to the actors from 
industry and society. The covenants are a manifestation of government ne-
gotiating fisheries policy in order to obtain a more sustainable use of marine 
resources. The degree of self-management differs between the three cove-
nants. In the North Sea covenant, covenant partners have quite some oppor-
tunity to (re)define policy goals, whereas under the engine capacity the policy 
objectives are not renegotiated at all; in the end, the industry will comply with 
prior existing regulations. 
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6�2�4 New EU marine policies 
Over the past decade new EU marine policies such as the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and the Maritime Policy have been developed. Both po-
licies aim at governing the marine environment, yet the two policies have a 
different signature in policy formulation and implementation. From a fisher’s 
perspective these policies present a change in institutional setting in terms of 
integration as well as participation. 
In a governance era contrasting policies can be developed simultaneously. 
The Maritime Policy is a novel, participatory and integrative arrangement. 
The Marine Strategic Framework Directive developed more or less in the 
same period, has a more classical etatist command and control arrangement. 
In addition to a difference in arrangement, the policies also have a difference 
in focus (in balancing economic and ecological aims), include different stakes 
and hence stakeholders and focus on different ways of setting rules. 
The position of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in a new marine policy 
arrangement is changing. With the Marine Strategic Framework Directive 
objective of good environmental quality, the sole competence of the CFP to 
manage fish resource conservation issues is terminated. And with a further 
integration of the CFP into a wider Maritime Policy, with even more stakes 
from a larger group of actors, fisheries can easily turn out to be a field of 
relative modest political and economic importance. The balancing act of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, in which conservation objectives are sought in con-
junction with goals for fleet and market development, is easily taken over by 
concrete marine environmental indicators defined outside the realm of the 
CFP. In fact, whereas the Common Fisheries Policy concerns the sustainable 
development of fisheries, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive clearly 
defines fisheries as one of the most important pressures on the marine en-
vironment (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). While in this 
policy discourse it is widely acknowledged that economic and environmen-
tal concerns should both be taken into account, the emphasis increasingly 
falls on putting the environment as top priority: without a healthy ecosystem, 
economic activities and society will not flourish. This illustrates a change in 
discourse from a fisheries management focus towards an environmental con-
servation policy focus.
It is too early to asses whether the new EU policies result in a better func-
tioning system in terms of effectively obtaining specific economic, ecologi-
cal and social goals. However, the new policies do have an influence on the 
constellation of stakeholders and the way they can participate in the policy 
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process. As Hatchard (2005) correctly states, the concept of stakeholder 
participation has only recently begun to spread in the actual governance of 
European seas. Direct input of stakeholders in actual policy development is 
modest. Regional Advisory Councils can advise the EU and on request nati-
onal governments, but their advice is not per se taken into account in policy 
development. In the Netherlands the implementation of the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive illustrates rather limited stakeholder input in marine go-
vernance. Participation of stakeholders only takes place in the early steps of 
operationalisation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and most of-
ten involves providing information into the policy development process rather 
than through actual involvement of stakeholders in defining issues, setting 
the agenda and defining measures. Actual implementation in the Netherlands 
is perceived as a rather technical, science driven matter, which is not subject 
to participation. The coming about of this environmental directive was staged 
by the EU’s DG Environment, while Dutch implementation is spearheaded 
by the Ministry of Water management. Traditionally fisheries policy is deve-
loped by DGMARE and implemented by the Dutch Ministry responsible for 
Fisheries: the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality’s directorate 
for Agro-supply chains and Fisheries. Hence the forum at which to participate 
and how and when to participate is moving away from the traditional neo-
corporatist fisheries arrangement. 
6�3 New institutional arrangements 
When going through the case studies, from the introduction of the ITQ sys-
tem and co-management in the Netherlands, the Dutch use of covenants in 
fisheries management and the introduction of the Marine Strategy Frame-
work Directive and Maritime Policy at the EU level, we see the chronologi-
cal introduction of new fisheries management arrangements. The common 
denominator in the new Dutch institutional arrangements is an increase in 
participation of stakeholders in the policy process. At the EU level, increased 
participation of stakeholders is an issue (e.g. the introduction of RACs) but 
the integration over activities and stakeholders is also an important trend. So, 
though stakeholder participation has increased, the nature of participation in 
these various new arrangements is not the same. Consequently, in this sec-
tion I analyse and compare the commonalities and differences of the new ar-
rangements and try to explain their emergence, while placing them in a wider 
geographical perspective.
If we first concentrate on the Dutch cases, why did the new institutional ar-
rangements emerge? In all cases the starting point has been the failure of 
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government to effectively implement fisheries policy. The introduction of ITQs 
and co-management and the extension of the co-management arrangement 
with the engine capacity covenant all emerged when the fishing sector re-
fused to comply with fisheries policy. The North Sea and Mussel covenants 
illustrate government’s frustration over the deadlock situation emerging 
between ENGOs and fishing sector over the development towards a more 
sustainable fisheries.
In all cases it is the government that takes the initiative to develop a new 
institutional arrangement. In all new arrangements the government opts for 
stakeholders gaining increased opportunity for participation in policy deve-
lopment; yet the participants and the modes of participation differ between 
the different arrangements. I note a difference in signature for those arran-
gements directly between government and the fisheries sector and the arran-
gements directly involving ENGOs. For the arrangements between govern-
ment and the sector the main stay is the handing over of responsibilities from 
government to the sector, either through the market (ITQs) or by devolving 
responsibilities to groups of fishermen. In the cases involving ENGOs the sig-
nature of the arrangement is much more on joint problem solving. Hence, in 
terms of participation and following Arnstein’s ladder of participation classi-
fication (Arnstein, 1969) and Raakjear and Vedsmand’s typology of fisheries 
co-management (Raakjær and Vedsmand, 1995, 1999), the arrangements 
between government and sector are not so much cases of co-management (a 
joint development and implementation of policy) but rather of co-enforcement 
(the devolution of enforcement tasks to the sector, while policy development 
remains a task of the state). A dual situation emerges in which, in fisheries 
policy implementation through co-enforcement, fishers’ participation, using 
Arnstein’s classification13, moves towards a form of ‘citizen’s power’ as enfor-
13 Arnstein’s ladder of participation classifies the rungs into three groups: non-participation, 
tokenism and citizen’s power. The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) 
Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of “non-participation” that have been contrived by 
some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable people to 
participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to “educate” or 
“cure” the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 progress to levels of “tokenism” that allow the have-
nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered 
by powerholders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. 
But under these conditions they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by 
the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no 
“muscle,” hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation is simply a 
higher level tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the 
powerholders the continued right to decide. Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power 
with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership 
that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At 
the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not citizens obtain the 
majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power. (Arnstein, 1969)
Chapter 6
132
cement tasks are delegated to the sector, whereas in general fisheries policy 
development participation remains at levels of what Arnstein calls ‘tokenism’, 
in which the sector is only informed about policy and at best consulted. With a 
joint search for solutions and resolving deadlocks, the arrangement between 
government, sector and NGOs in the North Sea and Mussel covenants is 
much more of a ‘cooperative arrangement’ (cf. Raakjær and Vedsmand, 1995) 
and as partnership with delegated power a move towards Arnstein’s ‘citizen’s 
power’ (Arnstein, 1969), a higher rung on the ladder of participation.
Hence, government responds to a crisis in fisheries management by searching 
for and allowing more participation. But this participation has at least two dif-
ferent objectives, from a governmental policy point of view. First, participa-
tion of fishermen has to improve the implementation of environmental policy 
(fish stock conservation). Secondly, with participation beyond fishermen the 
government (and also the sector) aimed to increase legitimacy and support 
of fishery policy. And this all follows from a crisis in the neo-corporatist arran-
gement in which fisheries policy was developed and implemented originally. 
The crisis in the neo-corporatist system emerged when the rank and file of 
the fisheries organisations did not comply with the management rules agreed 
between their representative elite and government. As the neo-corporatist 
fisheries management setting fell apart, the privileged relation between go-
vernment and sector was further challenged by other actors (ENGOs) that 
also claimed a stake in particular in the environmental concerns of fisheries 
management. When the closed neo-corporatist relation between fisheries re-
presentatives and government was no longer capable of devising a policy 
supported by the industry, new ways of cooperation and legitimacy had to be 
invented.
It has been illustrated in this dissertation that the new arrangements were 
successful in the sense that compliance with the rules increased and dead-
lock situations were resolved. The most recent covenants, in which state, 
industry, and ENGOs reached agreement on sustainable fisheries develop-
ment, in particular, illustrate a situation where leeway is created for economi-
cal development while ensuring ecological targets to be obtained, supported 
by different stakeholders. Where the agreements between government and 
fishing sector focus on enforcement and compliance with existing fisheries 
regulations, the agreements involving ENGOs focus much more on reaching 
environmental goals.
The most recent covenants between government, fishing sector and ENGOs 
illustrate these developments in three ways. Already mentioned above are 
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the developments in fisheries policy towards increased stakeholder partici-
pation in fisheries policy and in addition an opening up of the traditional neo-
corporatist arrangement to include more stakeholders. In addition we see 
a development of legitimacy and accountability in fisheries management. In 
the traditional top-down government lead fisheries management policy ar-
rangement, it is the state which is responsible and accountable for fisheries 
management. The legitimacy crisis of fisheries management induced gover-
nment to share fisheries management tasks with stakeholders (quota and 
engine capacity management with the sector; sustainable fisheries develop-
ment with sector and ENGOs). With increased involvement of stakeholders 
in fisheries management the legitimacy and accountability of actors in the ar-
rangement also changes. The traditional right to fish, granted by government 
to the industry, is replaced by a ‘licence to produce’ that the fishing sector has 
to obtain in negotiation with state and ENGOs. This affects the accountability 
in the arrangement and on the ‘burden of proof’ by shifting responsibility from 
government and society showing harmful impact, towards the industry having 
to show sustainable resource use. Also the forum at which to be accountable 
to shifts, from fishers being accountable to government (compliance with the 
rules) and government being accountable to society, towards a situation in 
which the fishers are directly accountable to the parties involved in the agree-
ment (covenant). It is in the aspects of accountability and legitimacy that the 
covenants show an Achilles heel of such a participatory policy development; 
as the covenant is only signed between a limited number of parties there are 
always actors left outside the agreement. The parties who were not allowed 
to participate can challenge the agreement in public, disqualifying it as a 
private matter between a non-representative group of parties, or even chal-
lenge the agreement in court as they are not bound by the arrangements of 
the agreement14. By applying this outside pressure the compromise reached 
in the covenant can be challenged.
In analysing the commonalities and differences in the emerging new gover-
nance arrangements we have mentioned the state or government as if it is a 
single actor. However the cases illustrate clearly that there is not one single 
state but a multi faceted government, which also partly explains differentia-
tions in participatory modes. The state sometimes arranges implementation 
of fisheries measures and enforcement in a more participatory way, yet at the 
same time in other parts of policy in a top down fashion (for example setting 
TACs and quota); sometimes it invites stakeholders to partake in fisheries 
14 The mussel covenant explicitly states that the signing parties will co-operate in a constructive 
way and will in case of difference of opinion not seek a solution via a legal action nor though 
public actions directed at one and other. (Anon. (2008). article 6)
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policy development15, yet in other cases severely limits participation in ope-
rationalisation of environmental policies (such as the national implementation 
of the EU Bird, Habitat, Natura 2000, Water and Marine directives); following 
the EU CFP, the Netherlands has a specific fisheries policy, yet it devises 
policies affecting fisheries operations outside the fisheries policy setting. Go-
vernment in this regard can be perceived as a descendent of Janus, having 
two faces facing opposite directions; part of government is involved in fis-
heries policy, part of it in environmental policy.  This is evidenced through the 
deployment of participatory instruments as well as top down management 
such as the EU Community Fisheries Control Agency and implementation of 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive.  Meanwhile, with co-management 
and covenants, government on one hands seeks the cooperation with the 
sector to reach policy goals, yet on the other, still imposes measures on the 
sector. Similar, seemingly contradictory sides can also be identified at the EU 
level with the simultaneous development of sectoral policy (revision of the 
EU CFP) as the need for integration over sectoral activities in an overarching 
marine integrated policy.
New fisheries arrangements beyond the Netherlands
The question can be raised to what extent the Dutch solutions to the fisheries 
management crisis are typical inventions of a national policy style that has 
been known throughout the years for its cooperative and collaborative cha-
racter. Are these new fisheries arrangements applicable to other situations, 
to other national styles of policy making? In this I will limit myself to looking 
at European countries and specifically those of the EU, since they all operate 
under the umbrella of the CFP. 
In looking at strategies to abate fisheries management crisis in other coun-
tries we easily can conclude that the solutions chosen in the Netherlands are 
not specifically Dutch. ITQs have been used in for example Iceland and New 
Zeeland and in the EU the UK system resembles to a large extent an ITQ 
system (van Hoof et al., 2002). Co-management, in varying forms, is a wide-
spread phenomenon in fisheries management and can be found in for example 
Denmark, Spain (Confradias) and France (Prudhomies). The use of covenants 
is also widely used in environmental policies (such as waste management, 
water management and energy efficiency in a wide array of countries (Mol 
15 In fact at the onset of the development of the Mussel covenant, although the state took 
the initiative for its development, it aimed at reaching an agreement between industry and 
ENGOs without government being part of the agreement; the industry and ENGOs explicitly 
brought back the government into the agreement.
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et al., 2000). The fisheries management systems across Europe have had a 
neo-corporatist signature (van Hoof et al., 2005), and the collapse of this 
neo-corporatist arrangement is widespread. And as one of the main failures 
of contemporary fishers management, in particular in the EU, is perceived to 
be lack of participation, the Dutch solutions could be examples applicable to 
other countries as well. However, in doing so one should render count of the 
specific national, regional and local settings, political and institutional traditi-
ons in which fisheries management takes place. Hence, while we can expect 
and indeed do see similar types of solutions following a fisheries management 
crisis in quite a number of EU and other OECD countries, the specific lay-
out and fine-tuning of these new arrangements is dependent on the national 
and local settings in terms of institutions, policy cultures, and participatory 
traditions. A covenant or co-management system does not look the same 
throughout the European countries and one should be careful with claims of 
isomorphism in studying these new fisheries arrangements. But of course, 
especially in the EU the CFP and other common marine policy developments 
mean that isomorphism is more likely within the EU than between EU member 
states on the one hand and, say, the US or Canada on the other.
As fisheries management in Europe takes place under the umbrella of the 
CFP, starting point for national fisheries policy are the regulations as set at 
the European level. The main challenges for the current CFP reform and fu-
ture fisheries policy are perceived to be (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2009 p 8):
- a deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity;
- imprecise policy objectives resulting in insufficient guidance for decisions 
and implementation;
- a decision-making system that encourages a short-term focus
- a management framework that does not give sufficient responsibility to 
the industry;
- lack of political will to ensure compliance, and poor compliance by the 
industry.
Can the Dutch new institutional arrangements address these issues? As for 
the sharing of responsibility in fisheries management and to overcome poor 
compliance the Dutch solutions have proven their worth. Also transferable 
fishing rights have proven their valuable role in adjusting fleet capacity, albeit 
not to the full extent of bringing about a stable equilibrium between fishing 
capacity, fishing opportunities and a viable fishing fleet. ITQs, in combination 
with co-management, have proven to increase compliance by devolving res-
ponsibilities. As for the focus of fishing policy, being short-term and impre-
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cise, the Dutch covenants have shown to be able to address this. Together 
stakeholders were able to develop a long term management perspective in 
which policy objectives with an economic, environmental and sustainability 
focus were translated into an operational plan.
 
Besides the revision of the CFP a new setting has evolved, in which fisheries 
policy has to be integrated with other sectoral interests in a wider maritime 
and marine environmental policy framework. Marine policy becomes less sec-
toral and more integrated over sectors and activities changing the constitu-
ency of (fisheries) policy including an increased number of stakeholders. In 
taking these new developments and perspectives into account the new insti-
tutional arrangements introduced in the Netherlands were mostly answers to 
the fisheries management problems of the past. They were hardly designed to 
address the new challenges and management demands that are now starting 
to shape the policy agenda of the future common marine policy. What are 
the challenges of the future for a fisheries governance that is integrated in a 
wider marine governance? 
6�4 Challenges for future fisheries governance
Based on the analysis and conclusions presented in this thesis I will draw 
some trends regarding the future fabric of fisheries governance, focusing on 
three aspects: participation, globalisation and the role of science in suppor-
ting fisheries policy development.
For the future development of fisheries policymaking and the institutional set 
up of marine resource management two main trends can be noticed: incre-
ased participation and cooperation between state, market and civil society, 
and integration of policy. A spin-off of these trends is a changing fisheries 
discourse from a focus on sustainable resource use and production towards 
ecosystem integrity and sustainability. As a result the traditional right to fish 
is replaced by a ‘licence to produce’, shifting accountability and ‘burden of 
proof’ from government and society towards the industry. 
6�4�1 Participation in fisheries management
Following Jänicke, van Tatenhove and Arts, and others (Weale, 1992; Jä-
nicke, 1993; Mol, 1995; van Tatenhove, 1999; Arts and van Tatenhove, 2000; 
van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003; Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004; Arts and van 
Tatenhove, 2006) a general trend of political modernisation both in the Ne-
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therlands as within the EU can be noted. According to ideas of political mo-
dernization, participation of citizens, non-governmental organisations, firms 
and other stakeholders changes from reactive to more reflexive and pro-ac-
tive ways of participation. This comes together with a shift from legislative 
procedures towards extra-legal processes, often resulting in experiments with 
participatory (or interactive) policy making, and a progressive interweaving 
of state, industry and society. This development is reflected in arrangements 
such as co-management between state and users, bi- or trilateral policy con-
tracts such as covenants between stakeholders and between stakeholders 
and the state, and Regional Advisory Councils. 
These participatory tendencies come together with questions on who can 
participate, and who determines who can participate; what are the rules for 
participation and who makes those rules; where in the policy cycle is parti-
cipation possible or even required; and what type of participation should be 
aimed for (informative, constructive, decisive)? Behind these questions of 
designing participation are the fundamental problems of legitimacy, accoun-
tability and effectiveness of fisheries governance. What participatory arran-
gements are most successful in contributing to a legitimate, accountable and 
effective fisheries governance?
These issues can be expected to remain leading themes in future fisheries 
governance. In this respect the Dutch cases, although presenting best prac-
tices that might be used to overcome deficiencies in contemporary fisheries 
management, might very well not stand up to the contemporary and future 
challenges for integration of policies and changes in participation. With the 
shift in accountability from government towards fishers (as the latter need a 
societal licence to produce; and the burden of proof for sustainable fisheries 
moves to fishermen) fishermen end up in an entirely new position and role in 
fisheries management. Regional Advisory Councils, with a limited focus on 
fisheries and a limited stakeholder representation in an advisory role, make 
fisheries policy more participatory, but do not provide the forum at which fis-
hers can take the lead in devising fisheries policy. To be able to take the lead 
in devising fisheries policy is essential when accountability for sustainable 
fisheries is put in the fishers’ hands. 
Also, in a context in which polices shift from sectoral policy to integrated 
marine environmental policies, a sectoral forum such as RACs, becomes su-
perfluous. If a stakeholder platform for participation in policy development 
is required at all, this will have to entail a representation of all stakeholder 
categories represented in the policy. In this the question that needs answe-
ring is: when fishers are increasingly held accountable for the development 
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of sustainable use of marine living resources, at which forum do they need 
to render count? Who can be participant in this forum? Should that still be a 
government or set of governments? Or is the logical consequence that wider 
fora, which include other societal interest, are to be addressed in terms of 
legitimacy and accountability of fishermen?
 
The current CFP reform does not reflect this forward looking integrative and 
participative aspects. Integrating fisheries (policy) in a process of marine 
spatial planning, with fishers (and other sectoral interest groups) being fully 
engaged and responsible, would require a much more radical form of partici-
pation than is currently envisaged in among others the RACs. Then the sector 
should be invited to develop sustainable operations, while making it fully res-
ponsible and accountable for these living marine resources. 
6�4�2 Analysing the state in fisheries governance
In all these new governance arrangements, as well as in the literature on fis-
heries governance as summarised in chapter 1, the role of the state seems a 
diminishing one: other actors and institutions are taking over. Rhodes (2007) 
explains the ‘hollowing out of the state’ by pointing at the reduced ability of 
the state as core executive to act effectively, making government less reliant 
on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy. But in my study, 
I find a situation in which the state deliberately opts to transfer authority to 
other parties in order to achieve policy goals. What is perceived from the 
outside as a weakening of the role of the state in the development and imple-
mentation of fisheries policy might in fact be a strengthening of the state’s 
position in obtaining policy objectives. From the Dutch cases it shows that 
it can be the state that deliberately chooses to broaden the hierarchical go-
vernance model to include more market and participatory oriented arrange-
ments, hence to shift from a rather etatist arrangement to a more participato-
ry arrangement. Also the development of the covenants and co-management 
illustrates that these more participatory arrangements call for a strong role 
of the state by monitoring and enforcing the arrangements between industry 
and other stakeholders. The covenant parties explicitly call for a strong state, 
but at a distance. 
Further, our study illustrates that in the process of re-institutionalising fis-
heries and marine management, the state can opt for the synchronic intro-
duction of different arrangements (for example an etatist arrangement for 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and an integrative and innovative 
arrangement for the Marine Policy). This lines up with the perceived com-
plexity of the system-to-be-managed and the ‘wicked nature’ (Jentoft and 
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Chuenpagdee, 2009) of the problem (cf. Chapter 1). It reflects the fact that 
we are trying to analyse a complex socio-ecological system in which ecologi-
cal, economic and societal/political sub-systems interact; these systems are 
characterised by competing claims on resource use and conflicting percepti-
ons by governors, resource users and other stakeholders. Hence each (sub)
set of problems encountered may call for a different type/arrangement of 
solution. But also it reflects the fact that the state in fisheries management 
is a complex entity, with different parts of government (ministries, agencies, 
levels) addressing different issues and from different traditions, hence prefer-
ring and resulting in different policy arrangements.
This also adds to our understanding of the temporal dimension of shifts in 
fisheries management. The conventional idea in fisheries governance is a 
chronological emergence of more participatory modes of fisheries governan-
ce over time. Yet synchronically etatist or statist solutions are introduced or 
exist next to participatory and integrative arrangements. This reflects the 
dynamics and complexity of the system and the temporary coagulation of a 
mode of governance in a continuous process of redefinition of the roles of 
state, industry and stakeholders.
Although the traditional neo-corporatist relationship in policy development 
between the state and industry has been opened up, to allow other stakehol-
ders such as ENGOs in, there exists still a rather closed circuit (for example 
in RACs) of parties having access to the process of fisheries policy develop-
ment. In fact, we could label this neo-neo-corporatism in policy development, 
in which the traditional neo-corporatist partners are being replaced by a new, 
but still limited, set of participants.
In conclusion, what we need to further reflect upon is the complex positi-
on that the state takes in this process. This complexity emerges from the 
synchronic development of different policy arrangements and modes of go-
vernance (partly based on the current zeitgeist, partly determined by poly-
morphism within governments) as well as the state’s role in preferring some 
arrangements over others (next to an overall process of redefining the role 
of state versus market and society). In that sense it further underlines the 
governance literature: the state is clearly not ‘one’ actor, with ‘one’ intention 
and therefore does not act in one uniform way. In fisheries governance, as 
much as in some of the other governance sectors, the state is not simply 
weak or strong – it may share power or ‘give away’ authority in one step of 
the policy process and thereby gain grip and control over the realisation of 
policy goals.
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6�4�3 Globalisation and scale of fisheries management
The wider economic, political and socio-cultural trend of globalisation has 
specific meaning for the fisheries sector. Simultaneously, the world fish mar-
ket has become integrated and the production chain has been globalised. 
The traditional Dutch fish markets for sole and plaice find stiff competition 
from alternative products such as tilapia and pangasius, resulting in the fact 
that scarcity of North Sea fish produce is not quite reflected in producer pri-
ces. On the other hand, processing activities such as filleting are easily out-
sourced to for example China (fish) or to Morocco (shrimp). Following Thorpe 
and Bennett (2001), next to the globalisation of production (e.g. Dutch traw-
lers operating worldwide from the North East Atlantic, North Sea, Celtic sea 
area to the waters of Western Africa and South America) and trade in capture 
fisheries, there is also the globalisation of regulation. The globalisation of 
regulatory control has resulted in a burgeoning body of rules and guidelines 
affecting the fisheries at all governing levels creating complicated – and often 
confusing – regulatory patterns. All these forms of globalisation contribute in 
different ways to the complexity of fisheries and their governance. 
A consequence for fisheries management is that the dimension of scale has 
to be considered. This becomes very clear in current developments within the 
EU fisheries management. The exclusive competence of the EU in fisheries 
management, together with the Member States as implementers of policy, 
is already questioned by the general discussion on regionalisation of marine 
policy. Although not foreseen in the EU treaty, in EU marine management the 
regional level seems to be the most appropriate level at which to organise 
marine policy development and implementation. The triplet Member State, 
regional seas, EU needs to be redefined in terms of partisanship and compe-
tence. For instance, the implementation of EU environmental directives, such 
as the Bird and Habitat directive, Natura 2000 and the water and marine 
directives show an institutional void; there is no equivalent regional gover-
nance level between the EU level and the Member States. For stakeholders 
the creation of RACs provided a regional level forum, in which the Member 
States are lacking.
Moreover, noting globalisation and the fact that the failure of fisheries ma-
nagement is a world wide phenomenon, in which European fleets are actors at 
a global scale, fisheries management needs to be addressed also in a global 
institutional setting. The Johannesburg summit, in which the EU agreed to a 
fisheries management target (to have stocks at Maximum Sustainable Level 
by 2015), forms an example of such a development. But it can only be seen 
as the start of global fisheries management.
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Embedding the European fisheries system in a global institutional framework 
further entrenches the national fisheries management systems in a nested lo-
cal, national, regional, international, supranational setting. Of course, this will 
affect new arrangements of policy formulation and implementation, much be-
yond the four case studies I have reported upon in this thesis. Displacement 
of fishing capacity does not tally with a global strive for ecosystem conserva-
tion. Local effects of either economic exploitation or ecological conservation 
will have to be viewed on a more wider global scale. Production, market or-
ganisation, conservation and sustainable development, but also participation, 
legitimacy and accountability, have to be addressed in an integrated global 
perspective. For Dutch fishers and Dutch fisheries policy makers and ma-
nagers this implies that the arena – that already had to be opened up to ac-
commodate more local and regional stakeholders and competing uses of the 
marine environment – has to be further opened and redefined to put policy in 
the more global perspective. This brings to bear the question at which level 
(international, national, regional, local) decisions should be taken and policies 
should be implemented and who decides at which level to decide? 
6�4�4 The role of science in fisheries management
For quite some time science, scientific information and scientist played a key 
role in fisheries management, not unlike the situation in many of the envi-
ronmental and natural resource controversies. Because the “expropriation of 
the senses” (Beck, 1986) has always been more dominant in fisheries gover-
nance compared to for instance forest or environmental governance, fisheries 
governance depended even stronger on science than the other two. However, 
the change in governance setting of fisheries management (especially the 
increased participation, the diversification of resource users) will affect the 
role of science and scientific support in fisheries policy development and im-
plementation radically. For one, as the actors in policy formulation change, 
advice needs to be rendered not just to governmental agencies but to an 
appropriate institution that includes wider constituencies. This development 
is already illustrated by the frequent Regional Advisory Council requests for 
scientific advice. Secondly, as the core fabric of fisheries policy changes, 
from top down, sectoral legislation and enforcement towards integrated co-
management, licence to produce and results-based management, a different 
kind of scientific evidence is needed. Hence a change from a rather linear 
decision-making process (Lane and Stephenson, 2000) in which science, in-
dustry, Ministers and managers each contribute in an independent fashion 
to the final decision, its implementation, and its consequences, towards an 
institutional setting accounting for the integrated complexity of fisheries 
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management involving a wide array of concerns, issues and subjects. Ad-
dressing these in a coherent manner requires knowledge of the biological, 
economic, social and cultural aspects of fisheries. Many academic disciplines 
have therefore been attracted to fisheries management, each with a focus on 
issues and implications relating to their specific area of expertise (Degnbol 
et al., 2006). In order to fit the modern world of fisheries management there 
is a need for the development of much more interdisciplinary and integrated 
science. Thirdly, science, scientists and scientific information are increasingly 
becoming part of controversies and policies in fisheries management, and will 
not succeed to remain the kind of objective outside institutions that only pro-
vide disinterested information. In other words, science will lose its undisputed 
authority. Scientific information will no longer be take for granted because it 
is provided by scientists or scientific institutions. Hence, new forms of autho-
rity for ‘scientific’ information need to be developed, and the answers might 
very well lie in a much more participatory science, a ‘citizens science’, where 
the involvement of stakeholders in scientific investigations are fundamental 
for the authoritative power of such investigations and information.
This can also be formulated in a different way. Most dissertations end with 
a call that “more research is required” and that is of course also valid for fis-
heries management. But within fisheries management it is as much true that 
not only more but also that another kind of research is required for developing 
an adequate future fisheries governance.
As fisheries governance is changing, science, the role of science and the role 
of scientists has to equally be changed. From scientific advice supporting (go-
vernment) policy development, which is academic, investigator-initiated and 
discipline-based, towards co-working with a wider group of stakeholders who, 
in differing constellations of actors, seek to reach agreement and legitimacy 
on measures to be undertaken in highly complex and uncertain situations. 
This calls for interdisciplinary and participatory science. This calls for an ope-
ning up of the scientific process, becoming more transparent and involving 
stakeholders in the process. And this requires a reflexive science community 
researching its own role and position within the complexity of fisheries gover-
nance.
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Annex I: Material used in this thesis
In this annex I present studies implemented by the author in the period 2000-
2009 of which the results have been used and re-analysed in this study. 
 ▪  In the period 2000-2002 at LEI (the Agricultural Economics Research In-
stitute of Wageningen UR) studies were conducted into fishing capacity 
(Data Envelopment Analysis) and linking the economic and ecological ana-
lysis of fisheries. Among others focus has been on technological develop-
ments and capacity issues in the Dutch fisheries. 
 ▪  The international implemented EU RESPONSIBLE project (2002-2005) 
was a study undertaken in Norway, Denmark, Shetland, Netherlands, 
France and Spain in the way responsibilities were shared between govern-
ment and the fisheries sector. This e.g. analysed forms of co-management 
such as in the Netherlands and the Prudhomies in France and Confradias 
in Spain.
 ▪  Since 2002 a number of studies and reports into the functioning of ITQ 
systems have been undertaken. Comparisons with the systems of Iceland, 
New Zealand, the Netherlands and the UK have been undertaken next to 
analysing possibilities of the introduction of an EU wide system of ITQs.
 ▪  Since the 2000s regularly discussions have been held with the fishing sec-
tor, fishing organisations, NGOs and fisheries managers on the economic 
impact of fisheries policy. In particular this has included studies into the 
structure and role of the Dutch Cockle fisheries, valuing the Cockle fis-
heries and advising on possibilities for a more sustainable Cockle fisheries; 
the effect of the introduction of the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield 
as target for fisheries management and the analysis of the costs of moving 
towards a more sustainable form of fisheries in the Netherlands.
 ▪  The importance of the Dutch coastal zone and the role of fisheries has 
been analysed in several studies among which the development of an in-
tegrated cost-benefit analysis methodology applicable to multi-functional 
marine use in the North Sea and coastal zone; for the implementation of 
the EU Water Directive an analysis has been made of Dutch fisheries in 
the river basins (as defined under the Water Directive); the impact on 
fisheries of the introduction of constructions at sea and the analysis of 
a regional strategy for the development of the fish processing and trade 
chain.
 ▪  The Self regulation of the Dutch shrimp industry and the conflict with the 
anti-trust law has been studied since its start in the early 2000s up to to-
day. 
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 ▪  At several instances discussions have been held with fisheries managers, 
sector representatives, policy makers and NGOs on ways to set up a fis-
heries management system which takes ecological and socio-economic 
perspectives into consideration addressing issues such as participation, 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy. 
 ▪  Studying the saline fringe (the coastal border) focused on possibilities 
of participatory plan development trying to overcome user conflicts. This 
resulted in a methodology used in the north western parts of the Nether-
lands to study the potential impact of climate change and sea water rise 
and land use planning. In addition a study was conducted into the potential 
of saline production in the coastal zone: alternative agricultural use of sa-
line cultures.
 ▪  Since 2006 the author has been involved in studies and methodology de-
velopment on gathering social data from fishing communities and integra-
ting these data in wider ecological and economic support to policy deve-
lopment. This led to the development of a framework for the assessment 
of social impacts of fisheries management plans. 
 ▪  The FEUFAR project, implemented between 2006 and 2008 focused on 
the development of a future research agenda for the EU in the fields of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture. The project was implemented as a step wise 
scenario building process with involvement of stakeholders from govern-
ment, industry and NGO communities in every step of the process. 
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Abstract
Fisheries management World wide is facing multiple crises. In ecological 
terms, as some stocks are not in good shape despite management effort; in 
economic terms as a large part of the fleets are not profitable and in social 
terms as fishing communities are, as a result of diminishing fishing activities, 
losing identity and losing legitimacy as public criticism on fisheries practices 
is increasing. Moreover, one could say that there is a managerial crisis in 
fisheries management as it fails to reach its goals and lacks legitimacy and 
accountability.
This thesis uses a governance perspective to analyse these crises in fisheries 
management. It looks at how the crisis in fisheries management emerged, 
how it is dealt with by the introduction of new innovative management initi-
atives and institutional arrangements and how these new institutional arran-
gements relate to the current debate on the future of fisheries governance.
In order to analyse innovations in fisheries management, the Netherlands 
presents a useful case. Over the past decades an array of innovations (ITQs: 
Individual Transferable Quota; a system of co-management and in recent 
years the introduction of covenants between state, industry and Environ-
mental NGOs) have been introduced in Dutch fisheries management. Within 
Europe the Dutch fisheries management system has since the 1990s been 
regarded as a best-practice model. In addition, the Dutch fleet is one of the 
main players in the North sea. From a global perspective the North Sea is one 
of the areas were human impact is highest.   
In addition we will look at innovations in the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) such as the introduction of Regional Advisory Councils and the intro-
duction of specific marine environmental legislation, such as the Marine Stra-
tegy Framework Directive, and the initiative of the Maritime Policy to seek 
integration over activities and actors in the marine environment. 
In order to analyse these innovations in fisheries management I have looked 
at the fisheries governance and the (changing) role of state, market and soci-
ety. The most prominent factor to look at is how participation of the different 
actors in the policy process is changing. This is related to which actors can 
participate in the policy process and to what extent these actors can partici-
pate. Part of analysing (new) institutional arrangements will be looking at the 
outcome of the process: does the (new) arrangement reach its objectives? 
Next to the direct output of a policy and for example rule compliance this can 
also relate to aspects of legitimacy and accountability.
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The central questions in this research are the following: noting the steering 
deficit in past fisheries management, which new institutional arrangements 
have been developed to cope with the deficit in fisheries management, how 
and why did these new arrangements emerge, what have been the results and 
how do these new institutional arrangements relate to the current debate on 
a sustainable future fisheries governance? Centre of attention is the develop-
ment of fisheries governance in the Netherlands since the introduction of the 
EU Common Fisheries Policy in 1983, in particular on the institutions in Dutch 
fisheries management, and how these institutions developed over the past 
decades as examples of new policy arrangements and the change of a former 
neo-corporatist system. The data for the analysis were obtained through ex-
tensive observations and interviews with the major players from the fishing 
communities, fisheries organisations, fishers, RAC members, Dutch and EU 
policy makers and the NGO community. 
The introduction of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs) in the Netherlands 
occurred in the early 1990s. In 1975, Total Allowable Catches (TACs) were 
introduced in the North Atlantic, and hence the North Sea, for several species 
of fish. Dutch government responded by setting up a system of non tradable 
Individual Quota (IQ) for the fishermen. In a reaction to the growing informal 
trade of these IQs over time,  the Ministry responsible for Fisheries officially 
allowed the trade of IQs hence creating ITQs in 1985. 
With the introduction of ITQs a management instrument was introduced which 
simultaneously functioned as an environmental instrument (limiting catches), 
and as an economic instrument (seeking optimal allocation of fishing capacity 
over fishing opportunities). From the perspective of the individual fisher the 
introduction of the ITQ system resulted in individual quota holdings being 
brought in line with the fishing capacity of the vessel and provided a right that 
can be exerted and defended and can be used as a collateral. As fishermen 
manage their quota uptake in groups the Dutch system is a mix of individual 
and collective management of catch rights. 
As a result of the introduction of the ITQ system (embedded in the co-ma-
nagement system which was introduced during the same period) the number 
of vessels and fishing pressure was reduced and compliance with catch res-
trictions increased. The ecological objective of reduction of fishing pressure 
and fishing within set TAC levels was obtained. Most likely because the ITQs 
were managed in fishers’ groups, accumulation of quota and communities 
losing catch rights had been very limited.  However the ITQ system has not 
resulted in a long term economic healthy cutter fleet. 
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The introduction of the ITQs had an effect on fisheries management as the 
allocation of catch rights became subject to market forces where earlier go-
vernment had allocated the rights. The industry participates in the system 
by exerting its market force; the Dutch ITQ system created private rights to 
access to fish and a market for these access rights where one did not exist 
before.
The second case, the introduction of the co-management system, can be per-
ceived as an attempt by the Dutch government to increase the legitimacy of 
the management system and compliance by devolving management respon-
sibility to the sector through the establishment of partnerships. By the end 
of the 1980’s a growing political concern about the non-compliance with the 
quota regulations, introduced in the mid 1970s, evolved. Until the late 1980s 
fishermen were able to dodge regulations due to  a weak monitoring and 
enforcement policy; low fines for violations; and logistical and administrative 
help from the auctions. In order to regain legitimacy of the fisheries policy, ne-
gotiations between the fishers and fisheries managers on the establishment 
of co-management groups were devised. The aim of the management groups 
was twofold: first, to arrive at an effective and efficient system of quota com-
pliance that would be supported by the fishers; secondly, to improve econo-
mic performance within the quota restrictions. 
The introduction of the Dutch co-management system clearly played a role 
in increasing compliance with the quota management system. By inclusion of 
the fishers into the management system and founding the system on social 
control and peer pressure, the legitimacy of the system is increased. Also a 
shift is noticed in the drivers for compliance, from compliance as an economic 
calculation of gains and sanctions towards a more normative approach emp-
hasising the social normative values of the fishers. 
The introduction of the co-management system in the Netherlands has 
brought about a change in the basic governance fabric of fisheries manage-
ment by devolving part of management responsibilities from government to 
user-groups. However the core of the system is not a joint management of 
fish stocks but a decentralised effort of monitoring quota uptake and kee-
ping landings in line with set Total Allowable Catch (TAC): a situation of co-
enforcement.
The use of covenants presents case 3. This, like the co-management sys-
tem, centres on a system of devolved management. But where co-manage-
ment is founded on cooperation between state and the industry in managing 
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a fisheries, covenants usually are based on a specific voluntary agreement 
between two or three of the actors of state, market and civic society (NGOs). 
Covenants are frequently used to obtain environmental objectives, especially 
when government policy fails to obtain results. Also covenants are applied 
as instrument in a pacification attempt of government and effort to mobilise 
support for policy. 
In the Netherlands we have seen the emergence of three covenants. The 
first, the management of engine capacity, in fact is an extension of the co-
management system. Despite engine capacity regulations, a seal plan (in 
which engines were sealed at a certain capacity) and increased inspections 
during the 1990 and early 2000s, government did not manage to enforce the 
engine capacity rules and increase compliance. A working group was establis-
hed which designed a private arrangement consisting of a framework of pri-
vate inspections and sanctions to which the sector signed up. The agreement 
played a role in opening up a dead lock situation in which individuals are only 
inclined to change conduct when free rider behaviour is no longer tolerated. 
The groups manage their engine capacity, while government has the final 
responsibility for compliance. 
In 2006 a Task Force Sustainable North Sea fisheries, established by the Mi-
nistry, consisting of representatives of the Ministry, the Fish Produce Board, 
fisheries sector and market organisations, Environmental NGOs, research 
institutions and fuelled by direct input from fishermen through a series of dis-
cussions, produced a report pinpointing the major challenges to reach sustai-
nable fisheries on the North Sea. An important motive for the establishment 
of this task force was the rapid increase in oil price. This  seriously affected 
the viability of the fleet, which was already confronted with diminishing catch 
opportunities for a prolonged period of time. A covenant  was signed in June 
2008 (the North Sea Covenant) between the Ministry, two Environmental 
NGOs, the Fish Produce Board and the 5 Fisheries Producers’ Organisati-
ons to facilitate the required transition process towards sustainable fisheries. 
Whereas the engine capacity agreement is a bilateral state-industry agree-
ment, the North Sea Covenant is a tripartite arrangement between state, 
industry and ENGOs. It aims at a policy to obtain a viable and sustainable 
fisheries sector within the boundaries of a healthy ecosystem, bringing en-
vironmental concerns and economic concerns together in an implementation 
plan. By entering the agreement the sector gains time, political support and 
resources to embark on a transition process towards more sustainable opera-
tions. From a societal perspective the covenant brings ENGOs and industry 
together to discuss environmental concerns and reach agreement on a pro-
Addendum
167
cess of change towards more sustainable fisheries. For the state the cove-
nant creates leeway for industry to become sustainable in an environmental 
and economic sense, yet simultaneously creates a sense of urgency to make 
this transition. 
The mussel covenant was a tool to open up a dead lock situation in which 
a transition towards sustainable production was hindered by the stalemate 
caused by the ‘War on the Wadden Sea” between the industry and ENGOs. 
The annual permit given to mussel fishers’ allowing them to fish for mussel 
seed in the Wadden Sea (A protected area) was every year challenged in 
court by the ENGOs. The judicial procedures frustrated further development 
and threatened the viability of the mussel sector. Government took a leading 
role in resolving this deadlock situation by orchestrating the coming about 
of a covenant between sector and ENGOs. The conservationists promised 
not to start any judicial procedure provided the mussel sector would do eve-
rything in its power to convert seed fishing and mussel cultivation into an 
environmental-friendly industry by 2020. The mussel covenant is the most 
clear example of using the instrument for conflict regulation. 
So far, the engine capacity covenant is perceived to be successful with no 
infringements and vessels having adjusted engine capacity. The North Sea 
covenant has facilitated a process of transition and an array of initiatives 
e.g. under the Fisheries Innovation Platform (subsidies for development of 
new fishing technology (pulse trawl, reduction of fuel consumption), impro-
ved marketing initiatives and sharing of knowledge among fishers) have been 
launched to support this process. The mussel covenant is put under pressure 
from parties not being signatory by contesting the agreement in court.
In all cases we see a repositioning of the state in relation to the actors from 
industry and society. The covenants are a manifestation of government ne-
gotiating fisheries policy in order to obtain a more sustainable use of marine 
resources. The degree of self-management differs between the three cove-
nants. In the North Sea covenant, the parties have quite some opportunity to 
(re)define policy goals, whereas under the engine capacity the policy objecti-
ves are not renegotiated at all; in the end the industry will comply with prior 
existing regulation. 
Finally, case 4 looks at the development over the past decade of new EU 
marine policies such as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the 
Maritime Policy. Both policies aim at governing the marine environment, yet 
the two policies have a differing signature in policy formulation and imple-
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mentation. From a fisher’s perspective these policies present a change in in-
stitutional setting in terms of integration as well as participation. Major policy 
measures no longer descend from the EU Common Fisheries Policy alone, 
but increasingly are derived from general environmental policy developments. 
In a governance era contrasting policies can be developed simultaneously. 
The Maritime Policy is a novel, participatory and integrative arrangement. 
The Marine Strategic Framework Directive developed more or less in the 
same period, has a more classical etatist command and control arrangement. 
The position of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in a new marine policy ar-
rangement is changing. The introduction of the EU Community Fisheries Con-
trol Agency, a top down government type solution, existing side by side with 
the Dutch state-market partnership, illustrates the possible co-existence of 
different policy arrangements. The EU Community Fisheries Control Agency 
can play a role in establishing participatory management arrangements at a 
wider EU scale by providing an enabling environment in which such sub-nati-
onal and national arrangements can be developed. On the other hand it can 
play a role by taking up the role of enforcement agent at a distance, sharing 
this role with the national enforcement agencies. 
From the case studies we see that the common denominator in the new in-
stitutional arrangements is an increase in participation of stakeholders in the 
policy process. In addition at the EU level the integration over activities and 
stakeholders is a main trend. Hence government responds to a crisis in fis-
heries management by searching for and allowing more participation. But this 
participation has at least two different objectives: to improve the implemen-
tation of environmental policy and, with participation beyond fishermen, to 
increase legitimacy and support of fishery policy. 
The traditional neo-corporatist arrangement in which fisheries policy was de-
veloped and implemented originally changed dramatically as the rank and 
file of the fisheries organisations did not comply with the management rules 
agreed between their representative elite and government. The privileged re-
lation between government and sector was further challenged by other ac-
tors (ENGOs) that also claimed a stake in particular in the environmental 
concerns of fisheries management. When the closed neo-corporatist relation 
between fisheries representatives and government was no longer capable 
of devising a policy supported by the industry, new ways of cooperation and 
legitimacy had to be invented.
With increased involvement of stakeholders in fisheries management the le-
gitimacy and accountability of actors in the arrangement also changes. The 
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traditional right to fish, granted by government to the industry, is replaced by 
a ‘licence to produce’ that the fishing sector has to obtain in negotiation with 
state and ENGOs. This affects the accountability in the arrangement and on 
the ‘burden of proof’ by shifting responsibility from government and society 
showing harmful impact, towards the industry having to show sustainable re-
source use. Also the forum at which to be accountable to shifts, from fishers 
being accountable to government (compliance with the rules) and govern-
ment being accountable to society, towards a situation in which the fishers 
are directly accountable to the parties involved in the agreement (covenant).
The solutions chosen in the Netherlands are not specifically Dutch. As one 
of the main failures of contemporary fishers management, in particular in 
the EU, is perceived to be lack of participation, the Dutch solutions could 
be examples applicable to other countries as well. However, in doing so one 
should render count of the specific national, regional and local settings, po-
litical and institutional traditions in which fisheries management takes place.
Marine policy becomes less sectoral and more integrated over sectors and 
activities changing the constituency of (fisheries) policy including an incre-
ased number of stakeholders. In taken these new developments and per-
spectives into account the new institutional arrangements introduced in the 
Netherlands were mostly answers to the fisheries management problems of 
the past. They were hardly designed to address the new challenges and ma-
nagement demands that are now starting to shape the policy agenda of the 
future common marine policy. 
There are three  main areas to address in a future fisheries governance. One 
will be answering the questions of organising participation: who can partici-
pate, who makes the rules and who decides. The second area is that of glo-
balisation, in terms of fishing, processing and trade and regulation. Thirdly, as 
fisheries governance is changing, the role of science and the role of scientists 
has to equally be changed from scientific advise supporting (government) 
policy development towards co-working with a wider group of stakeholders. 
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Samenvatting
Wereldwijd wordt visserijmanagement geconfronteerd met verschillende cri-
ses. Een ecologische crisis, omdat vissoorten worden bedreigd; een econo-
mische crisis, omdat grote delen van de vloot verlies maken, en een maat-
schappelijk crisis omdat als gevolg van een afname van visserijactiviteiten 
visserijgemeenschappen hun identiteit verliezen en, door toenemende maat-
schappelijke kritiek, de visserijsector haar legitimiteit verliest. In feite is er 
sprake van een visserijmanagementcrisis omdat visserijmanagement er niet 
in slaagt de gestelde doelen te bereiken, er onvoldoende verantwoordelijk-
heid voor wordt genomen en lijdt aan een gebrek aan legitimiteit. 
Om deze visserijmanagement crisis te analyseren gebruik ik in dit proefschrift 
het ‘governance16’ perspectief. We kijken hoe de crisis in visserijmanagement 
is ontstaan, hoe er geprobeerd wordt deze crisis af te wenden door innovatie-
ve management initiatieven te ontwikkelen en institutionele arrangementen 
te introduceren, en hoe deze innovatieve arrangementen bijdragen aan het 
huidige debat over de toekomt van visserij-governance.
De Nederlandse situatie is zeer geschikt om innovaties in visserijmanage-
ment te analyseren. De afgelopen dertig jaar kenmerkt het Nederlands visse-
rijbeheer zich door verschillende innovaties, zoals ITQs (Individuele Verhan-
delbare Visrechten), een co-management systeem, en, van meer recentere 
datum, het gebruik van convenanten tussen de overheid, de visserijsector en 
milieuorganisaties. Sinds 1990 wordt het Nederlandse visserijbeheer in Eu-
ropa beschouwd als een ‘best-practice’ voorbeeld. Tevens is de Nederlandse 
vloot een belangrijke speler op de Noordzee. De Noordzee is op wereldschaal 
één van de gebieden waar het effect van menselijke activiteiten het grootst 
is.
We zullen ook kijken naar innovaties van het EU Gemeenschappelijke Vis-
serijbeleid (GVB) zoals de introductie van Regionale Adviesraden (RACs) en 
de introductie van specifieke marine milieuwetgeving zoals de Kaderrichtlijn 
Marien (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) en het EU geïntegreerde Ma-
ritiem Beleid (Maritime Policy) dat streeft naar integratie van activiteiten en 
actoren in het marine milieu.
16 In deze samenvatting zal ik de Engelse term ‘governance’ gebruiken. De Nederlandse verta-
ling ‘bestuur’ dekt niet de lading van het begrip governance; tevens is het woord governance 
ook in de Nederlandse literatuur ingeburgerd.
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Om deze innovaties van visserijbeheer te analyseren heb ik gekeken naar 
visserij-governance en de (veranderende) rol van de staat, de markt en het 
maatschappelijk middenveld. Centraal daarbij stond de vraag hoe de deel-
name (participatie) van de verschillende actoren in het beleidsproces is ver-
anderd. Nieuwe institutionele arrangementen worden ook bekeken op hun 
resultaat: behaalt het (nieuwe) arrangement de gestelde doelen? Naast het 
directe resultaat van het uitvoeren van beleid, en bijvoorbeeld de mate van 
naleving van de regels, heeft dit ook te maken met de legitimiteit van het be-
leid en het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid voor het beleid. 
De centrale vraag van dit onderzoek is: uitgaande van falende sturing van 
visserijbeheer in het verleden, welke nieuwe institutionele arrangementen 
zijn er ontwikkeld om deze tekortkoming van visserijbeheer aan te pakken, 
hoe en waarom zijn deze nieuwe arrangementen ontstaan, wat zijn de be-
haalde resultaten en hoe verhouden deze innovaties in visserijbeheer zicht 
tot het huidige debat over een toekomstig duurzame visserij-governance? We 
concentreren ons op de ontwikkeling van visserij-governance in Nederland 
sinds de introductie van het EU Gemeenschappelijk Visserijbeleid in 1983. 
Meer specifiek is de analyse gericht op de veranderingen van de Nederlandse 
visserijinstituties als gevolg van het eroderen van het neo-corporatistische 
systeem en de ontwikkeling van nieuwe beleidsarrangementen. De gegevens 
voor dit onderzoek zijn verkregen door uitgebreide observaties en interviews 
met de belangrijkste spelers van de visserijgemeenschappen, visserijorgani-
saties, vissers, leden van de RAC, Nederlandse en Europese beleidsmakers 
en de milieuorganisaties gedurende de periode 2000-2009. 
In 1990 werden in Nederland Individueel verhandelbare Vangstrechten (ITQs) 
geïntroduceerd. Daarvoor waren in 1975 al Total Allowable Catches (TACs), 
maximale vangsthoeveelheden, voor een aantal soorten vis geïntroduceerd in 
de Noord Atlantische Oceaan en dus ook in de Noordzee. De Nederlandse 
overheid vertaalde direct de TACs naar een systeem van niet verhandelbare 
Individuele Vangstrechten (IQ). Door de groeiende informele handel in deze 
IQs besloot de Nederlandse overheid in 1985 de rechten officieel verhandel-
baar te maken en zodoende ITQs te introduceren.
Met de introductie van ITQs werd een beleidsinstrument in het leven geroe-
pen dat zowel fungeerde als milieubeleidsinstrument (beperken van vang-
sten) als een economisch instrument (het realiseren van een optimale alloca-
tie van vangstrechten en visserijcapaciteit). Het ITQ systeem gaf individuele 
vissers de mogelijkheid de individuele vangstrechten aan te passen aan de 
vangstcapaciteit van het schip. De vangstrechten kunnen worden opgeëist en 
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worden verdedigd en kunnen als onderpand worden gebruikt. Omdat vissers 
hun individuele quota in groepen beheren  is het Nederlandse ITQ systeem 
een mix van individueel en collectief beheer van vangstrechten.
Als een gevolg van het introduceren van het ITQ system (dat ingebed werd in 
een system van co-management) nam het aantal schepen in de Nederlandse 
vloot af, en daarmee dus de visserijdruk. Tevens nam de naleving van de regel-
geving toe, waarmee het ecologisch doel van verminderde visserijdruk en vis-
sen binnen de TAC limieten werd bereikt. Waarschijnlijk door het beheer van 
quota in groepen is er geen vergaande concentratie van vangstrechten opge-
treden en hebben visserijgemeenschappen niet in grote mate vangstrechten 
verloren. Het ITQ systeem heeft echter niet geresulteerd in een vloot die op 
de lange termijn economisch rendabel opereert. 
Het introduceren van ITQs verandert de structuur van het visserijbeheer. 
Voorheen verdeelde de overheid de vangstrechten, in het system van ITQs 
wordt deze allocatie overgedragen aan de markt. De visserijsector partici-
peert in dit system door op de markt te opereren. Het Nederlandse systeem 
van ITQs creëerde private toegangsrechten tot vis en een markt voor deze 
rechten waar er voorheen geen bestond. 
Het tweede voorbeeld, de introductie van een system van co-management, 
kan gezien worden als een poging van de Nederlandse overheid om de legi-
timiteit en naleving van de regels van het beheersysteem te vergroten door 
managementverantwoordelijkheid te delegeren aan de visserijsector. Tegen 
het eind van de jaren ‘80 van de vorige eeuw groeide de politieke bezorgd-
heid over het niet naleven van de quotaregulering. Vissers konden de regels 
ontduiken als gevolg van een zwakke inspectie en handhaving van het beleid, 
lage boetes, en logistieke en administratieve hulp van de visafslagen. Om de 
legitimiteit van het beheersysteem te herstellen ging de overheid in onder-
handeling met de vissers over de mogelijkheid van co-management. Het doel 
van deze managementgroepen was tweeledig: het opzetten van een efficiënt 
en effectief system van quotabeheer ondersteund door de vissers, en het 
verbeteren van de economische resultaten van de visserij binnen de geldende 
quotalimieten. 
Het introduceren van het co-management system speelde een duidelijke rol 
bij het verbeteren van de naleving van het quotamanagement. De legitimiteit 
van het beheer werd vergroot door de vissers deel te laten uitmaken van het 
systeem en door naleving af te dwingen via sociale controle. De afweging tus-
sen naleving en overtreding verschoof van een economische afweging tussen 
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verwachtte winsten en mogelijke sancties naar een meer normatieve bena-
dering waarin de sociale waarden en normen van de vissers centraal staan. 
De introductie van co-management heeft het fundament van visserijbeheer 
in Nederland veranderd door managementverantwoordelijkheid te delegeren 
naar de vissers. Maar concreet is het Nederlandse co-management systeem 
niet een gemeenschappelijk beheer van visbestanden tussen overheid en 
sector maar een gedecentraliseerd quotumbeheer en een management van 
aanlandingen binnen de Total Allowable Catch. Het betreft hier met andere 
woorden een situatie van gezamenlijke handhaving.
Het gebruik van convenanten in het Nederlandse visserijbeleid is de derde 
case die ik heb onderzocht. Net zoals co-management is een convenant een 
instrument gebaseerd op gedelegeerd beheer. Maar waar co-management 
is gebaseerd op de samenwerking tussen de overheid en de industrie zijn 
convenanten meestal gebaseerd op een specifieke vrijwillige overeenkomst 
tussen overheden, maatschappelijke partijen en marktpartijen. Convenanten 
worden om verschillende redenen gebruikt. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer het over-
heden niet lukt de beleidsdoelstellingen te behalen, of om conflictsituaties te 
pacificeren en om steun voor beleid te genereren. 
In de Nederlandse visserijsector zijn in de afgelopen periode 3 verschillende 
convenanten ontwikkeld. De eerste, het beheer van motorvermogen, is in 
feite een uitbreiding van het eerder opgezette co-management systeem. On-
danks het bestaan van een motorvermogenregulering, een zegelplan (waar-
bij motoren op een bepaald vermogen werden verzegeld) en toenemende 
controles bleek de overheid niet in staat om de motorvermogenregulering 
te handhaven. Een werkgroep werd opgericht met als opdracht een privaat 
arrangement van controles en sancties te ontwikkelen. Het convenant, dat 
door de visserijsector werd ondertekend, maakte een einde aan de impasse 
waarin individuele vissers pas geneigd zijn hun gedrag te veranderen als het 
niet nalaven van de regels door anderen niet langer wordt getolereerd. De co-
management groepen beheren het motorvermogen; de overheid heeft eind-
verantwoordelijkheid voor de naleving van de regels. 
In 2006 werd de ‘Task Force Duurzame Noordzeevisserij’, bestaande uit ver-
tegenwoordigers van het Productschap Vis, de visserijsector, milieuorgani-
saties en onderzoeksinstituten, door het Ministerie opgezet. Op basis van 
input van de vissers werden de voornaamste uitdagingen die er lagen om tot 
een duurzame Noordzeevisserij te komen vastgelegd. Een belangrijke reden 
om deze werkgroep in te stellen was de snel stijgende olieprijs die een grote 
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bedreiging vormde voor de levensvatbaarheid van een visserij die al voor lan-
gere tijd met verminderde vangstmogelijkheden werd geconfronteerd. In juni 
2008 werd het Noordzeeconvenant getekend tussen de Minister, twee milieu-
organisaties, het Productschap Vis en 5 Visserij Producentorganisaties. Waar 
het motorvermogenconvenant een overeenkomst is tussen de overheid en de 
sector is het Noordzeeconvenant een tripartiete arrangement tussen over-
heid, sector en milieuorganisaties. Het convenant poogt een levensvatbare en 
duurzame visserijsector te bewerkstelligen binnen een gezond ecosysteem, 
door economisch en ecologische belangen in een actieplan bijeen te bren-
gen. Door het convenant te ondertekenen krijgt de sector tijd, politieke steun 
en middelen om dit transitieproces aan te gaan. Vanuit een maatschappelijk 
perspectief brengt het convenant de milieuorganisaties en vissers bijeen om 
milieubelangen te bediscussiëren en zo tot een meer duurzame visserijprak-
tijk te komen. Met het convenant legt de overheid de verantwoordelijkheid bij 
de sector om economisch en ecologisch duurzamer te worden. Het convenant 
creëert voor de sector de ruimte voor deze ontwikkeling maar houdt tegelij-
kertijd ook de druk op de sector om de benodigde veranderingen daadwerke-
lijk te realiseren.
Het mosselconvenant was een geschikt instrument om de impasse op de 
Wadden Zee te doorbreken. Doordat milieuorganisaties de jaarlijkse vergun-
ning voor de mosselzaadvisserij bij de rechter aanvochten, was er een pat-
stelling tussen milieuorganisaties en vissers ontstaan, die een transitie naar 
een duurzame mosselvisserij in de weg stond. De overheid nam het voortouw 
om deze impasse te doorbreken door de partijen bij elkaar te brengen om een 
convenant op te stellen. De milieuorganisaties zegden toe geen juridische 
procedures meer te starten en de mosselsector zegde toe al het mogelijke te 
doen een duurzame zaadvisserij te realiseren in 2020. Het mosselconvenant 
is een duidelijk voorbeeld van hoe dit instrument kan worden ingezet om con-
flict te pacificeren.
Het motorvermogenconvenant wordt tot nu toe als succesvol beschouwd; 
schepen hebben hun motorvermogen aangepast en er zijn geen overtredin-
gen geconstateerd. Het Noordzeeconvenant heeft geresulteerd in een proces 
van verandering met een reeks aan initiatieven onder auspiciën van het Vis-
serijinnovatie Platform (VIP), zoals subsidie voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
technologie (pulstrawl, reductie brandstofgebruik), het verbeteren van de 
marketing en het delen van kennis tussen vissers in zogenaamde Kenniskrin-
gen. Het mosselconvenant staat onder druk omdat één van de partijen die het 
convenant niet heeft ondertekend alsnog een juridische procedure is begon-
nen tegen de mosselzaadvisserij. 
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In alle genoemde voorbeelden zien we dat de rol van de overheid verandert 
ten opzichte van de industrie en maatschappelijke partijen. De convenanten 
zijn een voorbeeld van hoe de overheid afspraken maakt met de sector ten-
einde een meer duurzaam gebruik van de zee te bewerkstelligen. De mate van 
zelfmanagement verschilt tussen de drie convenanten. In het Noordzeecon-
venant hebben de partijen tamelijk wat ruimte om beleidsdoelstellingen te 
(her)formuleren, terwijl bij het motorvermogenconvenant die doelstellingen 
niet ter discussie staan: uiteindelijk zal de sector moeten voldoen aan be-
staande regelgeving. 
De laatste case betreft de ontwikkeling van nieuw EU maritiem beleid zoals 
de Kaderrichtlijn Marien (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) en het Ma-
ritiem Beleid (Maritime Policy). Beide richten zich op het beheer van het ma-
rine milieu, maar hebben een totaal verschillende signatuur in beleidsformu-
lering en -uitvoering. Vanuit het perspectief van vissers vertegenwoordigen 
deze twee nieuwe EU beleidsinitiatieven een verandering in de institutionele 
ordening van visserijbeleid in termen van participatie en integratie. Belang-
rijke visserijwetgeving wordt niet langer alleen bepaald door het Gemeen-
schappelijk Visserijbeleid (GVB) maar in toenemende mate ook door andere 
beleidsterreinen, zoals milieu, of vanuit de wens sectorale maritieme activi-
teiten te integreren. 
In het tijdperk van governance kunnen contrasterende beleidsvormen tegelij-
kertijd worden ontwikkeld. Het Maritiem Beleid is een innovatief, participatief 
en integratief beleidsarrangement. De Kaderrichtlijn Marien, ontwikkeld in 
ongeveer dezelfde periode, heeft een meer klassieke etatistische ‘command 
and control’ signatuur. De positie van het GVB in een nieuw marine beleidar-
rangement is aan verandering onderhevig. En het EU Community Fisheries 
Control Agency, een traditionele inspectie instantie, bestaat naast het Neder-
landse participatieve co-management arrangement. 
De nieuwe beleidsarrangementen illustreren de toenemende participatie van 
belanghebbenden in het beleidsproces. Daarnaast is op EU niveau een be-
langrijke trend de integratie van sectoren, activiteiten en belanghebbenden. 
Met andere woorden, overheden reageren op de crises in het visserijbeheer 
door te zoeken naar meer en andere vormen van participatie. Door toene-
mende participatie van zowel de visserijsector als de milieuorganisaties wordt 
de legitimiteit van het visserijbeleid vergroot.
Het traditionele neo-corporatistische visserijarrangement veranderde ingrij-
pend toen de overeenkomsten gesloten tussen de visserijelite en de overheid 
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niet meer op steun van de achterban konden rekenen. De speciale band tus-
sen sector en overheid werd verder onder druk gezet door de milieuorganisa-
ties die ook een belang en rol in visserijbeheer claimden. Op het moment dat 
het neo-corporatistische arrangement tussen visserijvertegenwoordigers en 
overheid niet langer in staat bleek een gezamenlijk gedragen beleid te gene-
reren moesten er nieuwe wegen voor samenwerking en nieuwe vormen van 
legitimiteit worden gezocht.
Met een toenemende betrokkenheid van belanghebbenden in visserijbeheer 
verandert de legitimiteit en de verantwoordelijkheid van de actoren in het 
arrangement. Het traditionele recht om te vissen, door de overheid aan de 
vissers gegeven, wordt vervangen door een ‘licence to produce’ (een vergun-
ning om te produceren) die de visserijsector moet zien te verkrijgen in onder-
handeling met de overheid en de milieuorganisaties. Dit heeft geleid tot een 
verandering in verantwoordelijkheden en voor de bewijslast. Moesten voor-
heen de overheid en maatschappelijke partijen aantonen dat de visserij scha-
delijk gevolgen had, nu moet de visserijsector aantonen dat haar activiteiten 
duurzaam zijn. Ook het forum aan wie verantwoording moet worden afgelegd 
verandert; van een overheid die verantwoording aflegt aan de maatschappij 
en vissers regels oplegt, naar een situatie waarin de vissers direct verant-
woordelijkheid afleggen aan de andere publieke en private convenantpartijen. 
De Nederlandse oplossingen zijn niet specifiek Nederlands. Omdat in de hele 
EU gebrek aan participatie wordt gezien als één van de voornaamste redenen 
voor een falend visserijbeleid, zouden de Nederlandse oplossingen dan ook 
goed toepasbaar kunnen zijn in andere landen. Hierbij moet wel rekening wor-
den gehouden met het feit dat visserijmanagement in elke situatie, in elk land, 
in een eigen nationale, regionale en lokale politieke en institutionele context 
plaatsvindt en dat de oplossing daar dus bij aan moet sluiten. 
Marien beleid streeft steeds meer naar een integratie van sectoren, acto-
ren en belanghebbenden. Dit streven naar integratie heeft gevolgen voor het 
(visserij)beleid, dat wordt geconfronteerd met een toename van het aantal 
belanghebbenden. Met oog voor deze ontwikkelingen zijn de oplossingen die 
zijn ontstaan in Nederland in feite een antwoord op een probleem uit het 
verleden. Zij zijn namelijk niet toegerust op het geven van een antwoord op 
de uitdagingen die vandaag de dag de beleidsagenda van het toekomstige 
Gemeenschappelijk Visserijbeleid bepalen. 
Er zijn drie hoofdvragen waar het toekomstige visserij-governance zich op 
moet richten. Ten eerste, het beantwoorden van de vragen rondom participa-
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tie: wie mag meedoen, wie maakt de regels en wie bepaalt dat? Ten tweede 
is globalisering voor de visvangst, de verwerking, de handel en voor toekom-
stige regulering, een bepalend onderwerp. Ten derde, met het veranderen 
van visserij-governance zal ook de rol van wetenschap en wetenschappers 
moeten veranderen: van mono-disciplinair, wetenschap gedreven academisch 
advies ter ondersteuning van het ontwikkelen van overheidsbeleid, naar meer 
interdisciplinaire en participatieve advisering in een proces met een grote 
groep van belanghebbenden op zoek naar legitimiteit en support voor be-
leidsmaatregelen in een zeer complexe en ongewisse omgeving. 
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